hibbsa
2013-05-07 00:20:38 UTC
There are similarities and differences in both the method I used and the
results. The way I'm going to structure this, is across more than one
postpost, which taken together will provide successively more detailed,
more explanatory statements, beginning - in this post - with very simple
assertions that make it clear how dramatically similar and profoundly
different the two theories really are.
The idea of this post is not first to explain, but instead to assert as
simply as possible what I say the similarities and differences will be,
providing only explanations that are necessary for how those
distinctions come about to be properly understood.
Then in subsequent posts I will progressively seek to add explanations
that will hopefully culminate in all the assertions in the first post
being fully explained. I have to do it this way, because the
similarities and differences are hard to understand. It needs high and
low level detail; assertions for clarity; explanations for
substance...so the full spectrum.
So here goes.
First Approximation Assertion - Similarities and Differences
The similarity between the theories can be stated as comprehensive in
that every single important Popper Deutsch principle leading up to and
underlying C&R is reproduced and never contradicted; every philosophical
mistake is reproduced and also never contradicted. This remains true for
'knock-on' principles that progressively emerge with the philosophy. So
in a very real sense the similarities are comprehensive.
The differences can be stated in the following way: from the start and
progressively more so as the Popperian philosophy emerges new
principles, my theory defines the same principles in 'larger' ways such
that the popperian definition becomes just one of more and more possible
instances of that principle. The way this occurs becomes progressively
more and more varied, such that eventually Popper Deutsch principles
start becoming both confirmed and refuted at the same the time. For
example, this could happen in the following scenario: A popper deutsch
principle is confirmed as a specific instance of something more general.
However, another instance of the same generality takes a different form
that Popper Deutsch mistakenly identfify and refute as a 'competing
explanation'. So you see, how a Popper Deutsch principle can be both
true and false at the same time (i.e. the example was for when it would
be completely true in all respects including reach given to it. And yet
false for (a) not being identified as part of something larger and (b)
for mistaking another 'face' of that larger same thing for a competing
explanation, and falsifying it, resulting in the original principle
being mistakenly held constant across an explanatory domain that
actually it 'co-explains' with the 'competing explanation' (that
wasn't).
For example - and I'm not necessarily saying this is a real
example...I'm just using it for clarity. An example would be if Memes
theory, and 'instincts theory' were two faces of something more general.
Then the outcome would be that, the 'larger thing' both theories are
instances of, genuinelly explains the whole domain Popper Deutsch assign
to memes, and in some real way that more general theory and meme theory
are genuinelly part of the same thing, so Popper Deutsch were correct.
But in another equally real sense, Popper Deutsch were mistake because
they refuted the 'instincts' face and held meme theory constant across
the whole domain.
So there you go. Both the similarities and the differences are really
much more profound than one might realize. In many respects the
similarities and differences exist as pairs of dualities. Both similar
in a very real and complete sense. And different in a very real and
complete sense. And this can be about the same thing.
Second Approximation - The Profundity of the Differences.
Now I'm going to state the single difference that - if I can explain it
later on - should absolutely convince you that my theory and the Popper
Deutsch theory are profoundly different...I mean in the most profound
sense from the Popper Deutsch perspective, in that the most profound
insight of that theory is contradicted by my theory.
So the expression of that would be: My theory shows that Explanation in
the way Popper Deutsch define it, must NEVER play any part in the
*production* of scientific knowledge. Which means criticism as Popper
Deutsch define it must never be involved in the production neither.
Which means C&R as Popper Deutsch define must never be involved in the
production of scientific knowledge.
I think you'll agree that is a pretty profound difference.
Third Approximation - How the Second Appro ximation is Consistent with
the First.
My theory explains how Explanations and Criticisms in the way Popper and
Deutsch view them cannot be part of the fundamental knowledge creation
process.
However, my theory also explains how Explanations as Popper Deutsch view
them are nevertheless the only component of not just how knowledge is
created, but also the culminating and ultimate product and goal of
science and knowledge creation.
You *must* read the other two conditions to get a picture how this
apparent contradiction comes about. An example for how this can happen
is given in the First section above. There are other ways it happens,
but that example does apply to aspects of how this comes about regarding
Explantion. Basically, the ultimate/final product of science, for
humans, will involve understandings in pure explanatory form as Popper
and Deutsch envisage Explanation to be. And the way that pure
explanatory form will come about will be via criticism as Popper Deutsch
envisage, within a process of C&R as Popper Deutsch envisage.
