Intuitive

[hibbsa]

Let's say there was this amazing, unique and complex phenomenon never
before seen in human history, that was regarded as hugely important and
transformational, but not at all well understood and so important to get
a deep explanation about.

Further examination revealed that in terms of the complexity and
uniqueness the phenomenon clustered in two places: in terms of its
physical manifestation - the regularities, reccurrent themes,
organization, approaches - basically everything. All this and then its
evolution in time as well. The whole thing, its parts its whole, as a
suite of traits, as a history: in the overwhelming majority was both
complex and unique - not seen before in human history.

The other cluster was basically everything describing its product, its
productivity, its influence, its byproducts, and so on. This was also
complex and unique in human history, and then amazing on top of that as
well.

So thinking about the various possibilities of how all this was
explained, what I think I am comfortable to say is that, given this
complex uniqueness characterized the underlying suite of traits, and
then shows up again in its product and influence also complex and unique
(if anything more so), far and away the most intuitive - and reasonable,
and most promising, hypothesis would be that the underlying unique
complexity is the major causal force giving rise to the unique and
complex outcomes. I'd say there'd be every reason to put this at the top
of the list of the most promising prospects and exploring that would
reasonably be the first port of call.

Where would others here stand on this matter? Do you see it the same? Do
you agree it's certainly intuitive and reasonable. I should think it
would also be the best explanation in the popperian sense too. Or is the
intuitiveness a worry in your books? Is it a reason to look elsewhere,
for something more counter-intuitive? I'm being serious.

What about Popper? It's pretty clear I'm talking about something that is
just like Science. Just like a process of philosophizing science.

Or if let's say you don't experience my view so strongly as I seem to
be. Let's say for you this would be priority 2, or priority 3. That
would be fine. But then what about the possibility you or someone else
would regard this explanation as so unpromising that they didn't put it
on their to-do list at all. In fact didn't regard any direct examination
of the phenomenon as useful at all, and didn't put that on his to-do
list either.

Would that be rational? Would that be appropriate? Yes, it's what Popper
appears to have done, or something reasonably approximating to that. But
why? Or am I wrong and badly needing putting out of my misery, in which
case please let's get it over with :O)

[hibbsa]

Let's say there was this amazing, unique and complex phenomenon never before seen in human history, that was regarded as hugely important and transformational, but not at all well understood and so important to get a deep explanation about.
Further examination revealed that in terms of the complexity and
uniqueness the phenomenon clustered in two places: in terms of its
physical manifestation - the regularities, reccurrent themes,
organization, approaches - basically everything. All this and then its
evolution in time as well. The whole thing, its parts its whole, as a
suite of traits, as a history: in the overwhelming majority was both
complex and unique - not seen before in human history.
The other cluster was basically everything describing its product, its
productivity, its influence, its byproducts, and so on. This was also
complex and unique in human history, and then amazing on top of that as
well.
So thinking about the various possibilities of how all this was
explained, what I think I am comfortable to say is that, given this
complex uniqueness characterized the underlying suite of traits, and
then shows up again in its product and influence also complex and unique
(if anything more so), far and away the most intuitive - and reasonable,
and most promising, hypothesis would be that the underlying unique
complexity is the major causal force giving rise to the unique and
complex outcomes. I'd say there'd be every reason to put this at the top
of the list of the most promising prospects and exploring that would
reasonably be the first port of call.
Where would others here stand on this matter? Do you see it the same? Do
you agree it's certainly intuitive and reasonable. I should think it
would also be the best explanation in the popperian sense too. Or is the
intuitiveness a worry in your books? Is it a reason to look elsewhere,
for something more counter-intuitive? I'm being serious.
What about Popper? It's pretty clear I'm talking about something that is
just like Science. Just like a process of philosophizing science.
Or if let's say you don't experience my view so strongly as I seem to
be. Let's say for you this would be priority 2, or priority 3. That
would be fine. But then what about the possibility you or someone else
would regard this explanation as so unpromising that they didn't put it
on their to-do list at all. In fact didn't regard any direct examination
of the phenomenon as useful at all, and didn't put that on his to-do
list either.
Would that be rational? Would that be appropriate? Yes, it's what Popper
appears to have done, or something reasonably approximating to that. But
why? Or am I wrong and badly needing putting out of my misery, in which
case please let's get it over with :O)

so to summarize. the criticism is not that Popper sought to explain both
the suite of traits characterizing the manifestation of science on the
ground, and also the phenomenal growth of knowledge that was the
product, by the same common thing ( basically C&R ).

The criticism is that the key principles involved in C&R were selected
largely in a process of elimination, that largely featured the
philosophical components such as Justificationalism, Induction,
Foundationalism, Empiricism, Positivism, and so on, as possible
competing candidates.

But, those philosophical positions, didn't come from a direct analysis
of what was happening in science itself, but from attempts by scientists
to do philosophy about that underlying science. And, basically for many
of the reasons Popper himself identified about those philosophical
attempts, there is good reason to think the scientists that tried to do
this philosophy, were not at all clear what was happening in Science.

So the criticism is that of a fragility right at the core of the
philosophy. A dependency on the philosophical impressions of scientists
as to what was happening in Science, where Popper might have seen
something rather different had he analysed the reality of science
directly, from a philosophical standpoint.

I think this is a fairly straightforward and simple criticism. It should
be possible for David Deutsch or someone suitable to refute the critcism
or ask for more information, or whatever. I will endeavour to keep
looking for ways to make the criticism more clear, working on the
assumption if I'm not getting any kind of 'bite' it's because I haven't
yet made things clear enough.

So as and when I get the time, this is what I will endeavour to do.

[Alan Forrester]

Post by hibbsa

Let's say there was this amazing, unique and complex phenomenon never before seen in human history, that was regarded as hugely important and transformational, but not at all well understood and so important to get a deep explanation about.
Further examination revealed that in terms of the complexity and
uniqueness the phenomenon clustered in two places: in terms of its
physical manifestation - the regularities, reccurrent themes,
organization, approaches - basically everything. All this and then its
evolution in time as well. The whole thing, its parts its whole, as a
suite of traits, as a history: in the overwhelming majority was both
complex and unique - not seen before in human history.
The other cluster was basically everything describing its product, its
productivity, its influence, its byproducts, and so on. This was also
complex and unique in human history, and then amazing on top of that as
well.
So thinking about the various possibilities of how all this was
explained, what I think I am comfortable to say is that, given this
complex uniqueness characterized the underlying suite of traits, and
then shows up again in its product and influence also complex and unique
(if anything more so), far and away the most intuitive - and reasonable,
and most promising, hypothesis would be that the underlying unique
complexity is the major causal force giving rise to the unique and
complex outcomes. I'd say there'd be every reason to put this at the top
of the list of the most promising prospects and exploring that would
reasonably be the first port of call.
Where would others here stand on this matter? Do you see it the same? Do
you agree it's certainly intuitive and reasonable. I should think it
would also be the best explanation in the popperian sense too. Or is the
intuitiveness a worry in your books? Is it a reason to look elsewhere,
for something more counter-intuitive? I'm being serious.
What about Popper? It's pretty clear I'm talking about something that is
just like Science. Just like a process of philosophizing science.
Or if let's say you don't experience my view so strongly as I seem to
be. Let's say for you this would be priority 2, or priority 3. That
would be fine. But then what about the possibility you or someone else
would regard this explanation as so unpromising that they didn't put it
on their to-do list at all. In fact didn't regard any direct examination
of the phenomenon as useful at all, and didn't put that on his to-do
list either.
Would that be rational? Would that be appropriate? Yes, it's what Popper
appears to have done, or something reasonably approximating to that. But
why? Or am I wrong and badly needing putting out of my misery, in which
case please let's get it over with :O)

so to summarize. the criticism is not that Popper sought to explain both
the suite of traits characterizing the manifestation of science on the
ground, and also the phenomenal growth of knowledge that was the
product, by the same common thing ( basically C&R ).
The criticism is that the key principles involved in C&R were selected
largely in a process of elimination, that largely featured the
philosophical components such as Justificationalism, Induction,
Foundationalism, Empiricism, Positivism, and so on, as possible
competing candidates.
But, those philosophical positions, didn't come from a direct analysis
of what was happening in science itself, but from attempts by scientists
to do philosophy about that underlying science. And, basically for many
of the reasons Popper himself identified about those philosophical
attempts, there is good reason to think the scientists that tried to do
this philosophy, were not at all clear what was happening in Science.
So the criticism is that of a fragility right at the core of the
philosophy. A dependency on the philosophical impressions of scientists
as to what was happening in Science, where Popper might have seen
something rather different had he analysed the reality of science
directly, from a philosophical standpoint.
I think this is a fairly straightforward and simple criticism. It should
be possible for David Deutsch or someone suitable to refute the critcism
or ask for more information, or whatever. I will endeavour to keep
looking for ways to make the criticism more clear, working on the
assumption if I'm not getting any kind of 'bite' it's because I haven't
yet made things clear enough.
So as and when I get the time, this is what I will endeavour to do.

What would analysing science "directly" entail and how would the
results differ from what Popper did?

Also, Popper's philosophy is not solely a description, it also
prescribes standards for scientists to live up to. Can you improve on
those standards?

Alan

[hibbsa]

Post by Alan Forrester

Post by hibbsa

Post by hibbsa
Let's say there was this amazing, unique and complex phenomenon

never before seen in human history, that was regarded as hugely
important and transformational, but not at all well understood and so
important to get a deep explanation about.

Post by Alan Forrester

Post by hibbsa

Post by hibbsa
Further examination revealed that in terms of the complexity and
uniqueness the phenomenon clustered in two places: in terms of its
physical manifestation - the regularities, reccurrent themes,
organization, approaches - basically everything. All this and then its
evolution in time as well. The whole thing, its parts its whole, as a
suite of traits, as a history: in the overwhelming majority was both
complex and unique - not seen before in human history.
The other cluster was basically everything describing its product, its
productivity, its influence, its byproducts, and so on. This was also
complex and unique in human history, and then amazing on top of that as
well.
So thinking about the various possibilities of how all this was
explained, what I think I am comfortable to say is that, given this
complex uniqueness characterized the underlying suite of traits, and
then shows up again in its product and influence also complex and unique
(if anything more so), far and away the most intuitive - and reasonable,
and most promising, hypothesis would be that the underlying unique
complexity is the major causal force giving rise to the unique and
complex outcomes. I'd say there'd be every reason to put this at the top
of the list of the most promising prospects and exploring that would
reasonably be the first port of call.
Where would others here stand on this matter? Do you see it the same? Do
you agree it's certainly intuitive and reasonable. I should think it
would also be the best explanation in the popperian sense too. Or is the
intuitiveness a worry in your books? Is it a reason to look

elsewhere,

Post by Alan Forrester

Post by hibbsa

Post by hibbsa
for something more counter-intuitive? I'm being serious.
What about Popper? It's pretty clear I'm talking about something that is
just like Science. Just like a process of philosophizing science.
Or if let's say you don't experience my view so strongly as I seem to
be. Let's say for you this would be priority 2, or priority 3. That
would be fine. But then what about the possibility you or someone else
would regard this explanation as so unpromising that they didn't put it
on their to-do list at all. In fact didn't regard any direct examination
of the phenomenon as useful at all, and didn't put that on his to-do
list either.
Would that be rational? Would that be appropriate? Yes, it's what Popper
appears to have done, or something reasonably approximating to that. But
why? Or am I wrong and badly needing putting out of my misery, in which
case please let's get it over with :O)

so to summarize. the criticism is not that Popper sought to explain both
the suite of traits characterizing the manifestation of science on the
ground, and also the phenomenal growth of knowledge that was the
product, by the same common thing ( basically C&R ).
The criticism is that the key principles involved in C&R were selected
largely in a process of elimination, that largely featured the
philosophical components such as Justificationalism, Induction,
Foundationalism, Empiricism, Positivism, and so on, as possible
competing candidates.
But, those philosophical positions, didn't come from a direct analysis
of what was happening in science itself, but from attempts by scientists
to do philosophy about that underlying science. And, basically for many
of the reasons Popper himself identified about those philosophical
attempts, there is good reason to think the scientists that tried to do
this philosophy, were not at all clear what was happening in

Science.

