JAG
2013-02-13 16:48:54 UTC
Here's the extra implication to the domain of 'philosphy of science' as
I see it.
Greetings to all.....I see it.
"How is 'experimental reasoning' about causes and effects itself
justified? In terms of deduction? that is impossible since the
conclusion of inductive arguments are not deductively derivable from
their premises. In terms of experimental reasoning? that is arguing
in circle."
-Hume
sorry but i have to disagree. It's not impossible; but yes, kinda difficult. That's why if we are really good in what we do 'here' we'll find a way to justify IT.
Now, about 'legimization' and "justificatiohn":
if we can't justify a few things, then at bets, we are fooling ourselves or we are looking for LEGIT excuses to do so and get away with it! ;)
I am kinda surpised to hear that a few things don't justification
I am not here to argue about 'dogmas' but to find solutions to empirical methods/problems and conceptual issues in philosophy of science.
P.S. yes, i have read Popper, great stuff and i loved it, but he is kinda outdated and while briilint and 'correct' in many things, he is still limited to his own experiences/ability to see the whole and re-unite science and philosophy.
"To assert that metaphysical problems are meaningless is
unacceptable from the point of view of knowledge itself, not that
the validity of metaphysical knowledge can be accepted without
question, but because we are not justified in definitely
classification of a problem as either scientific or metaphysical; at
the most a disputed problem can be said to be without(cognitive)
meaning....there are can be many wisdoms, while ther exists only one
truth."
-Piaget