Macroscopic Emergence in MWI worlds

[hibbsa]

Thought I'd try a summary of where this is going.
 
First of all, it's important to exclude - for now - MWI conceptions involving conscious decisions, and probably biological decisions. This isn't because what I'm driving at is weak...but that this is the best way forward. So please note we are considering the more primitive, non conscious or pre-conscious/pre-biological world.  
 
By 'emergent properties' I just mean the way macroscopic reality emerges from QM. The specific description I'm using is Deutsch's 'Reality of Abstractions' chapter. In that, he basically describes the way macroscopic properties (say those associated with boiling the kettle) arise with a great amount of independence from the atomic behaviour going on beneath.
 
Regarding this sort of emergence, it occurs to me that unless there was a huge amount of stability/reliability/repeatability in terms of the emergence of the same macroscopic properties - for any given QM 'object' (I'll describe 'object' below), our macroscopic world would not be stable, nor deterministic, the way we find it. 
 
As an aside, I don't think this issue depends on the question whether macroscopic reality does emerge from the QM world, because to the extent it doesn't, the MWI model cannot represent divergence of, or any impact over, the components that don't (i.e. because the MWI multiverse is purely in terms of quantum divergence). 
 
But the inherent MWI logic does seem to be that all or some macroscopic emergence does arise from the QM world. For example Deutsch's definition of fungibility includes macroscopic objects. 
 
So, the issue I would like to explore is along the following lines. Given macroscopic reality is complex, it seems reasonable to expect there are many 'levels' of emergence involved, and many instances of emergence. It actually seems reasonable to think that pretty much all instances of quantum divergence will contribute toward some degree of emergence within individual universes. 
 
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour involves or is associated with some emergence.
 
The consequence of taking the two together seems to be that the multiverse has to deliver the same emergence for the same QM in the same contexts. Because....at the level of individual universes, all the different possible quantum histories for a given context of occurrence, reflect *possible* occurences in each participating universe within the multiverse.
 
Now...I think there are a lot of consequences from this, that need to be worked through and considered. The reason I'm not going into those yet is just that, unless people can understand wtf I'm saying so far, there's no point.
 
But a sneak preview would be, for example, to do with Deutsch's conception of fungibility. Given he includes the macroscopic world, by implication he includes the levels of emergence up through that world. But...by his own philosophical reasoning, to do with, for example non-foundationalist conceptions, higher levels of emergence actually change the physical definition of what 'fungibility' can physically mean. For a simple example, the macroscopic conception of an object moving with constant velocity through space only has meaning in relativistic terms.
 
Likewise - the principle of equivalence disallows certain distinctions. And so on and so forth.
 
Returning to Deutschs conceptions of these issues, it is possible for an emergent level to be independently downward influential on a lower level of emergence. Therefore a higher level of emergence can theoretically be the primary causality behind what would amount to a breaking of fungibility.
 
One of the implications of this seems to be the following logic: If macroscopic levels can break fungibility, fungibility must therefore be *physically* pegged to macroscopic levels. Which means that, whatever concept of 'being in the same place' Deutsch applies to fungible universes at the quantum level, has to also apply at the macroscopic levels.
 
Which means that fungible universes are also in the 'same place' at macroscopic levels.
 
Now.....to see the huge significance of where this is going, you have to go back to the question I am asking. If the vast majority of universes in the multiverse produce the same emergence, then the macroscopic reality of the vast majority of universes in the multiverse REMAINS IN THE SAME PLACE. 
 
The consequence of that being, the multiverse is not divergent....but CONVERGENT up macroscopic levels. 
 
Which implies convergence toward ONE macroscopic universe. 

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

[hibbsa]

Post by hibbsa
Thought I'd try a summary of where this is going.
 
First of all, it's important to exclude - for now - MWI conceptions involving conscious decisions, and probably biological decisions. This isn't because what I'm driving at is weak...but that this is the best way forward. So please note we are considering the more primitive, non conscious or pre-conscious/pre-biological world.  
 
By 'emergent properties' I just mean the way macroscopic reality emerges from QM. The specific description I'm using is Deutsch's 'Reality of Abstractions' chapter. In that, he basically describes the way macroscopic properties (say those associated with boiling the kettle) arise with a great amount of independence from the atomic behaviour going on beneath.
 