Post by Alan Forrester

Post by hibbsa
So the criticism is that of a fragility right at the core of the
philosophy. A dependency on the philosophical impressions of

scientists

Post by Alan Forrester

Post by hibbsa
as to what was happening in Science, where Popper might have seen
something rather different had he analysed the reality of science
directly, from a philosophical standpoint.
I think this is a fairly straightforward and simple criticism. It should
be possible for David Deutsch or someone suitable to refute the critcism
or ask for more information, or whatever. I will endeavour to keep
looking for ways to make the criticism more clear, working on the
assumption if I'm not getting any kind of 'bite' it's because I haven't
yet made things clear enough.
So as and when I get the time, this is what I will endeavour to do.

What would analysing science "directly" entail

Minimally it would entail a decision to cut out the philosopher middle
men and go see for himself. How things would develop would depend on
what was coming up for Popper and the directions he judged to go.

Both parts of my answer - I think - in large part arise as consequences
of the goals Popper had set himself. He was there to do fundamental
work. Popper was a visionary - he seen the possibility to solve the
puzzles of philosophy and the Western Enlightenment as part of the same
approach. Or that's my guess. Whatever his vision was, though, his
ambition was to do primary top-level problem solving.

How that's not a goal that can be reconciled with a policy of
outsourcing top-level judgements off to third parties. To be
fundamental, Popper had to be at the centre...with full spectrum control
over third party input at every stage. But the way he structured things
in the event, had no possibility at all of securing an adequate degree
of primacy to Popper's judgement in the process. He was effectively
deferring to the judgements of the philosopher middlemen.

Another way to conceptualize the arrangement he was left with is in
terms of the scourge of Authority. He could criticize the internal logic
of what the middlemen were proposing. But he couldn't criticize the
judgements and decisions and other influences that translated the
reality of Science, or some part of it, into the proposition being
recieved by Popper. And because he couldn't criticize it, by consequence
those philosophical middlemen manifested as a cluster of Authorities,
encircling Popper's core.

It's logically impossible to do fundamental work on something outside
and wider, like Science or the Englightenment, if the embryonic
philosophy you are using for a vehicle, defines a set of independent
authorities for its core. Think about it. It's impossible. All that is
possible is the creation of a philosophical explanation of the virtual
reality that structure creates. The world that would be, if the
Englightenment was fundamentally explicable as a basket of Popper's good
apples of C&R, and a lot of other bad apples of Inductionism,
foundationalism, justificationalism, empiricism, etc, etc.

But is that real? Is it Science or the Englightenment? Popper had no way
of knowing one way or the other, because the matter of the connectedness
with real Science, and all pertaining to it in its entirety, was in the
hands of external Authorities....not in some metaphorical sense, but as
actual realities - the reality of abstractions - at the core of his
philosophy.

Post by Alan Forrester
results differ from what Popper did?

Popper's insights and deliberations would have been completely different
historical manifestations. It's plausible that the final product
philosophical concepts would bear marked similarities to the product
manifested in the reality of Popperianism. That is because the product
of the philosophical middle men had a significant amount of
authenticity.

They were frequently individuals close to the heart of Science,
scientists in their own right. They were even the great pioneers of
Science. Truth seekers their efforts sincere. My guess is that they
typically had good intuitions what the key hubs and axils were, around
which the explanation of Science was turning. Foundations, Authority,
empirical and methodological components, and so on. But they were still
baffled how these hubs and axils defined themselves or what their
implications were.

So the result would have similarities with Popper Deutch as it stands,
just as Popper Deutsch philosophy has similarities with Science as it
stands. They are connected phenomenon, their histories have a genuine
intersection, that contains genuine and authentic impressions of Science
proper. So similarities would be the expectation.

But to re-iterate the central criticism I am making, setting it in
context at the same time: And this point is objectively true, by the
design of things. Popper criticizes the way the philosophical middlemen
*assemble* that core insight of theirs (that foundations as a concept is
fundamental in some unrecognized way). Popper criticizes the attempt to
explain the authentic core insight. And the way each of these 'issues'
gets proposed to explain, completely defines Popper's own
conceptualization of each of those fundamental issues.

In terms of the way foundational reality gets proposed, Popper refutes
foundational reality, and foundationalism as a philosophical concept (of
a mistake) is then defined, basically as the key reasoning and
judgements that made up Popper's refutation.

I appreciate this is difficult conceptually to get ones head around,
which is why I'm willing to persevere. It isn't easy to see, because
there are apparenent subtleties going on. But the implication of the
causality of reasoning, is that the very conception of these underlying
issues (foundationalism etc) is entirely encapsulated and contrained, by
the original proposition that was put forward to explain the part of
such concepts. Which means for better or for worse, the traits of those
original propositions are inherited right through into the philosophy.

And that's fragile.

I'm going to wind this post down now, but at some future point I will
add to this context by clarifying the many whole categories of
discovery, developments, and approaches, that are possible and plausible
in a direct analysis of the traits of science, but categorically
impossible out of the arrangement that Popper choose to depen on. It's
actually feasible to establish the character of many of these
categories, and in some cases prove some such categories are actually
manifesting important,influences,

Unless there is a glaringly hole in my analysis, This is a major
problem for Popperianism. If it's true, there aren't easy fixes.

Post by Alan Forrester
Also, Popper's philosophy is not solely a description, it also
prescribes standards for scientists to live up to. Can you improve on
those standards?
Alan

[Brett Hall]

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan Forrester

Post by hibbsa

Let's say there was this amazing, unique and complex phenomenon never before seen in human history, that was regarded as hugely important and transformational, but not at all well understood and so important to get a deep explanation about.
Further examination revealed that in terms of the complexity and
uniqueness the phenomenon clustered in two places: in terms of its
physical manifestation - the regularities, reccurrent themes,
organization, approaches - basically everything. All this and then its
evolution in time as well. The whole thing, its parts its whole, as a
suite of traits, as a history: in the overwhelming majority was both
complex and unique - not seen before in human history.
The other cluster was basically everything describing its product, its
productivity, its influence, its byproducts, and so on. This was also
complex and unique in human history, and then amazing on top of that as
well.
So thinking about the various possibilities of how all this was
explained, what I think I am comfortable to say is that, given this
complex uniqueness characterized the underlying suite of traits, and
then shows up again in its product and influence also complex and unique
(if anything more so), far and away the most intuitive - and reasonable,
and most promising, hypothesis would be that the underlying unique
complexity is the major causal force giving rise to the unique and
complex outcomes. I'd say there'd be every reason to put this at the top
of the list of the most promising prospects and exploring that would
reasonably be the first port of call.
Where would others here stand on this matter? Do you see it the same? Do
you agree it's certainly intuitive and reasonable. I should think it
would also be the best explanation in the popperian sense too. Or is the
intuitiveness a worry in your books? Is it a reason to look elsewhere,
for something more counter-intuitive? I'm being serious.
What about Popper? It's pretty clear I'm talking about something that is
just like Science. Just like a process of philosophizing science.
Or if let's say you don't experience my view so strongly as I seem to
be. Let's say for you this would be priority 2, or priority 3. That
would be fine. But then what about the possibility you or someone else
would regard this explanation as so unpromising that they didn't put it
on their to-do list at all. In fact didn't regard any direct examination
of the phenomenon as useful at all, and didn't put that on his to-do
list either.
Would that be rational? Would that be appropriate? Yes, it's what Popper
appears to have done, or something reasonably approximating to that. But
why? Or am I wrong and badly needing putting out of my misery, in which
case please let's get it over with :O)

so to summarize. the criticism is not that Popper sought to explain both
the suite of traits characterizing the manifestation of science on the
ground, and also the phenomenal growth of knowledge that was the
product, by the same common thing ( basically C&R ).
The criticism is that the key principles involved in C&R were selected
largely in a process of elimination, that largely featured the
philosophical components such as Justificationalism, Induction,
Foundationalism, Empiricism, Positivism, and so on, as possible
competing candidates.
But, those philosophical positions, didn't come from a direct analysis
of what was happening in science itself, but from attempts by scientists
to do philosophy about that underlying science. And, basically for many
of the reasons Popper himself identified about those philosophical
attempts, there is good reason to think the scientists that tried to do
this philosophy, were not at all clear what was happening in Science.
So the criticism is that of a fragility right at the core of the
philosophy. A dependency on the philosophical impressions of scientists
as to what was happening in Science, where Popper might have seen
something rather different had he analysed the reality of science
directly, from a philosophical standpoint.
I think this is a fairly straightforward and simple criticism. It should
be possible for David Deutsch or someone suitable to refute the critcism
or ask for more information, or whatever. I will endeavour to keep
looking for ways to make the criticism more clear, working on the
assumption if I'm not getting any kind of 'bite' it's because I haven't
yet made things clear enough.
So as and when I get the time, this is what I will endeavour to do.

What would analysing science "directly" entail

Minimally it would entail a decision to cut out the philosopher middle
men and go see for himself.

Whom does "himself" refer to? The scientist? You want the scientist to "go see for himself" how science is done or something?

You haven't answered the question. Not in the slightest. What would analysing science "directly" entail???

Watching a scientist? Is that "directly"? Can you observe anything "directly"? What does directly mean? Does it mean "without interpretation"? Have you read BoI?

Notice that "analysing science" (directly or otherwise - whatever this might mean) puts one squarely into philosophising. I reject the notion you can "cut out the philosopher middle men". Philosophers are not middle men when it comes to analysing how science is done. If you analyse science, you are being a philosopher. I have to implore you to respond to Alan: what does "directly" mean?

Explain yourself.

Post by hibbsa
How things would develop would depend on
what was coming up for Popper and the directions he judged to go.

Confusing. I don't understand. Can you rephrase (note, *many* of your sentences I want to write this exact same comment after).

Post by hibbsa
Both parts of my answer - I think - in large part arise as consequences
of the goals Popper had set himself.

What were they? Elaborate, if you can.

Post by hibbsa
He was there to do fundamental
work. Popper was a visionary - he seen the possibility to solve the
puzzles of philosophy

No, he rejected Wittgenstein's notion that philosophy was about *puzzles*. Philosophy contained/contains genuine metaphysical and epistemological *problems*. Do you disagree?

Post by hibbsa
and the Western Enlightenment as part of the same
approach. Or that's my guess. Whatever his vision was, though, his
ambition was to do primary top-level problem solving.

Yep. But puzzles, as the dispute between Popper and other philosophers seems to have been (still is) in part, is that problems are different to puzzles - the latter being a mere consequence of language. Philosophy is not about language games. That's an error. That's bad philosophy. Agree?

Post by hibbsa
How that's not a goal that can be reconciled with a policy of
outsourcing top-level judgements off to third parties. To be
fundamental, Popper had to be at the centre...with full spectrum control
over third party input at every stage. But the way he structured things
in the event, had no possibility at all of securing an adequate degree
of primacy to Popper's judgement in the process. He was effectively
deferring to the judgements of the philosopher middlemen.

This is almost opaque to analysis. How was Popper "deferring to the judgements of philosopher middlemen"? Can you provide examples?

You seem to suggest Popper was relying upon arguments from authority. I have read Popper, but regard myself as no expert, yet one theme that was prominent was the *rejection* of authority. Yet here you seem to say Popper was deferring to authority. Again, explain yourself. With examples. I might be mistaken...but I do not get this confused with other posts. I think it's you, not me, tbh.

Post by hibbsa
Another way to conceptualize the arrangement he was left with is in
terms of the scourge of Authority. He could criticize the internal logic
of what the middlemen were proposing. But he couldn't criticize the
judgements and decisions and other influences that translated the
reality of Science, or some part of it, into the proposition being
recieved by Popper.

For example?

