a b
2012-12-31 00:53:10 UTC
On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 3:17 PM, Alan Forrester
(hence subject line change) onto turf that DD in BoI gets behind more
explicitly, which happens to be in line with what the majority of
scientists in the field also think: that there is or may be a set of
heavily specialized brain regions which solve some other set of
(perhaps as yet not understood) challenges associated with language.
Specialised brain regions for language.
The reason it might be fruitful to switch to this matter, is because
it may be that certain issues that arise directly - perhaps as
corollaries - out of acceptance of such brain regions, that contain
some subset of implications for the subject in hand, that may turn out
to be inescapable. Or that would be the strongest possible
outcome....but anything interesting would possibly be useful to the
current discussion. So in other words, let's explore the "indirect"
route for the starting-out reason Deutsch is explicit in support of
this idea, and so far as I know no one has criticized that support.
OK....so I'll kick off with what a sequence of consequences from that
that are as inescapable as I can think of.
- The original 'challenge' must have been very hard to accomplish in
general brain areas for the selective force to be there sufficiently
to result in a whole set of specialized regions.
- So 'knocking-out' one of these regions would plausibly cause a
deficit that the rest of the brain would not be capable of
compensating for, or would compensate quite badly for (indeed I think
this is consistent with the vast majority of the scientific evidence)
- Which means that small gene mutations affecting regions like this
might also result in large effects that the brain would have trouble
compensating for (there might also be a connection here with Deutsch's
"hard to vary" idea in that more specialized regions are harder to
vary at the genetic level, while delivering the same value in terms of
whatever they do).
- Yet small mutations will occur in specialized regions as often as
anywhere else. Being harder to vary doesn't effect the occurrence of
such events, but only the prospect such events will deliver as good a
'service'. In terms of evolutionary theory, all else being equal
natural selection would certainly kick in against such mutations with
proportionality to the size of the deleterious effect.
- However, natural selection is only relevant if the deleterious
effect reduces probability of surviving long enough to reproduce.
- It is reasonable to assume generally that human society has steadily
allowed the population to acquire mutations with larger and larger
effects that at some benchmark point in pre-history w, ould have been
selected against. In other words, less and less powerful negative
selection as human civilization has advanced.
- At some point therefore, even mutations in these specialized areas
for language, even if they have large effects which disadvantage the
individual considerably, are nevertheless becoming more frequent in
the population.
- So harder-to-very brain regions are acquiring mutations at some
level at or below the fairly well established and constant mutational
rate at the molecular level. With larger and larger effects, so harder
and harder for natural selection to keep up. Also, increasingly no
selective force of positive selection in order to 'correct' such
errors (for the same reason as increasingly no selective force to
breed out such effects).
OK so that's roughly the line of reasoning bringing us to the
following situation.
- Language ability...at the innate level...must vary considerably in
the population.
- Language ability is a major factor in assessing IQ
- Language ability is a major factor in success in society
- Language is a major factor in absorbing existing knowledge (i.e.
from books, talks, etc).
- Absorbing existing knowledge is a major influence on what new
knowledge you are going to create next.
So.....even if we once were universal knowledge creators, we can't
still be. Not in terms of equal ability given the same set of ideas.
We can't be. Not unless you can break down this reasoning.
P.s. please try to avoid 'breaking down' the reasoning by refuting
weak spots caused by shortcomings in how I have used language. In
other words, in the spirit of truth seeking and having a good
discussion, do the following. Read my reasoning, improve it, identify
the key logic that has to be in place for the outcome I am pointing
to. Then criticize THAT.
p.p.s Doing this would be in line with what Popper said to do. He
said, when someone puts forward a conjecture. First improve it. Then
improve it again. Then criticize that. In other words set it into the
strongest form that you can.
Just to add two further implications to thisIn BoI, David explicitly says that mirror neurons don't explain human
imitation. However, there is another problem with the mirror neuron idea.
Neurons, or some set of neurons, can act as a set of universal classical
gates. So mirror neurons (or some subset thereof) play a role in imitation
by virtue of instantiating some algorithm. The explanation of how the
imitation is done is in terms of that algorithm rather than in terms of the
neurons per se. So then calling them mirror neurons is a bit like saying
that a universal computer that happens to be set up to implement a chess
playing algorithm is a chess playing chip when that chip could just as
easily be programmed to do any other classical computation.
This could lead to mistakes. It could be the case that some of the mirror
neurons could be cut out or destroyed without destroying the mirror
functionality. They happen to go off because they're wired up to other
neurons that do the mirror neuron algorithm. Worse, it could be the case
that there are two sets of neurons A and B and you could destroy either one
of them without destroying the mirror functionality but if we destroy both
sets then we destroy the mirror functionality. In the absence of a specific
explanation it's important to think of the mirror functionality as being
software so we don't miss stuff.
Alan
With everyone's consent what I'd like to do is change the subjectimitation. However, there is another problem with the mirror neuron idea.