Regarding this sort of emergence, it occurs to me that unless there was a huge amount of stability/reliability/repeatability in terms of the emergence of the same macroscopic properties - for any given QM 'object' (I'll describe 'object' below), our macroscopic world would not be stable, nor deterministic, the way we find it. 
 
As an aside, I don't think this issue depends on the question whether macroscopic reality does emerge from the QM world, because to the extent it doesn't, the MWI model cannot represent divergence of, or any impact over, the components that don't (i.e. because the MWI multiverse is purely in terms of quantum divergence). 
 
But the inherent MWI logic does seem to be that all or some macroscopic emergence does arise from the QM world. For example Deutsch's definition of fungibility includes macroscopic objects. 
 
So, the issue I would like to explore is along the following lines. Given macroscopic reality is complex, it seems reasonable to expect there are many 'levels' of emergence involved, and many instances of emergence. It actually seems reasonable to think that pretty much all instances of quantum divergence will contribute toward some degree of emergence within individual universes. 
 
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour involves or is associated with some emergence.
 
The consequence of taking the two together seems to be that the multiverse has to deliver the same emergence for the same QM in the same contexts. Because....at the level of individual universes, all the different possible quantum histories for a given context of occurrence, reflect *possible* occurences in each participating universe within the multiverse.
 
Now...I think there are a lot of consequences from this, that need to be worked through and considered. The reason I'm not going into those yet is just that, unless people can understand wtf I'm saying so far, there's no point.
 
But a sneak preview would be, for example, to do with Deutsch's conception of fungibility. Given he includes the macroscopic world, by implication he includes the levels of emergence up through that world. But...by his own philosophical reasoning, to do with, for example non-foundationalist conceptions, higher levels of emergence actually change the physical definition of what 'fungibility' can physically mean. For a simple example, the macroscopic conception of an object moving with constant velocity through space only has meaning in relativistic terms.
 
Likewise - the principle of equivalence disallows certain distinctions. And so on and so forth.
 
Returning to Deutschs conceptions of these issues, it is possible for an emergent level to be independently downward influential on a lower level of emergence. Therefore a higher level of emergence can theoretically be the primary causality behind what would amount to a breaking of fungibility.
 
One of the implications of this seems to be the following logic: If macroscopic levels can break fungibility, fungibility must therefore be *physically* pegged to macroscopic levels. Which means that, whatever concept of 'being in the same place' Deutsch applies to fungible universes at the quantum level, has to also apply at the macroscopic levels.
 
Which means that fungible universes are also in the 'same place' at macroscopic levels.
 
Now.....to see the huge significance of where this is going, you have to go back to the question I am asking. If the vast majority of universes in the multiverse produce the same emergence, then the macroscopic reality of the vast majority of universes in the multiverse REMAINS IN THE SAME PLACE. 
 
The consequence of that being, the multiverse is not divergent....but CONVERGENT up macroscopic levels. 
 
Which implies convergence toward ONE macroscopic universe. 
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

I'm hoping for a response about this. It's hard to move forward without one. I fully accept I am probably getting something wrong, but without recieving a clear explanation where that happens, I don't see a way forward on this particular criticism.

To clarify the above. The argument is not necessarily about MWI directly, but about the way three of Deutsch's arguments work together. MWI is one. The other is his concept of fungibility. The third is his description of the reality of abstractions.

The jist of the argument is that taken together the multiverse is convergent up macroscopic levels.

Which would tend to throw out the MWI if the underlying reasoning is correct.

OR throw up contradictions somewhere else, either concerning the concept of fungibility or something to do with the reality of abstractions.

OR MOST LIKELY something I'm getting wrong.

But the way I see this situation. I am making a fairly simple argument, that does use Deutsch's concepts. Given those concepts are very familiar territory to a lot of people here, it does seem reasonable to think it is possible for my own reasoning to be anticipated in terms of some misconception, and therefore corrected.

[john]

Post by hibbsa

Post by hibbsa
Thought I'd try a summary of where this is going.
 