Post by hibbsa
And because he couldn't criticize it,

For example? What? What couldn't he criticise? Popper *could* criticise everything. He argued for that stance towards knowledge claims better than anyone...why would something be immune to it...from him?

Post by hibbsa
by consequence
those philosophical middlemen manifested as a cluster of Authorities,
encircling Popper's core.
It's logically impossible to do fundamental work on something outside
and wider, like Science or the Englightenment, if the embryonic
philosophy you are using for a vehicle, defines a set of independent
authorities for its core.

False. And obscurantist. Obscurantist, first, because "a set of independent authorities" isn't well defined, clear terminology. What do you mean? False because "logically impossible" implies some sort of sequence of deductive statements reaching a conclusion via Modus Ponens or Modus Tollens or whatever...and yet I see nothing in what you have typed here that establishes a strict contradiction entitling you to assert Popper has tried to "do fundamental work" which is logically impossible.

Again, more explanation on your part is required.

Post by hibbsa
Think about it.

Ok. Hmmm. Wait...more thinking. Wait...hmmm....

Do you think such sentences, such commands, are at all useful?

"Think about it."

Post by hibbsa
It's impossible.

You are yet to demonstrate this.

Post by hibbsa
All that is
possible is the creation of a philosophical explanation of the virtual
reality that structure creates.

That sounds so po-mo. Is communication between people *always* possible? I wonder, but do not despair. Keep trying! I am optimistic you can improve! I am hopeful we can communicate. At the moment, we do not seem to be anywhere near on the same level. You say words and I seem to be just saying "please explain?" And "what?" And "I don't understand". A "yawning chasm of nihilism" separates us. I like to make friends - to have a "meeting of minds". Let us keep trying.

Post by hibbsa
The world that would be, if the
Englightenment was fundamentally explicable as a basket of Popper's good
apples of C&R, and a lot of other bad apples of Inductionism,
foundationalism, justificationalism, empiricism, etc, etc.

Look at the *form* of what you write. Just the logical or grammatical structure of it. You say "That world would be, IF (x & y)..." But you do not complete the conditional.

If....what...?

Write clearly.

If you say "If" you need to say what would happen "if" or else you shouldn't say "if". Instead just make a claim that can be criticised.

Post by hibbsa
But is that real?

What? Is what real? If....?

Post by hibbsa
Is it Science or the Englightenment?

What? What does "it" refer to? So, so frustrating to spend time trying to understand this.

Post by hibbsa
Popper had no way
of knowing one way or the other, because the matter of the connectedness

What's connectedness? I am genuinely asking. Do you know? I don't. Define it. It sounds interesting. People use the word but never really explain it.

Post by hibbsa
with real Science, and all pertaining to it in its entirety, was in the
hands of external Authorities....not in some metaphorical sense, but as
actual realities - the reality of abstractions - at the core of his
philosophy.

Post by Alan Forrester
results differ from what Popper did?

Popper's insights and deliberations would have been completely different
historical manifestations. It's plausible that the final product
philosophical concepts would bear marked similarities to the product
manifested in the reality of Popperianism. That is because the product
of the philosophical middle men had a significant amount of
authenticity.

More po-mo.

Oh...Post-Modernism, if I was being snobby and not defining things.

Post by hibbsa
That is because the product
of the philosophical middle men had a significant amount of
authenticity.

This can be reduced to:

"The product of (some philosophers) had (authenticity)."

Um...ok. Yes. Some philosophers have said some good stuff that Popper agreed with. Is that your point? If so, what is the revelation or insight here?

Post by hibbsa
They were frequently individuals close to the heart of Science,
scientists in their own right. They were even the great pioneers of
Science.

Who were? Again, examples make *all* the difference. Concrete examples of what you are trying to get at will make or break this interjection.

Post by hibbsa
Truth seekers their efforts sincere.

Is that a sentence? Seriously? Ok, I'm going to go all grade school on you now but...english is an SVO language. Subject, Verb, Object. You seem to have a subject and an object. But no verb. I know I seem to be being harsh and needlessly finicky, but really, this seems to be the way you write - deliberately obscurantist and then somehow faux-offended when people (like David Deutsch and Alan Forrester who are busy pushing the frontiers of knowledge in philosophy and science) don't reply. But what is there to reply to when it is so hard to find something substantive to engage with? This sentence above is - par-excellence - the way you are communicating more generally...but it is too hard to understand. I want to understand, I genuinely do...but you do not write in a way that helps.

Post by hibbsa
My guess is that they
typically had good intuitions what the key hubs and axils

axils?

Axils!

Really?

AXILS?
ax·il (ksl)
n.
The upper angle between a lateral organ, such as a leafstalk, and the stem that bears it.
[Latin axilla, armpit.]
which the explanation of Science was turning. Foundations, Authority,

Post by hibbsa
empirical and methodological components, and so on. But they were still
baffled how these hubs and axils defined themselves or what their
implications were.
So the result would have similarities with Popper Deutch as it stands,
just as Popper Deutsch philosophy has similarities with Science as it
stands. They are connected phenomenon, their histories have a genuine
intersection, that contains genuine and authentic impressions of Science
proper. So similarities would be the expectation.
But to re-iterate the central criticism I am making, setting it in
context at the same time: And this point is objectively true, by the
design of things. Popper criticizes the way the philosophical middlemen
*assemble* that core insight of theirs (that foundations as a concept is
fundamental in some unrecognized way). Popper criticizes the attempt to
explain the authentic core insight. And the way each of these 'issues'
gets proposed to explain, completely defines Popper's own
conceptualization of each of those fundamental issues.
In terms of the way foundational reality gets proposed, Popper refutes
foundational reality, and foundationalism as a philosophical concept (of
a mistake) is then defined, basically as the key reasoning and
judgements that made up Popper's refutation.
I appreciate this is difficult conceptually to get ones head around,
which is why I'm willing to persevere. It isn't easy to see, because
there are apparenent subtleties going on. But the implication of the
causality of reasoning, is that the very conception of these underlying
issues (foundationalism etc) is entirely encapsulated and contrained, by
the original proposition that was put forward to explain the part of
such concepts. Which means for better or for worse, the traits of those
original propositions are inherited right through into the philosophy.
And that's fragile.
I'm going to wind this post down now, but at some future point I will
add to this context by clarifying the many whole categories of
discovery, developments, and approaches, that are possible and plausible
in a direct analysis of the traits of science, but categorically
impossible out of the arrangement that Popper choose to depen on. It's
actually feasible to establish the character of many of these
categories, and in some cases prove some such categories are actually
manifesting important,influences,
Unless there is a glaringly hole in my analysis, This is a major
problem for Popperianism. If it's true, there aren't easy fixes.

I kinda made my point. The rest I have not responded to seems to suffer from the flaws I highlight in the earlier part of your post. I do guess that you are hinting at something interesting...but it simply is not articulated clearly enough to engage with.

I am not a perfect writer, no one is. I don't pretend to be. But I try my very best to write simply and clearly. Do you?

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan Forrester
Also, Popper's philosophy is not solely a description, it also
prescribes standards for scientists to live up to. Can you improve on
those standards?

These are important questions, hibbsa! You should attempt an answer.

Incidentally, do you think Popper, and Deutsch explain epistemology as best as it is currently understood? Or do you think there is some better way of understanding the growth of knowledge?

Thanks,

Brett.

[hibbsa]

Post by Brett Hall

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan Forrester
What would analysing science "directly" entail

Minimally it would entail a decision to cut out
the philosopher middle
men and go see for himself.

Whom does "himself" refer to? The scientist? You
want the scientist to "go see for himself" how
science is done or something?

Brett - I can see that I haven't made it clear yet what the correct approach would be to analyse Science. I can certainly reassure you though it is nothing to do with calls for empiricism or observing scientists at work. Although certainly it could and would naturally lead to that eventually, just as it does in science. I don't think there's a difference between real philosophy and real science. Neither does Deutsch so we agree.

But at the moment most of my effort is going into trying to shed light on what went wrong in the Popperian philosophy. I am not yet putting effort into explaining what I think the right approach entails. I think it is important to see how and why something went wrong in the Popperian philosophy becaue that is linked to how and why the way I used is correct. I think it's going to be hard to understand what went wront with Popper, and in some cases hard to want to understand. I of course fully accept this could go the other way.

So perhaps concentrate on the area I am putting effort in...what went wrong with Popper. If you want to.

And if I want to respond to future posts to me from you on this matter. We both have to want to. On my side I will need to see some sign of real thought. FYI the question you ask above and several below don't really 'do it' for me.

Post by Brett Hall
You haven't answered the question. Not in the slightest. What would analysing science "directly" entail???

I think I did give a reasonable answer, so long as you realize there is no intrinsic 'right way' to do things. It needs explaining. Each way raises its own problems and as Deutsch say, interesting problems are soluable. Popper could have made it work the way he did it, if he'd seen the problems and solved them. But he didn't and that's the real issue here.

I think the reason he didn't is because the way everything was set up made it devilishly hard to 'see' the problem. As indeed people are finding hard here. The 'direct' solution, is not direct in the empirical sense...and 'direct' probably isn't a good word. Let me try another simple expr? ession for the distinction between Popper Deutsch approach and mine.

If Popper Deutsch's approach could be summed up as the answer to this question: What if Science was Easy To Happen?

Then my approach could be summed up as: What if Science was Really Hard To Happen.

I think this is a good way to understand things, and actually that question is pretty much what has guided me. If Popper Deutsch had asked that question at the start, I think they would have basically ended up with something along the lines of what they did get. A lucky coincidence of conditions allows a simple but profound thing called a Culture of Criticism to take root (one condition being 'Rejection of Authority').

This allows Science to be hard to happen but only in the sense the coincidence of the conditions needed to be 'lucky'

With Science Easy to Happen, then almost by definition the specific details of the specific way it happend aren't necessarily important. And in fact, as they 'discover' in the event was mostly all nonsense. So there you go.

But if the root question is "What if Science was Really Hard to Happen" then the starting point becomes "What if the way Science happened...all it's key traits as they really were....were literally the only way Science could have happened, because the Problems that had to be solved were Really Really Hard."

...and so on and so on... So you see it's not about 'observatio' or 'empiricism' or anything like that. And yet it is about 'directness' in some sort of way.

Post by Brett Hall

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan Forrester
Also, Popper's philosophy is not solely a description, it also
prescribes standards for scientists to live up to. Can you improve on
those standards?

These are important questions, hibbsa! You should attempt an answer.

Well Brett, they are important questions but showing that Popper went wrong early on, is actually a pretty big category level answer to those questions.

Post by Brett Hall
Incidentally, do you think Popper, and Deutsch explain epistemology as best as it is currently understood? Or do you think there is some better way of understanding the growth of knowledge?

Yes I think they are wrong, but that they also get a lot right. For example I think it is possible to be completey right that, say, Foundationalism is a catastrophic error, and yet have a completely partial and inadequate explanation of the real issue about Foundations. In the same way, I think it's possible to get a lot right about Knowledge and yet for initially pretty subtle omissions be profoundly off base at the same time.

About knowledge...I think the right idea...and the right way to express it...would be much more in the vein of scientific conceptualization and expression. And no surprise there, because I happen to think that way of doing things 'evolved' for a reason and that reason involved a major Problem that is and was incredibly hard to solve.

So the upshot is that, first off, the concept of true creation has to be completely dismissed absent an explanation. And that includes as part of the C&R process.

So the best way to understand this in general, is that new knowledge 'creation' comes about as the integration of two (or more) pre-existent knowledge sets, whether implicit or otherwise.

Try to think of an exception to that.

For example Criticism itself is intrinsically a goal-oriented procedure. That goal could be good philosophy, but on some given instance it could also be something more mundane like "this guy is stupid I'm not going to bother reading his ideas but he gets on my nerves so I'm going to shut him down'. I mean, we might not think it explicitly, but we all moments like that don't we? Or something similar.

So that criticism...that we actually make...is a slightly different concept..it's a marriage of those explicit and implicit goals, and lots of other stuff to do with the conditions there and then..and whatever the other party has brought to the table.