However, that process does (in science) and will involve the conversion
of complete explanations that sit in terse, algebraic, forms, into the
explanatory form Popper Deutsch envisage.
However, that terse algebraic form, when associated with underlying
explanations also in terse algebraic form, (e.g. a theory with all its
'references'), will represent another face of the Popper Deutsch
explanatory concept (i.e. both 'faces' will be instances of some more
generic concept of Explanation). Similarly, the concept of Criticism as
Popper Deutsch see it, will have a dual representation in context of the
algebraic/terse form of the explanation. And again, Criticism as Popper
Deutsch see, and Criticism as it manifests in that other way, will be
two faces of a more general thing. And so likewise C&R itself.
Therefore in a very real sense, my theory will show Popper Deutsch are
completely correct at the level of Explanation, Criticism and C&R. And
yet in an equally real sense, will contradict and refute the very same
concepts, and be a profoundly different proposition. This will come
about in other ways as well as this exampled, but the point made here
is that that the First and Second Approximations above are wholly
consistent with one another, as explained here.
Fourth Approximation - The self-similarity between levels of Abstraction
The fourth approximation is just to point out that, the concepts of
'similarity' and 'difference' as they are used here, are, in their most
generic form, in fact themselves, two faces of some more general thing
(i.e. just as specific instances of similarity and difference are as
explained above). Up higher levels of abstraction, the similarity and
difference, in terms of how those concepts are used in my theory, are
difference instances (or faces) of the same more general thing. And that
thing is a conceptual duality.
My theory will show that this self-similarity continues up through
levels of abstraction, into ever more abstracted forms. This happens in
ways that become harder and harder to intuitively appreciate, but their
existence can be proven in other more mathematical ways. For example,
this happens not just as a concept becoming simpler and simpler (in just
this sense alone, the notion of higher levels of abstraction would
fizzle way into something vague and arbitrary).
That does happen in the central,or original, hierarchy of abstraction,
that actually emerges out of the specific simarities and differences as
they will be explained. But that 'original' hierarchy splits into
multiple related hierarchies that then interact with one-another to
create new substance in the forms of new principles, in increasingly
explicit and far reaching forms.
For example, as the levels of abstraction go higher, the now-abstract
concepts of similarity and difference begin to acquire new levels of
detail, in new downward hierarchies (i.e. less and less abstract), but
which become completely different, possibly 'faces' of the concept of
similarity/difference, possibly now unrecognizable as 'similarity' or
'difference' as we think of those concepts, eventually becoming the more
general forms of wholly different concepts within the theory.
As such as the concept of the more general form of that original
similarity and differences - that being the Conceptual Duality concept -
becomes more and more abstract, it also becomes the more general form of
more and more different aspects of the theory. Ultimately becoming in
some real sense , the more general form of all naspects.
And for a final further example of the counter intuitive nature of the
structure of my theory, that top level form itself - the Conceptual
Duality that I say becomes the more general form of every object in the
theory.....becomes itself just one face of several others, all of which
are equally and equivalently the most general form of every object in
the theory. All of which, of course, are faces or 'instances' of some
even more generic form.
Conclusion: The objective of this Fourth Approximation is not to be
understood by you, so don't worry if you don't. The purpose is simply to
provide a first illustration of what I believe is a really profound
internal structure exhibited by my theory.
And again, this structure will itself reflect both similarities and
differences with o the Popper Deutsch theory, and those similarities and
differences will occur in such way that is consistent with all four
Approximations made here. The Popper Deutsch theory will be revealed as
exhibiting a highly structured form at the Meta-Level. That structure
will be shown to be one 'face' or 'instance' of structure exhibited by
my theory. As such, the Popper Deutsch theory will be shown to be,
itself, one of the distinct hierarchies of abstractions, ultimately
becoming instances of those same high level abstract concepts as the
rest of my theory. So even at that level, ultimately being both the same
as my theory, and different. Part of my theory, and my theory part of
it.