Neurons, or some set of neurons, can act as a set of universal classical
gates. So mirror neurons (or some subset thereof) play a role in imitation
by virtue of instantiating some algorithm. The explanation of how the
imitation is done is in terms of that algorithm rather than in terms of the
neurons per se. So then calling them mirror neurons is a bit like saying
that a universal computer that happens to be set up to implement a chess
playing algorithm is a chess playing chip when that chip could just as
easily be programmed to do any other classical computation.
This could lead to mistakes. It could be the case that some of the mirror
neurons could be cut out or destroyed without destroying the mirror
functionality. They happen to go off because they're wired up to other
neurons that do the mirror neuron algorithm. Worse, it could be the case
that there are two sets of neurons A and B and you could destroy either one
of them without destroying the mirror functionality but if we destroy both
sets then we destroy the mirror functionality. In the absence of a specific
explanation it's important to think of the mirror functionality as being
software so we don't miss stuff.
Alan
(hence subject line change) onto turf that DD in BoI gets behind more
explicitly, which happens to be in line with what the majority of
scientists in the field also think: that there is or may be a set of
heavily specialized brain regions which solve some other set of
(perhaps as yet not understood) challenges associated with language.
Specialised brain regions for language.
The reason it might be fruitful to switch to this matter, is because
it may be that certain issues that arise directly - perhaps as
corollaries - out of acceptance of such brain regions, that contain
some subset of implications for the subject in hand, that may turn out
to be inescapable. Or that would be the strongest possible
outcome....but anything interesting would possibly be useful to the
current discussion. So in other words, let's explore the "indirect"
route for the starting-out reason Deutsch is explicit in support of
this idea, and so far as I know no one has criticized that support.
OK....so I'll kick off with what a sequence of consequences from that
that are as inescapable as I can think of.
- The original 'challenge' must have been very hard to accomplish in
general brain areas for the selective force to be there sufficiently
to result in a whole set of specialized regions.
- So 'knocking-out' one of these regions would plausibly cause a
deficit that the rest of the brain would not be capable of
compensating for, or would compensate quite badly for (indeed I think
this is consistent with the vast majority of the scientific evidence)
- Which means that small gene mutations affecting regions like this
might also result in large effects that the brain would have trouble
compensating for (there might also be a connection here with Deutsch's
"hard to vary" idea in that more specialized regions are harder to
vary at the genetic level, while delivering the same value in terms of
whatever they do).
- Yet small mutations will occur in specialized regions as often as
anywhere else. Being harder to vary doesn't effect the occurrence of
such events, but only the prospect such events will deliver as good a
'service'. In terms of evolutionary theory, all else being equal
natural selection would certainly kick in against such mutations with
proportionality to the size of the deleterious effect.
- However, natural selection is only relevant if the deleterious
effect reduces probability of surviving long enough to reproduce.
- It is reasonable to assume generally that human society has steadily
allowed the population to acquire mutations with larger and larger
effects that at some benchmark point in pre-history w, ould have been
selected against. In other words, less and less powerful negative
selection as human civilization has advanced.
- At some point therefore, even mutations in these specialized areas
for language, even if they have large effects which disadvantage the
individual considerably, are nevertheless becoming more frequent in
the population.
- So harder-to-very brain regions are acquiring mutations at some
level at or below the fairly well established and constant mutational
rate at the molecular level. With larger and larger effects, so harder
and harder for natural selection to keep up. Also, increasingly no
selective force of positive selection in order to 'correct' such
errors (for the same reason as increasingly no selective force to
breed out such effects).
OK so that's roughly the line of reasoning bringing us to the
following situation.
- Language ability...at the innate level...must vary considerably in
the population.
- Language ability is a major factor in assessing IQ
- Language ability is a major factor in success in society
- Language is a major factor in absorbing existing knowledge (i.e.
from books, talks, etc).
- Absorbing existing knowledge is a major influence on what new
knowledge you are going to create next.
So.....even if we once were universal knowledge creators, we can't
still be. Not in terms of equal ability given the same set of ideas.
We can't be. Not unless you can break down this reasoning.
P.s. please try to avoid 'breaking down' the reasoning by refuting
weak spots caused by shortcomings in how I have used language. In
other words, in the spirit of truth seeking and having a good
discussion, do the following. Read my reasoning, improve it, identify
the key logic that has to be in place for the outcome I am pointing
to. Then criticize THAT.
p.p.s Doing this would be in line with what Popper said to do. He
said, when someone puts forward a conjecture. First improve it. Then
improve it again. Then criticize that. In other words set it into the
strongest form that you can.
- IQ differences are either real, or if they aren't this is because of
shortcomings in the process, not shortcomings in the proposition.
- Secondly....that even if DD is correct (and he seems to be) in the
distinctions he made that set his earlier comments about "solidity"
within the fold of good-philosophy as currently agreed, and so the
criticisms/suggestions put forward by myself and others including
Elliot are wrong on this specific matter. Even if that is the case, it
still seems to be so, that DD is departing from the philosophy at some
as yet not fully identified juncture that is 'local' to, or associated
with, this area in general.