The truth is this model, I don't think contradicts C&R at all. It allows for it. But what it also does is imply different lines of consequences, which create different problems, the solutions of which lead to different things.

But it's inherently something that can be expressed mimimally, probably in a logic or math form with effort. It's also something that implies hard, objective-by-design consequences..things that can be said - always - about every act of knowledge growth. Things that have ramifications.

For example, if every piece of knowlege growth (and much else, like I say, criticism) is an integration of two or more knowledge sets, then the first big ramification is that knowledge is never a clean explanation of one thing. The explanation is changed by the other knowledge set. It becomes a mixture result.

What that means is, for example, if you allow a large implicit assumption to enter your knowledge creations process, and if it becomes 'the other' knowledge set as you integrate two to create new knowledge, then you will have embedded that assumption deeply into the very fibre of your explanatory world. And that new knowledge becomes important in the creation of yet more, then that original implicit assumption will become yet more embedded. In some cases it will be diluted out, but in others it will keep on growing.

The implication, in the end, is that unpicking large influential assumptions gets more and more difficult as new knowledge builds up, and this is a pretty exponential effect in product knowledge creation systems.

This usually doesn't happen, for example a badly motivated criticism can only impact the whole of knowledge so far as that particular criticism has real enduring influence into that world of knowledge. Mostly, the influence doesn't appear so it works out ok.

Now...there are I believe knock on implications about this, that pose serious questions for the basic idea of C&R.

There are many other consequences of viewing knowledge this way. The consequences are more powerful and more objective by design, because this model intrinsically kicks out unknowns like 'creativity'. And does so, without actually asserting anything about the world at all. As I say, the model doesn't have to explain real knowledge growth to be 'real'...it only has to be consistent with real knowledge growth. The *consequences* and *results* of working through the problems will decide the question of truth....as they work ever nearer to it, or not.

There's another objective-by-design implication by the way..if it is true. If all knowledge is created as the integration of two (or more) knowledge sets, then every time we create knowledge we are implicitly asking this question: "What would it take for these two knowledge sets to be consistent and part of the same thing"?

That's an important understanding, I think. Because, if we are always asking that question, then for the same reason as Popper Deutsch realize regarding the importance of 'making explicit' it becomes important to always make that question explicit as part of a suite of other solutions geared toward controlling what those two knowledge sets actually are.

So it would follow from that, that the most productive scientific threads are linked to how explicitly that question was.

Newton's was "What would it take for [how he saw gravity and motion behave on Earth] and [What he saw in the sky] to be consisten and part of the same thing".

Try using that question, and just some realism (another very important but dangerous knowledge set) and Kepler's Laws...another knowledge Newtwon had, and see how far you can go to invent all the laws that Newton did. You, or some others here, will be surprised...it's like butter off a knife.

So....as you see....from a different question come different answers...and the measure of which is the right route, is in the results.

[hibbsa]

Post by hibbsa

Post by Brett Hall

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan Forrester
What would analysing science "directly" entail

Minimally it would entail a decision to cut out
the philosopher middle
men and go see for himself.

Whom does "himself" refer to? The scientist? You
want the scientist to "go see for himself" how
science is done or something?

Brett - I can see that I haven't made it clear yet what the correct approach would be to analyse Science. I can certainly reassure you though it is nothing to do with calls for empiricism or observing scientists at work. Although certainly it could and would naturally lead to that eventually, just as it does in science. I don't think there's a difference between real philosophy and real science. Neither does Deutsch so we agree.
But at the moment most of my effort is going into trying to shed light on what went wrong in the Popperian philosophy. I am not yet putting effort into explaining what I think the right approach entails. I think it is important to see how and why something went wrong in the Popperian philosophy becaue that is linked to how and why the way I used is correct. I think it's going to be hard to understand what went wront with Popper, and in some cases hard to want to understand. I of course fully accept this could go the other way.
So perhaps concentrate on the area I am putting effort in...what went wrong with Popper. If you want to.
And if I want to respond to future posts to me from you on this matter. We both have to want to. On my side I will need to see some sign of real thought. FYI the question you ask above and several below don't really 'do it' for me.

Post by Brett Hall
You haven't answered the question. Not in the slightest. What would analysing science "directly" entail???

I think I did give a reasonable answer, so long as you realize there is no intrinsic 'right way' to do things. It needs explaining. Each way raises its own problems and as Deutsch say, interesting problems are soluable. Popper could have made it work the way he did it, if he'd seen the problems and solved them. But he didn't and that's the real issue here.
I think the reason he didn't is because the way everything was set up made it devilishly hard to 'see' the problem. As indeed people are finding hard here. The 'direct' solution, is not direct in the empirical sense...and 'direct' probably isn't a good word. Let me try another simple expr? ession for the distinction between Popper Deutsch approach and mine.
If Popper Deutsch's approach could be summed up as the answer to this question: What if Science was Easy To Happen?
Then my approach could be summed up as: What if Science was Really Hard To Happen.
I think this is a good way to understand things, and actually that question is pretty much what has guided me. If Popper Deutsch had asked that question at the start, I think they would have basically ended up with something along the lines of what they did get. A lucky coincidence of conditions allows a simple but profound thing called a Culture of Criticism to take root (one condition being 'Rejection of Authority').
This allows Science to be hard to happen but only in the sense the coincidence of the conditions needed to be 'lucky'
With Science Easy to Happen, then almost by definition the specific details of the specific way it happend aren't necessarily important. And in fact, as they 'discover' in the event was mostly all nonsense. So there you go.
But if the root question is "What if Science was Really Hard to Happen" then the starting point becomes "What if the way Science happened...all it's key traits as they really were....were literally the only way Science could have happened, because the Problems that had to be solved were Really Really Hard."
...and so on and so on... So you see it's not about 'observatio' or 'empiricism' or anything like that. And yet it is about 'directness' in some sort of way.

Post by Brett Hall

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan Forrester
Also, Popper's philosophy is not solely a description, it also
prescribes standards for scientists to live up to. Can you improve on
those standards?

These are important questions, hibbsa! You should attempt an answer.

Well Brett, they are important questions but showing that Popper went wrong early on, is actually a pretty big category level answer to those questions.

Post by Brett Hall
Incidentally, do you think Popper, and Deutsch explain epistemology as best as it is currently understood? Or do you think there is some better way of understanding the growth of knowledge?

Yes I think they are wrong, but that they also get a lot right. For example I think it is possible to be completey right that, say, Foundationalism is a catastrophic error, and yet have a completely partial and inadequate explanation of the real issue about Foundations. In the same way, I think it's possible to get a lot right about Knowledge and yet for initially pretty subtle omissions be profoundly off base at the same time.
About knowledge...I think the right idea...and the right way to express it...would be much more in the vein of scientific conceptualization and expression. And no surprise there, because I happen to think that way of doing things 'evolved' for a reason and that reason involved a major Problem that is and was incredibly hard to solve.
So the upshot is that, first off, the concept of true creation has to be completely dismissed absent an explanation. And that includes as part of the C&R process.
So the best way to understand this in general, is that new knowledge 'creation' comes about as the integration of two (or more) pre-existent knowledge sets, whether implicit or otherwise.
Try to think of an exception to that.
For example Criticism itself is intrinsically a goal-oriented procedure. That goal could be good philosophy, but on some given instance it could also be something more mundane like "this guy is stupid I'm not going to bother reading his ideas but he gets on my nerves so I'm going to shut him down'. I mean, we might not think it explicitly, but we all moments like that don't we? Or something similar.
So that criticism...that we actually make...is a slightly different concept..it's a marriage of those explicit and implicit goals, and lots of other stuff to do with the conditions there and then..and whatever the other party has brought to the table.
The truth is this model, I don't think contradicts C&R at all. It allows for it. But what it also does is imply different lines of consequences, which create different problems, the solutions of which lead to different things.
But it's inherently something that can be expressed mimimally, probably in a logic or math form with effort. It's also something that implies hard, objective-by-design consequences..things that can be said - always - about every act of knowledge growth. Things that have ramifications.
For example, if every piece of knowlege growth (and much else, like I say, criticism) is an integration of two or more knowledge sets, then the first big ramification is that knowledge is never a clean explanation of one thing. The explanation is changed by the other knowledge set. It becomes a mixture result.
What that means is, for example, if you allow a large implicit assumption to enter your knowledge creations process, and if it becomes 'the other' knowledge set as you integrate two to create new knowledge, then you will have embedded that assumption deeply into the very fibre of your explanatory world. And that new knowledge becomes important in the creation of yet more, then that original implicit assumption will become yet more embedded. In some cases it will be diluted out, but in others it will keep on growing.
The implication, in the end, is that unpicking large influential assumptions gets more and more difficult as new knowledge builds up, and this is a pretty exponential effect in product knowledge creation systems.
This usually doesn't happen, for example a badly motivated criticism can only impact the whole of knowledge so far as that particular criticism has real enduring influence into that world of knowledge. Mostly, the influence doesn't appear so it works out ok.
Now...there are I believe knock on implications about this, that pose serious questions for the basic idea of C&R.
There are many other consequences of viewing knowledge this way. The consequences are more powerful and more objective by design, because this model intrinsically kicks out unknowns like 'creativity'. And does so, without actually asserting anything about the world at all. As I say, the model doesn't have to explain real knowledge growth to be 'real'...it only has to be consistent with real knowledge growth. The *consequences* and *results* of working through the problems will decide the question of truth....as they work ever nearer to it, or not.
There's another objective-by-design implication by the way..if it is true. If all knowledge is created as the integration of two (or more) knowledge sets, then every time we create knowledge we are implicitly asking this question: "What would it take for these two knowledge sets to be consistent and part of the same thing"?
That's an important understanding, I think. Because, if we are always asking that question, then for the same reason as Popper Deutsch realize regarding the importance of 'making explicit' it becomes important to always make that question explicit as part of a suite of other solutions geared toward controlling what those two knowledge sets actually are.
So it would follow from that, that the most productive scientific threads are linked to how explicitly that question was.
Newton's was "What would it take for [how he saw gravity and motion behave on Earth] and [What he saw in the sky] to be consisten and part of the same thing".
Try using that question, and just some realism (another very important but dangerous knowledge set) and Kepler's Laws...another knowledge Newtwon had, and see how far you can go to invent all the laws that Newton did. You, or some others here, will be surprised...it's like butter off a knife.
So....as you see....from a different question come different answers...and the measure of which is the right route, is in the results.

p.s. if you think my explanation of knowledge looks foundationalist, the answer to that is firstly, this is why it's important to start with what went wrong for Popper.

Foundations are a much bigger problem than you think. There's no simple one-off answer the way you think there is. The problem keeps on reappearing and growing and reappearing in its own right. Therefore the solution has to also keep on growing and reappearing on new levels.

The way things pan out, I think, is that yes Foundations are a huge problem, but from the human perspective the even huger problem turns out to be how to control the implicit influences...and that problem is also a direct implication of the basic model I'm pointing to.

Where that goes is, yes Foundations are a huge implicit problem straight away in the model. But humans, have absolutely no chance of ever solving that one...not as it really is in reality...if they can't first solve the problem of how to create explanations that don't embed implicit misconceptions ever more intricately into their explanatory world, in ever harder to spot and unpick ways.

And actually, these two problems turn out to be different faces of the same thing. Large influential implicit assumptions...if their influence continues and grows....actually progressively become the foundations, in that because they are never controlled or spotted, their influences just keep on growing, until in the limit the whole explanatory world becomes a huge description of the reality that would be if those assumptions were true.

And that's why it's catastrophic. That's why foundationalism is a true catastrophic error. It describes this outcome. But it's huger than just a human problem. It's a problem that was embedded into reality itself, which reality had to find a solution for.

And if the probelm kept on growing and reappearing, then so did that solution have to.