First of all, it's important to exclude - for now - MWI conceptions involving conscious decisions, and probably biological decisions. This isn't because what I'm driving at is weak...but that this is the best way forward. So please note we are considering the more primitive, non conscious or pre-conscious/pre-biological world.  
 
By 'emergent properties' I just mean the way macroscopic reality emerges from QM. The specific description I'm using is Deutsch's 'Reality of Abstractions' chapter. In that, he basically describes the way macroscopic properties (say those associated with boiling the kettle) arise with a great amount of independence from the atomic behaviour going on beneath.
 
Regarding this sort of emergence, it occurs to me that unless there was a huge amount of stability/reliability/repeatability in terms of the emergence of the same macroscopic properties - for any given QM 'object' (I'll describe 'object' below), our macroscopic world would not be stable, nor deterministic, the way we find it. 
 
As an aside, I don't think this issue depends on the question whether macroscopic reality does emerge from the QM world, because to the extent it doesn't, the MWI model cannot represent divergence of, or any impact over, the components that don't (i.e. because the MWI multiverse is purely in terms of quantum divergence). 
 
But the inherent MWI logic does seem to be that all or some macroscopic emergence does arise from the QM world. For example Deutsch's definition of fungibility includes macroscopic objects. 
 
So, the issue I would like to explore is along the following lines. Given macroscopic reality is complex, it seems reasonable to expect there are many 'levels' of emergence involved, and many instances of emergence. It actually seems reasonable to think that pretty much all instances of quantum divergence will contribute toward some degree of emergence within individual universes. 
 
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour involves or is associated with some emergence.
 
The consequence of taking the two together seems to be that the multiverse has to deliver the same emergence for the same QM in the same contexts. Because....at the level of individual universes, all the different possible quantum histories for a given context of occurrence, reflect *possible* occurences in each participating universe within the multiverse.
 
Now...I think there are a lot of consequences from this, that need to be worked through and considered. The reason I'm not going into those yet is just that, unless people can understand wtf I'm saying so far, there's no point.
 
But a sneak preview would be, for example, to do with Deutsch's conception of fungibility. Given he includes the macroscopic world, by implication he includes the levels of emergence up through that world. But...by his own philosophical reasoning, to do with, for example non-foundationalist conceptions, higher levels of emergence actually change the physical definition of what 'fungibility' can physically mean. For a simple example, the macroscopic conception of an object moving with constant velocity through space only has meaning in relativistic terms.
 
Likewise - the principle of equivalence disallows certain distinctions. And so on and so forth.
 
Returning to Deutschs conceptions of these issues, it is possible for an emergent level to be independently downward influential on a lower level of emergence. Therefore a higher level of emergence can theoretically be the primary causality behind what would amount to a breaking of fungibility.
 
One of the implications of this seems to be the following logic: If macroscopic levels can break fungibility, fungibility must therefore be *physically* pegged to macroscopic levels. Which means that, whatever concept of 'being in the same place' Deutsch applies to fungible universes at the quantum level, has to also apply at the macroscopic levels.
 
Which means that fungible universes are also in the 'same place' at macroscopic levels.
 
Now.....to see the huge significance of where this is going, you have to go back to the question I am asking. If the vast majority of universes in the multiverse produce the same emergence, then the macroscopic reality of the vast majority of universes in the multiverse REMAINS IN THE SAME PLACE. 
 
The consequence of that being, the multiverse is not divergent....but CONVERGENT up macroscopic levels. 
 
Which implies convergence toward ONE macroscopic universe. 
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

I'm hoping for a response about this. It's hard to move forward without one. I fully accept I am probably getting something wrong, but without recieving a clear explanation where that happens, I don't see a way forward on this particular criticism.
To clarify the above. The argument is not necessarily about MWI directly, but about the way three of Deutsch's arguments work together. MWI is one. The other is his concept of fungibility. The third is his description of the reality of abstractions.
The jist of the argument is that taken together the multiverse is convergent up macroscopic levels.
Which would tend to throw out the MWI if the underlying reasoning is correct.
OR throw up contradictions somewhere else, either concerning the concept of fungibility or something to do with the reality of abstractions.
OR MOST LIKELY something I'm getting wrong.
But the way I see this situation. I am making a fairly simple argument, that does use Deutsch's concepts. Given those concepts are very familiar territory to a lot of people here, it does seem reasonable to think it is possible for my own reasoning to be anticipated in terms of some misconception, and therefore corrected.

http://arxiv.org/abs/1006.4053

This is a link to a study that shows that DNA is stable or exist at all due to quantum entanglement.