There you go....my assertions have been made. I hope you agree I have
set myself a high standard to deliver in Explanation form.
results. The way I'm going to structure this, is across more than one
postpost, which taken together will provide successively more detailed,
more explanatory statements, beginning - in this post - with very simple
assertions that make it clear how dramatically similar and profoundly
different the two theories really are.
The idea of this post is not first to explain, but instead to assert as
simply as possible what I say the similarities and differences will be,
providing only explanations that are necessary for how those
distinctions come about to be properly understood.
Then in subsequent posts I will progressively seek to add explanations
that will hopefully culminate in all the assertions in the first post
being fully explained. I have to do it this way, because the
similarities and differences are hard to understand. It needs high and
low level detail; assertions for clarity; explanations for
substance...so the full spectrum.
So here goes.
First Approximation Assertion - Similarities and Differences
The similarity between the theories can be stated as comprehensive in
that every single important Popper Deutsch principle leading up to and
underlying C&R is reproduced and never contradicted; every philosophical
mistake is reproduced and also never contradicted. This remains true for
'knock-on' principles that progressively emerge with the philosophy. So
in a very real sense the similarities are comprehensive.
The differences can be stated in the following way: from the start and
progressively more so as the Popperian philosophy emerges new
principles, my theory defines the same principles in 'larger' ways such
that the popperian definition becomes just one of more and more possible
instances of that principle. The way this occurs becomes progressively
more and more varied, such that eventually Popper Deutsch principles
start becoming both confirmed and refuted at the same the time. For
example, this could happen in the following scenario: A popper deutsch
principle is confirmed as a specific instance of something more general.
However, another instance of the same generality takes a different form
that Popper Deutsch mistakenly identfify and refute as a 'competing
explanation'. So you see, how a Popper Deutsch principle can be both
true and false at the same time (i.e. the example was for when it would
be completely true in all respects including reach given to it. And yet
false for (a) not being identified as part of something larger and (b)
for mistaking another 'face' of that larger same thing for a competing
explanation, and falsifying it, resulting in the original principle
being mistakenly held constant across an explanatory domain that
actually it 'co-explains' with the 'competing explanation' (that
wasn't).
For example - and I'm not necessarily saying this is a real
example...I'm just using it for clarity. An example would be if Memes
theory, and 'instincts theory' were two faces of something more general.
Then the outcome would be that, the 'larger thing' both theories are
instances of, genuinelly explains the whole domain Popper Deutsch assign
to memes, and in some real way that more general theory and meme theory
are genuinelly part of the same thing, so Popper Deutsch were correct.
But in another equally real sense, Popper Deutsch were mistake because
they refuted the 'instincts' face and held meme theory constant across
the whole domain.
So there you go. Both the similarities and the differences are really
much more profound than one might realize. In many respects the
similarities and differences exist as pairs of dualities. Both similar
in a very real and complete sense. And different in a very real and
complete sense. And this can be about the same thing.
Second Approximation - The Profundity of the Differences.
Now I'm going to state the single difference that - if I can explain it
later on - should absolutely convince you that my theory and the Popper
Deutsch theory are profoundly different...I mean in the most profound
sense from the Popper Deutsch perspective, in that the most profound
insight of that theory is contradicted by my theory.
So the expression of that would be: My theory shows that Explanation in
the way Popper Deutsch define it, must NEVER play any part in the
*production* of scientific knowledge. Which means criticism as Popper
Deutsch define it must never be involved in the production neither.
Which means C&R as Popper Deutsch define must never be involved in the
production of scientific knowledge.
I think you'll agree that is a pretty profound difference.
Third Approximation - How the Second Appro ximation is Consistent with
the First.
My theory explains how Explanations and Criticisms in the way Popper and
Deutsch view them cannot be part of the fundamental knowledge creation
process.
However, my theory also explains how Explanations as Popper Deutsch view
them are nevertheless the only component of not just how knowledge is
created, but also the culminating and ultimate product and goal of
science and knowledge creation.
You *must* read the other two conditions to get a picture how this
apparent contradiction comes about. An example for how this can happen
is given in the First section above. There are other ways it happens,
but that example does apply to aspects of how this comes about regarding
Explantion. Basically, the ultimate/final product of science, for
humans, will involve understandings in pure explanatory form as Popper
and Deutsch envisage Explanation to be. And the way that pure
explanatory form will come about will be via criticism as Popper Deutsch
envisage, within a process of C&R as Popper Deutsch envisage.