And this is why foundations are so central. The solution for reality, and to science, and everything else that endures, has to be seen as ever more and more the solution to foundations. Similarly some other key problems Popper noticed and also the original scientists and philosophers noticed. Those problems, like 'authority' (in fact itself one face of something that has other faces like 'power', 'energy' etc).

[Brett Hall]

Post by hibbsa

Post by Brett Hall

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan Forrester
What would analysing science "directly" entail

Minimally it would entail a decision to cut out
the philosopher middle
men and go see for himself.

Whom does "himself" refer to? The scientist? You
want the scientist to "go see for himself" how
science is done or something?

Brett - I can see that I haven't made it clear yet what the correct approach would be to analyse Science. I can certainly reassure you though it is nothing to do with calls for empiricism or observing scientists at work. Although certainly it could and would naturally lead to that eventually, just as it does in science. I don't think there's a difference between real philosophy and real science. Neither does Deutsch so we agree.

That has nothing to do with the quote you have provided from me.

Post by hibbsa
But at the moment most of my effort is going into trying to shed light on what went wrong in the Popperian philosophy.

I don't know what has gone wrong with it. No one has suggested anything "went wrong" on this list. Of course there are many people who don't understand Popper, like say Kuhn and his many followers, who think Popper was wrong. But they never articulate a good reading of Popper and their criticisms can be dismissed as misunderstandings.

Now here you are saying you are "trying to shed light on what went wrong in the Popperian philosophy" and yet you provide no list of errors or criticisms. Can you provide an example, here and now? What's wrong with Popper's epistemology?

Reading through all of this post now, and my replies below, I challenge your claim to be shedding light. You are casting shadows and obscuring things. State, plainly, where Popper went wrong. State, clearly, what your improvements are. State, clearly, what "serious questions" you think need to be answered are.

Post by hibbsa
I am not yet putting effort into explaining what I think the right approach entails. I think it is important to see how and why something went wrong in the Popperian philosophy becaue that is linked to how and why the way I used is correct. I think it's going to be hard to understand what went wront with Popper, and in some cases hard to want to understand. I of course fully accept this could go the other way.

So you cannot say what went wrong with Popper. But you assert *something* did. Something you don't know. And moreover you cannot (or choose not to) attempt an explanation as to what the right approach would entail.

What is there to engage with here, with you? Neither a criticism of Popper (beyond the bold assertion that he is "wrong") and no alternative epistemology to discuss. What are these posts about, then?

Post by hibbsa
So perhaps concentrate on the area I am putting effort in...what went wrong with Popper. If you want to.

You haven't convinced me that anything went wrong with Popper. In any of your posts.

Post by hibbsa
And if I want to respond to future posts to me from you on this matter. We both have to want to. On my side I will need to see some sign of real thought.

I am not pretending to provide revelatory insights into Popperian epistemology that others on these lists have not already covered. It is hard to make genuine creative contributions to this area in the way David has. But I do claim to be criticising your lack of clarity. I'm not doing this to be nasty...criticism is the *only* way we can make progress and come to mutual understanding. For example, I'm not sure what you mean by "real thought". Sounds ad-hominem.

Post by hibbsa
FYI the question you ask above and several below don't really 'do it' for me.

Post by Brett Hall
You haven't answered the question. Not in the slightest. What would analysing science "directly" entail???

I think I did give a reasonable answer, so long as you realize there is no intrinsic 'right way' to do things.

What do you mean by "things" now? The scientific method? (okay, right, there's no one method that works all the time) or do you mean us discussing things here and now? Okay, there's no "right way" there either but there are productive and less-good ways of discussing stuff. Your obscure way of writing doesn't clarify. It casts shadows where a light would be better.

Post by hibbsa
It needs explaining. Each way raises its own problems and as Deutsch say, interesting problems are soluable. Popper could have made it work the way he did it, if he'd seen the problems and solved them.

What problems?

Post by hibbsa
But he didn't and that's the real issue here.

What problems?!

Post by hibbsa
I think the reason he didn't is because the way everything was set up made it devilishly hard to 'see' the problem.

The problem? Not plural? Just one now? What is it?

Post by hibbsa
As indeed people are finding hard here. The 'direct' solution, is not direct in the empirical sense...and 'direct' probably isn't a good word. Let me try another simple expr? ession for the distinction between Popper Deutsch approach and mine.

What, exactly, is your approach to how science should be done and how knowledge grows? Can you improve on "guess and criticise", for example?

Post by hibbsa
If Popper Deutsch's approach could be summed up as the answer to this question: What if Science was Easy To Happen?

If it was easy then progress would be faster.

Post by hibbsa
Then my approach could be summed up as: What if Science was Really Hard To Happen.

Progress would be slower.

Any problem with my responses?

Post by hibbsa
I think this is a good way to understand things, and actually that question is pretty much what has guided me.

I don't. If science was harder or easier to do, then progress in science (and then all other fields) would speed up or slow down with respect to time, compared with the present rate when science is just as hard as it is.

I do not know how to measure the degree of hardness of science though. Some may have ideas on this. Do you? The world is explicable. Is it explicable but hard to understand? Yes. Nothing is obvious. How hard is it? I'm not sure that is even meaningful. It could be a category error. That is to say, it might be a question that admits of a qualitative, not quantitative answer...and you are after the latter. In error.

Post by hibbsa
If Popper Deutsch had asked that question at the start, I think they would have basically ended up with something along the lines of what they did get. A lucky coincidence of conditions allows a simple but profound thing called a Culture of Criticism to take root (one condition being 'Rejection of Authority').
This allows Science to be hard to happen but only in the sense the coincidence of the conditions needed to be 'lucky'
With Science Easy to Happen, then almost by definition the specific details of the specific way it happend aren't necessarily important. And in fact, as they 'discover' in the event was mostly all nonsense. So there you go.

There you go? I'm still unsure. Now I am thinking: is this "science easy to happen" thing about whether or not science would, or would not, come into existence *at all*? Is that your question? Such a counterfactual probably isn't at all important, except to historians. It's not a philosophical question. There have been accidents of history that meant enlightenments and progress occurred when they did. But given the existence of people, science probably is inevitable in the multiverse. Your concern seems parochial.

Post by hibbsa
But if the root question is "What if Science was Really Hard to Happen" then the starting point becomes "What if the way Science happened...all it's key traits as they really were....were literally the only way Science could have happened, because the Problems that had to be solved were Really Really Hard."

What? Science is what it is. One can play childish games, I'm sure, and wonder "but what if there was a universe where science was magic and magic was science" and so forth, but that's uninteresting. Science here in our universe is an error correction device which grows knowledge of the physical world. What else could it be, childish linguistic games aside?

Science could have happened in an infinite number of ways...Newton might not have been born, nor Galileo or Socrates, etc, etc. The enlightenment could have happened far sooner, or later, or not at all. None of that was inevitable. Science might have happened in a different way. But given our brains, I reckon science is inevitable.

Post by hibbsa
...and so on and so on... So you see it's not about 'observatio' or 'empiricism' or anything like that. And yet it is about 'directness' in some sort of way.

Post by Brett Hall

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan Forrester
Also, Popper's philosophy is not solely a description, it also
prescribes standards for scientists to live up to. Can you improve on
those standards?

These are important questions, hibbsa! You should attempt an answer.

Well Brett, they are important questions but showing that Popper went wrong early on, is actually a pretty big category level answer to those questions.

You still have not done anything, in these last two posts at least, beyond the bare assertion that Popper went wrong. But you do not say where, or how. You provide no explanation. You are not arguing. To just say "Popper was wrong" (which, it seems to me, your most recent postings reduce to) doesn't allow us to make headway. Perhaps you have said something in previous posts - ok then, but I do tend to follow these lists. I probably would not have missed a good challenge to Popperian epistemology. But that aside, each post *should be* stand alone. I shouldn't have to go searching the archives for your argument.

So again, can you provide your argument of where Popper went wrong? What is inadequate about his view of knowledge? Below you make some fitful starts at this, but it lacks the detail of what might be called an "epistemology" as it fails to adequately *explain* why it is that progress occurs. We see objective progress: how do you explain it? Guessing at objective truth and criticising gets us there. And we converge on the truth and people come to understand the same things. As I explain below, your scheme fails to explain these phenomena.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Brett Hall
Incidentally, do you think Popper, and Deutsch explain epistemology as best as it is currently understood? Or do you think there is some better way of understanding the growth of knowledge?

Yes I think they are wrong, but that they also get a lot right. For example I think it is possible to be completey right that, say, Foundationalism is a catastrophic error, and yet have a completely partial and inadequate explanation of the real issue about Foundations. In the same way, I think it's possible to get a lot right about Knowledge and yet for initially pretty subtle omissions be profoundly off base at the same time.

Those are all assertions again. No explanation. Just bare assertions that you think certain things are true and certain things are inadequate...but no explanation of why you think any of it. Not even one "because" after any "I think...".

Post by hibbsa
About knowledge...I think the right idea...and the right way to express it...would be much more in the vein of scientific conceptualization and expression. And no surprise there, because I happen to think that way of doing things 'evolved' for a reason and that reason involved a major Problem that is and was incredibly hard to solve.

Now there's a "because" but it still doesn't constitute an explanation of your position. What does "scientific conceptualization and expression" mean? That is key...that is what needs explanation. You should elaborate on this so we have something substantive to engage with.

The "way if doing things" you refer to is, I guess you mean, how science is done. I am not sure, because (again) I find it hard to follow you. Science and the way science is done no doubt evolves - intelligently - people choose what works best and test it. Even the methods of science. Exactly as Popper's epistemology predicts. That's not a failing of Popper. That's a success. The way science works is precisely as he describes. And it gets better...in just the way he predicts.

Post by hibbsa
So the upshot is that, first off, the concept of true creation has to be completely dismissed absent an explanation.

Um...? I don't understand. Who is dismissing true creation? If you don't have an explanation, of any type, of "creation" then creation wouldn't exist. What exists is that which features in our best explanations. Creation is real as that is where knowledge comes from. A creative act, then surviving criticism.

I am not sure what "true" as a prefix means here. Is it redundant?

Post by hibbsa
And that includes as part of the C&R process.
So the best way to understand this in general, is that new knowledge 'creation' comes about as the integration of two (or more) pre-existent knowledge sets, whether implicit or otherwise.

Well...again, that is Popperian. No revelation here. Deutsch explains this in many places in FoR and especially BoI - all knowledge is some adaptation of prior knowledge. Knowledge improves incrementally. So, yes...creation occurs when we change (improve) some already existing knowledge. We don't create ex-nihilio. Although the creative changes we do make to existing knowledge - we cannot yet explain that.

Can you?

Post by hibbsa
Try to think of an exception to that.

Why? It's how all knowledge is created. As Popper and Deutsch explain.

Post by hibbsa
For example Criticism itself is intrinsically a goal-oriented procedure. That goal could be good philosophy, but on some given instance it could also be something more mundane like "this guy is stupid I'm not going to bother reading his ideas but he gets on my nerves so I'm going to shut him down'.

That is a related, but nonetheless *different* meaning of the word "criticism" when applied to knowledge claims. Adhominem attacks on a person - like asserting someone is stupid - isn't a criticism in the Popperian sense, to my mind. It's just a useless insult.

Post by hibbsa
I mean, we might not think it explicitly, but we all moments like that don't we? Or something similar.

But this is no criticism of criticism.

Post by hibbsa
So that criticism...that we actually make...is a slightly different concept..it's a marriage of those explicit and implicit goals, and lots of other stuff to do with the conditions there and then..and whatever the other party has brought to the table.
The truth is this model, I don't think contradicts C&R at all.

Right. Because from what I can tell, it's not a different model. So, no surprise so far.

Post by hibbsa
It allows for it. But what it also does is imply different lines of consequences, which create different problems, the solutions of which lead to different things.

For example?

Post by hibbsa
But it's inherently something that can be expressed mimimally, probably in a logic or math form with effort.

So do so. But why would that be an improvement to have a symbolic schema? If it can be said at all, it can be said clearly...in English.