Thus it could be that even if he's not yet nailed it in what he's
saying in the specifics...and so possibly wrong in how he is
characterizing the specifics of his 'change of mind' regarding DD,
Elliot could be right at the more intuitive level, that something
"isn't right" with some directions DD is going down. By "not right" I
don't mean wrong in the objective/real sense, but in the sense of the
philosophy that was previously seen as being fallibly settled,
actually being at odds with avenues DD has since gone down.
The reason I see this as an important possibility that should be
explored is simply that, if they had a good friendship, or good
intellectual relationship, for a considerable period of time. And if
that relationship has become stressed or is at or near breaking point.
And if the key most central reason from Elliot's side of things, is
what he says at the start of his announcement, namely that if people
change their minds about important things, they owe it to.....if not
others then to be in-keeping with the philosophy shared with those
others....to announce it and make clear.
Indeed, to be fair, that conviction pretty much has to be at the
centre of things or if not then very high on the list, since Elliot
himself takes the momentus decision to make this announcement
presumably out of precisely that conviction. Which has to be noted
since almost certainly there is a very significant risk to him of loss
of personal status for having done so. Watever you think of him and
his announcement, and whether or not you think he's right about
Deutsch, whether or not you think he would have been better off
changing his mind about himself than Deutsch, these factors I'm
pointing out still have to be noteworthy. Doing something at risk of
personal sacrifice sits above or outside all these other factors,
allowing them to be abstracted away, at least to the extent of that.
So, where am I going? Well...if this issue of not announcing shifts is
at the core of things, then the significance to this that sits behind
the reasoning and route I have offered that I say have the effect of
throwing some major philosophical principles into question, is not
only that on some level Elliot may not have quite got to yet in the
rational, being able to explain sense, intuitively he may nevertheless
be onto something.
Not only that, but also by the same coin, Deutsch might not have quite
yet worked things through rationally so as to be able to see that
inconsistency with the philosophy. And if that's true, then Elliot can
be reassured of his most central fear/criticism...that Deutsch is
falling short of his obligation to announce major changes of mind,
because Deutsch doesn't yet understand this is the case, and Elliot
needn't see this as a shortcoming since he himself hasn't yet
clarified his intuition on the matter either.
So...this matters if their relationship to eachother matters, because
it is a possibility of some crossed-lines between them, of sufficient
significance that this situation can to a great extent be reversed,
healed, halted, whatever.
So....on the strength of that, do have a go at my reasoning in my
first post, and please do remember to take some time and effort to set
my reasoning into its strongest form. I don't write particularly
clearly or well, and for all you know there's a reasonable explanation
for that involving life-history that does not rule out internally
nevertheless having an insight worth sparing time to improving the
communication of.
Cheers.
- my reasoning (in the first post) derives from something Deutsch does
explicitly endorse in BoI (specialized regions for language).
- But the same basic logic can be applied to mirror neurons and more
generally any concept of significant 'specialized' regions directly
involved how the brain delivers UKC status.
- The corollary of this is that the region of the brain that delivers
UKC probably has to be physically homogenous down to some scale of
granularity, such that any two divisible, dependent,
components/concepts can be, and are, delivered purely computationally
(software) by identical underlying physical configuration (software).
- if that is the case, then Elliot's discomfort with some of Deutsch's
stances on these matters deserves some proper time and attention from
Deutsch, and if they want to do this in public, then also from
everyone else who wants to participate.
On the other hand maybe the reasoning in my first post is fatally
flawed. But the point is....it is worth taking the time and effort to
properly demonstrate this is the case, because more is hanging on this
than just the usual. It shouldn't on this occasion be good enough to
simply assume what I'm saying is wrong because it is 'dehumanizing' or
perhaps because you think something I say is 'pre-refuted' by some
more basic component of the philosophy.
The reason is that such pre-refutations are logically and
philosophically WRONG in this particular context, because my specific
point is not that I am right in what I am saying...so it does not
matter if I am pre-refuted. Part of the context here, is actually the
supposition that I am indeed incorrect and pre-refuted, hence if my
reasoning is nevertheless correct in the 'local' sense that it does
follow on from Deutsch's endorsement of 'specialised brain regions for
language' that the explanation for this situation may be that
something - maybe something subtle - in where Deutsch is going with
these matters is *also* pre-refuted, hence Elliot may be onto
something.
Nuff Said. Just wanted to be as clear as possible and head off any
wrong criticisms. Reason being, typically when I see criticisms coming
back that I regard as artifacts of a significant failure on my part to
communicate myself well enough to have been understood....9 times out
of 10 I'll give up on it right there. Hence this being a potentially
important matter to key relationships in the popper world, I have come
back these three times attempting to anticipate such 'wrong'
criticisms in advance. However, there won't be a fourth time. This
much will have to be good enough.