However, that process does (in science) and will involve the conversion
of complete explanations that sit in terse, algebraic, forms, into the
explanatory form Popper Deutsch envisage.
However, that terse algebraic form, when associated with underlying
explanations also in terse algebraic form, (e.g. a theory with all its
'references'), will represent another face of the Popper Deutsch
explanatory concept (i.e. both 'faces' will be instances of some more
generic concept of Explanation). Similarly, the concept of Criticism as
Popper Deutsch see it, will have a dual representation in context of the
algebraic/terse form of the explanation. And again, Criticism as Popper
Deutsch see, and Criticism as it manifests in that other way, will be
two faces of a more general thing. And so likewise C&R itself.
Therefore in a very real sense, my theory will show Popper Deutsch are
completely correct at the level of Explanation, Criticism and C&R. And
yet in an equally real sense, will contradict and refute the very same
concepts, and be a profoundly different proposition. This will come
about in other ways as well as this exampled, but the point made here
is that that the First and Second Approximations above are wholly
consistent with one another, as explained here.
Fourth Approximation - The self-similarity between levels of Abstraction
The fourth approximation is just to point out that, the concepts of
'similarity' and 'difference' as they are used here, are, in their most
generic form, in fact themselves, two faces of some more general thing
(i.e. just as specific instances of similarity and difference are as
explained above). Up higher levels of abstraction, the similarity and
difference, in terms of how those concepts are used in my theory, are
difference instances (or faces) of the same more general thing. And that
thing is a conceptual duality.
My theory will show that this self-similarity continues up through
levels of abstraction, into ever more abstracted forms. This happens in
ways that become harder and harder to intuitively appreciate, but their
existence can be proven in other more mathematical ways. For example,
this happens not just as a concept becoming simpler and simpler (in just
this sense alone, the notion of higher levels of abstraction would
fizzle way into something vague and arbitrary).
That does happen in the central,or original, hierarchy of abstraction,
that actually emerges out of the specific simarities and differences as
they will be explained. But that 'original' hierarchy splits into
multiple related hierarchies that then interact with one-another to
create new substance in the forms of new principles, in increasingly
explicit and far reaching forms.
For example, as the levels of abstraction go higher, the now-abstract
concepts of similarity and difference begin to acquire new levels of
detail, in new downward hierarchies (i.e. less and less abstract), but
which become completely different, possibly 'faces' of the concept of
similarity/difference, possibly now unrecognizable as 'similarity' or
'difference' as we think of those concepts, eventually becoming the more
general forms of wholly different concepts within the theory.
As such as the concept of the more general form of that original
similarity and differences - that being the Conceptual Duality concept -
becomes more and more abstract, it also becomes the more general form of
more and more different aspects of the theory. Ultimately becoming in
some real sense , the more general form of all naspects.
And for a final further example of the counter intuitive nature of the
structure of my theory, that top level form itself - the Conceptual
Duality that I say becomes the more general form of every object in the
theory.....becomes itself just one face of several others, all of which
are equally and equivalently the most general form of every object in
the theory. All of which, of course, are faces or 'instances' of some
even more generic form.
Conclusion: The objective of this Fourth Approximation is not to be
understood by you, so don't worry if you don't. The purpose is simply to
provide a first illustration of what I believe is a really profound
internal structure exhibited by my theory.
And again, this structure will itself reflect both similarities and
differences with o the Popper Deutsch theory, and those similarities and
differences will occur in such way that is consistent with all four
Approximations made here. The Popper Deutsch theory will be revealed as
exhibiting a highly structured form at the Meta-Level. That structure
will be shown to be one 'face' or 'instance' of structure exhibited by
my theory. As such, the Popper Deutsch theory will be shown to be,
itself, one of the distinct hierarchies of abstractions, ultimately
becoming instances of those same high level abstract concepts as the
rest of my theory. So even at that level, ultimately being both the same
as my theory, and different. Part of my theory, and my theory part of
it.
There you go....my assertions have been made. I hope you agree I have
set myself a high standard to deliver in Explanation form.