Post by hibbsa
It's also something that implies hard, objective-by-design consequences..things that can be said - always - about every act of knowledge growth. Things that have ramifications.
For example, if every piece of knowlege growth (and much else, like I say, criticism) is an integration of two or more knowledge sets, then the first big ramification is that knowledge is never a clean explanation of one thing. The explanation is changed by the other knowledge set. It becomes a mixture result.

Again, this *is* Popperian, not an adaptation of Popper. As genuinely true, deeper explanations are discovered, they can replace multiple less deep explanations. Deeper explanations tend to unify multiple phenomena. So, again, no revelation. You are not adding anything. You are just expressing Popperian epistemology in your own words.

Post by hibbsa
What that means is, for example, if you allow a large implicit assumption to enter your knowledge creations process, and if it becomes 'the other' knowledge set as you integrate two to create new knowledge, then you will have embedded that assumption deeply into the very fibre of your explanatory world. And that new knowledge becomes important in the creation of yet more, then that original implicit assumption will become yet more embedded. In some cases it will be diluted out, but in others it will keep on growing.

Yep.

Post by hibbsa
The implication, in the end, is that unpicking large influential assumptions gets more and more difficult as new knowledge builds up, and this is a pretty exponential effect in product knowledge creation systems.

Exactly. Deutsch explains this sort of things really well in BoI. It's very hard to know what is obvious (impossible?). We often simply cannot see what is right before our eyes. So...the most simple assumptions we (people) made long ago and which are deep, deep in our collective consciousness or whatever...might be hard to know.

Post by hibbsa
This usually doesn't happen, for example a badly motivated criticism can only impact the whole of knowledge so far as that particular criticism has real enduring influence into that world of knowledge. Mostly, the influence doesn't appear so it works out ok.
Now...there are I believe knock on implications about this, that pose serious questions for the basic idea of C&R.

I've been waiting for this...so...you're going to give me these "serious questions for the basic idea of C&R" now? Great!

Post by hibbsa
There are many other consequences of viewing knowledge this way. The consequences are more powerful and more objective by design, because this model intrinsically kicks out unknowns like 'creativity'. And does so, without actually asserting anything about the world at all. As I say, the model doesn't have to explain real knowledge growth to be 'real'...it only has to be consistent with real knowledge growth. The *consequences* and *results* of working through the problems will decide the question of truth....as they work ever nearer to it, or not.

Wait...not one question! I feel cheated! Come on...where are these serious questions?

Post by hibbsa
As I say, the model doesn't have to explain real knowledge growth to be 'real'...it only has to be consistent with real knowledge growth

That's badly false. An *infinite* number of "models" are consistent with the growth of knowledge. For example: the model that "knowledge is guided by a supernatural intelligence interjecting into the brains of humans" explains the growth if knowledge *here on Earth*. But it is *no explanation*.

Consistent models are an infinite amount less than a dime a dozen.

Models of epistemology must have accompanying explanations to be worth anything. Popper's explains knowledge. So for example, if it really was the case that some super intelligence implanted knowledge into humans, C&R would simply ask "fine, but where did the knowledge in the super intelligence come from?" And again, an infinite number of models would be consistent, but the only explanation is creative conjecture and criticism.

Post by hibbsa
There's another objective-by-design implication by the way..if it is true. If all knowledge is created as the integration of two (or more) knowledge sets, then every time we create knowledge we are implicitly asking this question: "What would it take for these two knowledge sets to be consistent and part of the same thing"?
That's an important understanding, I think. Because, if we are always asking that question, then for the same reason as Popper Deutsch realize regarding the importance of 'making explicit' it becomes important to always make that question explicit as part of a suite of other solutions geared toward controlling what those two knowledge sets actually are.
So it would follow from that, that the most productive scientific threads are linked to how explicitly that question was.
Newton's was "What would it take for [how he saw gravity and motion behave on Earth] and [What he saw in the sky] to be consisten and part of the same thing".

Was this really what he asked? How do you know?

Post by hibbsa
Try using that question, and just some realism (another very important but dangerous knowledge set) and Kepler's Laws...another knowledge Newtwon had, and see how far you can go to invent all the laws that Newton did. You, or some others here, will be surprised...it's like butter off a knife.

Not surprised. Look, it's no failing to be accused of not improving on Popper Deutsch. It seems you haven't. But neither have I. I have no seen anyone who has. You're in good company. Keep trying though.

Post by hibbsa
So....as you see....from a different question come different answers...and the measure of which is the right route, is in the results.

Ok...

Well, I've taken a long time to engage with what I could. I hope you can appreciate that for what it is. I'm just not seeing anything new. You seem to be explaining aspects of Popperian epistemology. The flaws you claim there exist in Popper's ideas just are not there. I think your concerns are all answered by Popper and Deutsch in their writings. I must ask...have you read BoI?

Brett


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

[hibbsa]

Post by Brett Hall

Post by hibbsa

Post by Brett Hall

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan Forrester
What would analysing science "directly" entail

Minimally it would entail a decision to cut out
the philosopher middle
men and go see for himself.

Whom does "himself" refer to? The scientist? You
want the scientist to "go see for himself" how
science is done or something?

Brett - I can see that I haven't made it clear yet what the correct approach would be to analyse Science. I can certainly reassure you though it is nothing to do with calls for empiricism or observing scientists at work. Although certainly it could and would naturally lead to that eventually, just as it does in science. I don't think there's a difference between real philosophy and real science. Neither does Deutsch so we agree.

That has nothing to do with the quote you have provided from me.

Post by hibbsa
But at the moment most of my effort is going into trying to shed light on what went wrong in the Popperian philosophy.

I don't know what has gone wrong with it. No one has suggested anything "went wrong" on this list. Of course there are many people who don't understand Popper, like say Kuhn and his many followers, who think Popper was wrong. But they never articulate a good reading of Popper and their criticisms can be dismissed as misunderstandings.
Now here you are saying you are "trying to shed light on what went wrong in the Popperian philosophy" and yet you provide no list of errors or criticisms. Can you provide an example, here and now? What's wrong with Popper's epistemology?
Reading through all of this post now, and my replies below, I challenge your claim to be shedding light. You are casting shadows and obscuring things. State, plainly, where Popper went wrong. State, clearly, what your improvements are. State, clearly, what "serious questions" you think need to be answered are.

Post by hibbsa
I am not yet putting effort into explaining what I think the right approach entails. I think it is important to see how and why something went wrong in the Popperian philosophy becaue that is linked to how and why the way I used is correct. I think it's going to be hard to understand what went wront with Popper, and in some cases hard to want to understand. I of course fully accept this could go the other way.

So you cannot say what went wrong with Popper. But you assert *something* did. Something you don't know. And moreover you cannot (or choose not to) attempt an explanation as to what the right approach would entail.
What is there to engage with here, with you? Neither a criticism of Popper (beyond the bold assertion that he is "wrong") and no alternative epistemology to discuss. What are these posts about, then?

Post by hibbsa
So perhaps concentrate on the area I am putting effort in...what went wrong with Popper. If you want to.

You haven't convinced me that anything went wrong with Popper. In any of your posts.

Post by hibbsa
And if I want to respond to future posts to me from you on this matter. We both have to want to. On my side I will need to see some sign of real thought.

I am not pretending to provide revelatory insights into Popperian epistemology that others on these lists have not already covered. It is hard to make genuine creative contributions to this area in the way David has. But I do claim to be criticising your lack of clarity. I'm not doing this to be nasty...criticism is the *only* way we can make progress and come to mutual understanding. For example, I'm not sure what you mean by "real thought". Sounds ad-hominem.

Post by hibbsa
FYI the question you ask above and several below don't really 'do it' for me.

Post by Brett Hall
You haven't answered the question. Not in the slightest. What would analysing science "directly" entail???

I think I did give a reasonable answer, so long as you realize there is no intrinsic 'right way' to do things.

What do you mean by "things" now? The scientific method? (okay, right, there's no one method that works all the time) or do you mean us discussing things here and now? Okay, there's no "right way" there either but there are productive and less-good ways of discussing stuff. Your obscure way of writing doesn't clarify. It casts shadows where a light would be better.

Post by hibbsa
It needs explaining. Each way raises its own problems and as Deutsch say, interesting problems are soluable. Popper could have made it work the way he did it, if he'd seen the problems and solved them.

What problems?

Post by hibbsa
But he didn't and that's the real issue here.

What problems?!

Post by hibbsa
I think the reason he didn't is because the way everything was set up made it devilishly hard to 'see' the problem.

The problem? Not plural? Just one now? What is it?

Post by hibbsa
As indeed people are finding hard here. The 'direct' solution, is not direct in the empirical sense...and 'direct' probably isn't a good word. Let me try another simple expr? ession for the distinction between Popper Deutsch approach and mine.

What, exactly, is your approach to how science should be done and how knowledge grows? Can you improve on "guess and criticise", for example?

Post by hibbsa
If Popper Deutsch's approach could be summed up as the answer to this question: What if Science was Easy To Happen?

If it was easy then progress would be faster.

Post by hibbsa
Then my approach could be summed up as: What if Science was Really Hard To Happen.

Progress would be slower.
Any problem with my responses?

Post by hibbsa
I think this is a good way to understand things, and actually that question is pretty much what has guided me.

I don't. If science was harder or easier to do, then progress in science (and then all other fields) would speed up or slow down with respect to time, compared with the present rate when science is just as hard as it is.
I do not know how to measure the degree of hardness of science though. Some may have ideas on this. Do you? The world is explicable. Is it explicable but hard to understand? Yes. Nothing is obvious. How hard is it? I'm not sure that is even meaningful. It could be a category error. That is to say, it might be a question that admits of a qualitative, not quantitative answer...and you are after the latter. In error.

Post by hibbsa
If Popper Deutsch had asked that question at the start, I think they would have basically ended up with something along the lines of what they did get. A lucky coincidence of conditions allows a simple but profound thing called a Culture of Criticism to take root (one condition being 'Rejection of Authority').
This allows Science to be hard to happen but only in the sense the coincidence of the conditions needed to be 'lucky'
With Science Easy to Happen, then almost by definition the specific details of the specific way it happend aren't necessarily important. And in fact, as they 'discover' in the event was mostly all nonsense. So there you go.

There you go? I'm still unsure. Now I am thinking: is this "science easy to happen" thing about whether or not science would, or would not, come into existence *at all*? Is that your question? Such a counterfactual probably isn't at all important, except to historians. It's not a philosophical question. There have been accidents of history that meant enlightenments and progress occurred when they did. But given the existence of people, science probably is inevitable in the multiverse. Your concern seems parochial.

Post by hibbsa
But if the root question is "What if Science was Really Hard to Happen" then the starting point becomes "What if the way Science happened...all it's key traits as they really were....were literally the only way Science could have happened, because the Problems that had to be solved were Really Really Hard."

What? Science is what it is. One can play childish games, I'm sure, and wonder "but what if there was a universe where science was magic and magic was science" and so forth, but that's uninteresting. Science here in our universe is an error correction device which grows knowledge of the physical world. What else could it be, childish linguistic games aside?
Science could have happened in an infinite number of ways...Newton might not have been born, nor Galileo or Socrates, etc, etc. The enlightenment could have happened far sooner, or later, or not at all. None of that was inevitable. Science might have happened in a different way. But given our brains, I reckon science is inevitable.

Post by hibbsa
...and so on and so on... So you see it's not about 'observatio' or 'empiricism' or anything like that. And yet it is about 'directness' in some sort of way.

Post by Brett Hall

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan Forrester
Also, Popper's philosophy is not solely a description, it also
prescribes standards for scientists to live up to. Can you improve on
those standards?

These are important questions, hibbsa! You should attempt an answer.

Well Brett, they are important questions but showing that Popper went wrong early on, is actually a pretty big category level answer to those questions.

You still have not done anything, in these last two posts at least, beyond the bare assertion that Popper went wrong. But you do not say where, or how. You provide no explanation. You are not arguing. To just say "Popper was wrong" (which, it seems to me, your most recent postings reduce to) doesn't allow us to make headway. Perhaps you have said something in previous posts - ok then, but I do tend to follow these lists. I probably would not have missed a good challenge to Popperian epistemology. But that aside, each post *should be* stand alone. I shouldn't have to go searching the archives for your argument.
So again, can you provide your argument of where Popper went wrong? What is inadequate about his view of knowledge? Below you make some fitful starts at this, but it lacks the detail of what might be called an "epistemology" as it fails to adequately *explain* why it is that progress occurs. We see objective progress: how do you explain it? Guessing at objective truth and criticising gets us there. And we converge on the truth and people come to understand the same things. As I explain below, your scheme fails to explain these phenomena.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Brett Hall
Incidentally, do you think Popper, and Deutsch explain epistemology as best as it is currently understood? Or do you think there is some better way of understanding the growth of knowledge?

Yes I think they are wrong, but that they also get a lot right. For example I think it is possible to be completey right that, say, Foundationalism is a catastrophic error, and yet have a completely partial and inadequate explanation of the real issue about Foundations. In the same way, I think it's possible to get a lot right about Knowledge and yet for initially pretty subtle omissions be profoundly off base at the same time.

Those are all assertions again. No explanation. Just bare assertions that you think certain things are true and certain things are inadequate...but no explanation of why you think any of it. Not even one "because" after any "I think...".

Post by hibbsa
About knowledge...I think the right idea...and the right way to express it...would be much more in the vein of scientific conceptualization and expression. And no surprise there, because I happen to think that way of doing things 'evolved' for a reason and that reason involved a major Problem that is and was incredibly hard to solve.

Now there's a "because" but it still doesn't constitute an explanation of your position. What does "scientific conceptualization and expression" mean? That is key...that is what needs explanation. You should elaborate on this so we have something substantive to engage with.
The "way if doing things" you refer to is, I guess you mean, how science is done. I am not sure, because (again) I find it hard to follow you. Science and the way science is done no doubt evolves - intelligently - people choose what works best and test it. Even the methods of science. Exactly as Popper's epistemology predicts. That's not a failing of Popper. That's a success. The way science works is precisely as he describes. And it gets better...in just the way he predicts.

Post by hibbsa
So the upshot is that, first off, the concept of true creation has to be completely dismissed absent an explanation.

Um...? I don't understand. Who is dismissing true creation? If you don't have an explanation, of any type, of "creation" then creation wouldn't exist. What exists is that which features in our best explanations. Creation is real as that is where knowledge comes from. A creative act, then surviving criticism.
I am not sure what "true" as a prefix means here. Is it redundant?

Post by hibbsa
And that includes as part of the C&R process.
So the best way to understand this in general, is that new knowledge 'creation' comes about as the integration of two (or more) pre-existent knowledge sets, whether implicit or otherwise.

Well...again, that is Popperian. No revelation here. Deutsch explains this in many places in FoR and especially BoI - all knowledge is some adaptation of prior knowledge. Knowledge improves incrementally. So, yes...creation occurs when we change (improve) some already existing knowledge. We don't create ex-nihilio. Although the creative changes we do make to existing knowledge - we cannot yet explain that.
Can you?

Post by hibbsa
Try to think of an exception to that.

Why? It's how all knowledge is created. As Popper and Deutsch explain.

Post by hibbsa
For example Criticism itself is intrinsically a goal-oriented procedure. That goal could be good philosophy, but on some given instance it could also be something more mundane like "this guy is stupid I'm not going to bother reading his ideas but he gets on my nerves so I'm going to shut him down'.

That is a related, but nonetheless *different* meaning of the word "criticism" when applied to knowledge claims. Adhominem attacks on a person - like asserting someone is stupid - isn't a criticism in the Popperian sense, to my mind. It's just a useless insult.

Post by hibbsa
I mean, we might not think it explicitly, but we all moments like that don't we? Or something similar.

But this is no criticism of criticism.

Post by hibbsa
So that criticism...that we actually make...is a slightly different concept..it's a marriage of those explicit and implicit goals, and lots of other stuff to do with the conditions there and then..and whatever the other party has brought to the table.
The truth is this model, I don't think contradicts C&R at all.

Right. Because from what I can tell, it's not a different model. So, no surprise so far.

Post by hibbsa
It allows for it. But what it also does is imply different lines of consequences, which create different problems, the solutions of which lead to different things.

For example?

Post by hibbsa
But it's inherently something that can be expressed mimimally, probably in a logic or math form with effort.

So do so. But why would that be an improvement to have a symbolic schema? If it can be said at all, it can be said clearly...in English.

Post by hibbsa
It's also something that implies hard, objective-by-design consequences..things that can be said - always - about every act of knowledge growth. Things that have ramifications.
For example, if every piece of knowlege growth (and much else, like I say, criticism) is an integration of two or more knowledge sets, then the first big ramification is that knowledge is never a clean explanation of one thing. The explanation is changed by the other knowledge set. It becomes a mixture result.

Again, this *is* Popperian, not an adaptation of Popper. As genuinely true, deeper explanations are discovered, they can replace multiple less deep explanations. Deeper explanations tend to unify multiple phenomena. So, again, no revelation. You are not adding anything. You are just expressing Popperian epistemology in your own words.

Post by hibbsa
What that means is, for example, if you allow a large implicit assumption to enter your knowledge creations process, and if it becomes 'the other' knowledge set as you integrate two to create new knowledge, then you will have embedded that assumption deeply into the very fibre of your explanatory world. And that new knowledge becomes important in the creation of yet more, then that original implicit assumption will become yet more embedded. In some cases it will be diluted out, but in others it will keep on growing.

Yep.

Post by hibbsa
The implication, in the end, is that unpicking large influential assumptions gets more and more difficult as new knowledge builds up, and this is a pretty exponential effect in product knowledge creation systems.

Exactly. Deutsch explains this sort of things really well in BoI. It's very hard to know what is obvious (impossible?). We often simply cannot see what is right before our eyes. So...the most simple assumptions we (people) made long ago and which are deep, deep in our collective consciousness or whatever...might be hard to know.

Post by hibbsa
This usually doesn't happen, for example a badly motivated criticism can only impact the whole of knowledge so far as that particular criticism has real enduring influence into that world of knowledge. Mostly, the influence doesn't appear so it works out ok.
Now...there are I believe knock on implications about this, that pose serious questions for the basic idea of C&R.

I've been waiting for this...so...you're going to give me these "serious questions for the basic idea of C&R" now? Great!

Post by hibbsa
There are many other consequences of viewing knowledge this way. The consequences are more powerful and more objective by design, because this model intrinsically kicks out unknowns like 'creativity'. And does so, without actually asserting anything about the world at all. As I say, the model doesn't have to explain real knowledge growth to be 'real'...it only has to be consistent with real knowledge growth. The *consequences* and *results* of working through the problems will decide the question of truth....as they work ever nearer to it, or not.

Wait...not one question! I feel cheated! Come on...where are these serious questions?

Post by hibbsa
As I say, the model doesn't have to explain real knowledge growth to be 'real'...it only has to be consistent with real knowledge growth

That's badly false. An *infinite* number of "models" are consistent with the growth of knowledge. For example: the model that "knowledge is guided by a supernatural intelligence interjecting into the brains of humans" explains the growth if knowledge *here on Earth*. But it is *no explanation*.
Consistent models are an infinite amount less than a dime a dozen.
Models of epistemology must have accompanying explanations to be worth anything. Popper's explains knowledge. So for example, if it really was the case that some super intelligence implanted knowledge into humans, C&R would simply ask "fine, but where did the knowledge in the super intelligence come from?" And again, an infinite number of models would be consistent, but the only explanation is creative conjecture and criticism.

Post by hibbsa
There's another objective-by-design implication by the way..if it is true. If all knowledge is created as the integration of two (or more) knowledge sets, then every time we create knowledge we are implicitly asking this question: "What would it take for these two knowledge sets to be consistent and part of the same thing"?
That's an important understanding, I think. Because, if we are always asking that question, then for the same reason as Popper Deutsch realize regarding the importance of 'making explicit' it becomes important to always make that question explicit as part of a suite of other solutions geared toward controlling what those two knowledge sets actually are.
So it would follow from that, that the most productive scientific threads are linked to how explicitly that question was.
Newton's was "What would it take for [how he saw gravity and motion behave on Earth] and [What he saw in the sky] to be consisten and part of the same thing".

Was this really what he asked? How do you know?

Post by hibbsa
Try using that question, and just some realism (another very important but dangerous knowledge set) and Kepler's Laws...another knowledge Newtwon had, and see how far you can go to invent all the laws that Newton did. You, or some others here, will be surprised...it's like butter off a knife.

Not surprised. Look, it's no failing to be accused of not improving on Popper Deutsch. It seems you haven't. But neither have I. I have no seen anyone who has. You're in good company. Keep trying though.

Post by hibbsa
So....as you see....from a different question come different answers...and the measure of which is the right route, is in the results.

Ok...
Well, I've taken a long time to engage with what I could. I hope you can appreciate that for what it is. I'm just not seeing anything new. You seem to be explaining aspects of Popperian epistemology. The flaws you claim there exist in Popper's ideas just are not there. I think your concerns are all answered by Popper and Deutsch in their writings. I must ask...have you read BoI?
Brett
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Brett, you're asking me to spoon feed you. Maybe I will be willing to do this, if you will first summarize what you think I've said about the mistake Popper made. If you can do that an show either insight/ability (my judgement) your end, OR just good old effort, then I will seriously consider a commitment to working with your questions.

[Nick Belane]

Post by hibbsa
**
...
Brett, you're asking me to spoon feed you. Maybe I will be willing to do
this, if you will first summarize what you think I've said about the
mistake Popper made. If you can do that an show either insight/ability (my
judgement) your end, OR just good old effort, then I will seriously
consider a commitment to working with your questions.

Hibbsa,
I honestly experience the same problems Brett is trying to list when I read
your posts.

Could you just repost something from scratch with a numbered list of
self-consistent short sentences in simple english which critic something
specific about Popper's thoughts?
We could have missed something you think you have already clarified in one
of your previous posts.

That would be great!

Thanks,
Piernicola

[hibbsa]

Post by Nick Belane

Post by hibbsa
**
...
Brett, you're asking me to spoon feed you. Maybe I will be willing to do
this, if you will first summarize what you think I've said about the
mistake Popper made. If you can do that an show either insight/ability (my
judgement) your end, OR just good old effort, then I will seriously
consider a commitment to working with your questions.

Hibbsa,
I honestly experience the same problems Brett is trying to list when I read
your posts.
Could you just repost something from scratch with a numbered list of
self-consistent short sentences in simple english which critic something
specific about Popper's thoughts?
We could have missed something you think you have already clarified in one
of your previous posts.
That would be great!
Thanks,
Piernicola

Brett, Piernicola, Alan,

I sincerely appreciate and am grateful for the attention which I regard as generous and understand as time taken from busy lives.

But I think it is rfeally important to establish an understanding what sort of criticism and/or questions is going to be beneficial.

There is a strong relationship between the results of the study I've done and the results obtained by Deutsch and Popper. But the outcomes are very very different, for reasons that can be explained.

Alan has mentioned that the Philosophy can handle initial Authorities or any other bad start. I agree with him, and if he would read the next paragraph or so below the one he gets that 'authorities' view from, he'll note I acknowledge that, but then mention that...for the C&R to happen to fix the problems (say of Authorities or whatever) it actually has to happen, and in the instance I am speaking of it didn't and hasn't, and that's the point.

This isn't going to be easy to get across. It won't work to create multiple questions/criticisms threaded throughout posts the way Brett is doing. This is because, if something hasn't yet been understood, that non-understanding will thread through all those criticisms.

It could work if you are happy that I will read all your criticisms and try to see the key point that is most common to all criticisms. Maybe that would work if it was acceptable to you?

But with that, I would also like that we definitely focus on one thing as the centre. I think it's premature to focus on, for example, what I'm saying the right solution to Knowledge is. I answered that because it was asked.

But really the important first componentis debating what occured by Popper's decision to make the philosophical ideas relating to things like inductivism, empiricism, foundationalism, the centre piece of his 'view' into Science proper. That's key.

I'm sorry if I've seemed unappreciative Brett ps....it's just that I do think I've already said a lot about what went wrong for Popper, and I do think it is reasonable to ask that an amount of effort goes into making some embryonic sense...even if it's scathing and unhappy. I don't mind....but just saying there's nothing makes it hard for me to be able to distinguish whether you've bothered. And if you hadn't bothered, then why would you suddenly start bothering?

In any event.....whatever happens....I will continue as I get time to try to rephrase and improve.

So I will definitely be doing what you ask....as and when. So hopefully whether now or later, we will be having a good debate.

[Alan Forrester]

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan Forrester

Post by hibbsa

Let's say there was this amazing, unique and complex phenomena never before seen in human history, that was regarded as hugelyimportant and transformational, but not at all well understood and so important to get a deep explanation about.
Further examination revealed that in terms of the complexity and
uniqueness the phenomenon clustered in two places: in terms of its
physical manifestation - the regularities, reccurrent themes,
organization, approaches - basically everything. All this and then its
evolution in time as well. The whole thing, its parts its whole, asa
suite of traits, as a history: in the overwhelming majority wasboth
complex and unique - not seen before in human history.
The other cluster was basically everything describing its product,its
productivity, its influence, its byproducts, and so on. This was also
complex and unique in human history, and then amazing on top ofthat as
well.
So thinking about the various possibilities of how all this was
explained, what I think I am comfortable to say is that, given this
complex uniqueness characterized the underlying suite of traits,and
then shows up again in its product and influence also complex and unique
(if anything more so), far and away the most intuitive - and reasonable,
and most promising, hypothesis would be that the underlying unique
complexity is the major causal force giving rise to the unique and
complex outcomes. I'd say there'd be every reason to put this at the top
of the list of the most promising prospects and exploring that would
reasonably be the first port of call.
Where would others here stand on this matter? Do you see it the same? Do
you agree it's certainly intuitive and reasonable. I should think it
would also be the best explanation in the popperian sense too. Or is the
intuitiveness a worry in your books? Is it a reason to look elsewhere,
for something more counter-intuitive? I'm being serious.
What about Popper? It's pretty clear I'm talking about something that is
just like Science. Just like a process of philosophizing science.
Or if let's say you don't experience my view so strongly as I seem to
be. Let's say for you this would be priority 2, or priority 3. That
would be fine. But then what about the possibility you or someone else
would regard this explanation as so unpromising that they didn't put it
on their to-do list at all. In fact didn't regard any direct examination
of the phenomenon as useful at all, and didn't put that on his to-do
list either.
Would that be rational? Would that be appropriate? Yes, it's what Popper
appears to have done, or something reasonably approximating to that. But
why? Or am I wrong and badly needing putting out of my misery, in which
case please let's get it over with :O)

so to summarize. the criticism is not that Popper sought to explain both
the suite of traits characterizing the manifestation of science on the
ground, and also the phenomenal growth of knowledge that was the
product, by the same common thing ( basically C&R ).
The criticism is that the key principles involved in C&R were selected
largely in a process of elimination, that largely featured the
philosophical components such as Justificationalism, Induction,
Foundationalism, Empiricism, Positivism, and so on, as possible
competing candidates.
But, those philosophical positions, didn't come from a direct analysis
of what was happening in science itself, but from attempts by scientists
to do philosophy about that underlying science. And, basically for many
of the reasons Popper himself identified about those philosophical
attempts, there is good reason to think the scientists that tried to do
this philosophy, were not at all clear what was happening in Science.
So the criticism is that of a fragility right at the core of the
philosophy. A dependency on the philosophical impressions of scientists
as to what was happening in Science, where Popper might have seen
something rather different had he analysed the reality of science
directly, from a philosophical standpoint.
I think this is a fairly straightforward and simple criticism. It should
be possible for David Deutsch or someone suitable to refute the critcism
or ask for more information, or whatever. I will endeavour to keep
looking for ways to make the criticism more clear, working on the
assumption if I'm not getting any kind of 'bite' it's because I haven't
yet made things clear enough.
So as and when I get the time, this is what I will endeavour to do.

What would analysing science "directly" entail

Minimally it would entail a decision to cut out the philosopher middle
men and go see for himself. How things would develop would depend on
what was coming up for Popper and the directions he judged to go.
Both parts of my answer - I think - in large part arise as consequences
of the goals Popper had set himself. He was there to do fundamental
work. Popper was a visionary - he seen the possibility to solve the
puzzles of philosophy and the Western Enlightenment as part of the same
approach. Or that's my guess. Whatever his vision was, though, his
ambition was to do primary top-level problem solving.
How that's not a goal that can be reconciled with a policy of
outsourcing top-level judgements off to third parties. To be
fundamental, Popper had to be at the centre...with full spectrum control
over third party input at every stage. But the way he structured things
in the event, had no possibility at all of securing an adequate degree
of primacy to Popper's judgement in the process. He was effectively
deferring to the judgements of the philosopher middlemen.
Another way to conceptualize the arrangement he was left with is in
terms of the scourge of Authority. He could criticize the internal logic
of what the middlemen were proposing. But he couldn't criticize the
judgements and decisions and other influences that translated the
reality of Science, or some part of it, into the proposition being
recieved by Popper. And because he couldn't criticize it, by consequence
those philosophical middlemen manifested as a cluster of Authorities,
encircling Popper's core.
It's logically impossible to do fundamental work on something outside
and wider, like Science or the Englightenment, if the embryonic
philosophy you are using for a vehicle, defines a set of independent
authorities for its core. Think about it. It's impossible.

You have said a lot about the origin of something or other that you say is bad. You have then asserted that since Popper had some unspecified bad assumptions he made unspecified mistakes. This cloud of vague abstraction is no good at all as a criticism.

You further assert that you can't start with a bad set of authorities and make progress, but that's false. Provided that you're willing to discard ideas that don't survive criticism and you look for problems, starting with bad ideas is not an insurmountable obstacle to progress. See Popper's "On the sources of knowledge and of ignorance" in "Conjectures and Refutations".

Alan

[hibbsa]

Post by Alan Forrester

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan Forrester

Post by hibbsa

Let's say there was this amazing, unique and complex phenomena never before seen in human history, that was regarded as hugelyimportant and transformational, but not at all well understood and so important to get a deep explanation about.
Further examination revealed that in terms of the complexity and
uniqueness the phenomenon clustered in two places: in terms of its
physical manifestation - the regularities, reccurrent themes,
organization, approaches - basically everything. All this and then its
evolution in time as well. The whole thing, its parts its whole, asa
suite of traits, as a history: in the overwhelming majority wasboth
complex and unique - not seen before in human history.
The other cluster was basically everything describing its product,its
productivity, its influence, its byproducts, and so on. This was also
complex and unique in human history, and then amazing on top ofthat as
well.
So thinking about the various possibilities of how all this was
explained, what I think I am comfortable to say is that, given this
complex uniqueness characterized the underlying suite of traits,and
then shows up again in its product and influence also complex and unique
(if anything more so), far and away the most intuitive - and reasonable,
and most promising, hypothesis would be that the underlying unique
complexity is the major causal force giving rise to the unique and
complex outcomes. I'd say there'd be every reason to put this at the top
of the list of the most promising prospects and exploring that would
reasonably be the first port of call.
Where would others here stand on this matter? Do you see it the same? Do
you agree it's certainly intuitive and reasonable. I should think it
would also be the best explanation in the popperian sense too. Or is the
intuitiveness a worry in your books? Is it a reason to look elsewhere,
for something more counter-intuitive? I'm being serious.
What about Popper? It's pretty clear I'm talking about something that is
just like Science. Just like a process of philosophizing science.
Or if let's say you don't experience my view so strongly as I seem to
be. Let's say for you this would be priority 2, or priority 3. That
would be fine. But then what about the possibility you or someone else
would regard this explanation as so unpromising that they didn't put it
on their to-do list at all. In fact didn't regard any direct examination
of the phenomenon as useful at all, and didn't put that on his to-do
list either.
Would that be rational? Would that be appropriate? Yes, it's what Popper
appears to have done, or something reasonably approximating to that. But
why? Or am I wrong and badly needing putting out of my misery, in which
case please let's get it over with :O)

so to summarize. the criticism is not that Popper sought to explain both
the suite of traits characterizing the manifestation of science on the
ground, and also the phenomenal growth of knowledge that was the
product, by the same common thing ( basically C&R ).
The criticism is that the key principles involved in C&R were selected
largely in a process of elimination, that largely featured the
philosophical components such as Justificationalism, Induction,
Foundationalism, Empiricism, Positivism, and so on, as possible
competing candidates.
But, those philosophical positions, didn't come from a direct analysis
of what was happening in science itself, but from attempts by scientists
to do philosophy about that underlying science. And, basically for many
of the reasons Popper himself identified about those philosophical
attempts, there is good reason to think the scientists that tried to do
this philosophy, were not at all clear what was happening in Science.
So the criticism is that of a fragility right at the core of the
philosophy. A dependency on the philosophical impressions of scientists
as to what was happening in Science, where Popper might have seen
something rather different had he analysed the reality of science
directly, from a philosophical standpoint.
I think this is a fairly straightforward and simple criticism. It should
be possible for David Deutsch or someone suitable to refute the critcism
or ask for more information, or whatever. I will endeavour to keep
looking for ways to make the criticism more clear, working on the
assumption if I'm not getting any kind of 'bite' it's because I haven't
yet made things clear enough.
So as and when I get the time, this is what I will endeavour to do.

What would analysing science "directly" entail

Minimally it would entail a decision to cut out the philosopher middle
men and go see for himself. How things would develop would depend on
what was coming up for Popper and the directions he judged to go.
Both parts of my answer - I think - in large part arise as consequences
of the goals Popper had set himself. He was there to do fundamental
work. Popper was a visionary - he seen the possibility to solve the
puzzles of philosophy and the Western Enlightenment as part of the same
approach. Or that's my guess. Whatever his vision was, though, his
ambition was to do primary top-level problem solving.
How that's not a goal that can be reconciled with a policy of
outsourcing top-level judgements off to third parties. To be
fundamental, Popper had to be at the centre...with full spectrum control
over third party input at every stage. But the way he structured things
in the event, had no possibility at all of securing an adequate degree
of primacy to Popper's judgement in the process. He was effectively
deferring to the judgements of the philosopher middlemen.
Another way to conceptualize the arrangement he was left with is in
terms of the scourge of Authority. He could criticize the internal logic
of what the middlemen were proposing. But he couldn't criticize the
judgements and decisions and other influences that translated the
reality of Science, or some part of it, into the proposition being
recieved by Popper. And because he couldn't criticize it, by consequence
those philosophical middlemen manifested as a cluster of Authorities,
encircling Popper's core.
It's logically impossible to do fundamental work on something outside
and wider, like Science or the Englightenment, if the embryonic
philosophy you are using for a vehicle, defines a set of independent
authorities for its core. Think about it. It's impossible.

You have said a lot about the origin of something or other that you say is bad. You have then asserted that since Popper had some unspecified bad assumptions he made unspecified mistakes. This cloud of vague abstraction is no good at all as a criticism.
You further assert that you can't start with a bad set of authorities and make progress, but that's false. Provided that you're willing to discard ideas that don't survive criticism and you look for problems, starting with bad ideas is not an insurmountable obstacle to progress. See Popper's "On the sources of knowledge and of ignorance" in "Conjectures and Refutations".
Alan

Alan - I think I've addressed these issues across the posts I've made. So would it be reasonable to ask that you demonstrate you've read and made effort by summarizing what I have said in a little more detail, whether you think it wrong or right?

Otherwise, the proposition your end seems to be that I answer your question as if you are correctly summing up, after having gone to that bother. Is that what you say you have done?