"We model the electron clouds of nucleic acids in DNA as a chain of coupled quantum harmonic oscillators with dipole-dipole interaction between nearest neighbours resulting in a van der Waals type bonding. Crucial parameters in our model are the distances between the acids and the coupling between them, which we estimate from numerical simulations."

[Alan]

Post by hibbsa
Thought I'd try a summary of where this is going.
 
First of all, it's important to exclude - for now - MWI conceptions involving conscious decisions, and probably biological decisions. This isn't because what I'm driving at is weak...but that this is the best way forward. So please note we are considering the more primitive, non conscious or pre-conscious/pre-biological world.  
 
By 'emergent properties' I just mean the way macroscopic reality emerges from QM. The specific description I'm using is Deutsch's 'Reality of Abstractions' chapter. In that, he basically describes the way macroscopic properties (say those associated with boiling the kettle) arise with a great amount of independence from the atomic behaviour going on beneath.
 
Regarding this sort of emergence, it occurs to me that unless there was a huge amount of stability/reliability/repeatability in terms of the emergence of the same macroscopic properties - for any given QM 'object' (I'll describe 'object' below), our macroscopic world would not be stable, nor deterministic, the way we find it. 

There are limits to our ability to predict stuff owing to the divergence of macroscopic universes over time. There's a bit about this in FoR where David discusses chaos theory.

The macroscopic quantities we are used to dealing with are very coarse grained and so they can be the same for objects whose microscopic constitutions are different, e.g. - bubbles in boiling water forming in different places. As the difference between two versions of the same object grow they may become macroscopically different.

Post by hibbsa
As an aside, I don't think this issue depends on the question whether macroscopic reality does emerge from the QM world, because to the extent it doesn't, the MWI model cannot represent divergence of, or any impact over, the components that don't (i.e. because the MWI multiverse is purely in terms of quantum divergence). 
 
But the inherent MWI logic does seem to be that all or some macroscopic emergence does arise from the QM world. For example Deutsch's definition of fungibility includes macroscopic objects. 
 
So, the issue I would like to explore is along the following lines. Given macroscopic reality is complex, it seems reasonable to expect there are many 'levels' of emergence involved, and many instances of emergence. It actually seems reasonable to think that pretty much all instances of quantum divergence will contribute toward some degree of emergence within individual universes. 
 
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour involves or is associated with some emergence.
 
The consequence of taking the two together seems to be that the multiverse has to deliver the same emergence for the same QM in the same contexts. Because....at the level of individual universes, all the different possible quantum histories for a given context of occurrence, reflect *possible* occurences in each participating universe within the multiverse.
 
Now...I think there are a lot of consequences from this, that need to be worked through and considered. The reason I'm not going into those yet is just that, unless people can understand wtf I'm saying so far, there's no point.
 
But a sneak preview would be, for example, to do with Deutsch's conception of fungibility. Given he includes the macroscopic world, by implication he includes the levels of emergence up through that world. But...by his own philosophical reasoning, to do with, for example non-foundationalist conceptions, higher levels of emergence actually change the physical definition of what 'fungibility' can physically mean. For a simple example, the macroscopic conception of an object moving with constant velocity through space only has meaning in relativistic terms.
 
Likewise - the principle of equivalence disallows certain distinctions. And so on and so forth.
 
Returning to Deutschs conceptions of these issues, it is possible for an emergent level to be independently downward influential on a lower level of emergence. Therefore a higher level of emergence can theoretically be the primary causality behind what would amount to a breaking of fungibility.
 
One of the implications of this seems to be the following logic: If macroscopic levels can break fungibility, fungibility must therefore be *physically* pegged to macroscopic levels. Which means that, whatever concept of 'being in the same place' Deutsch applies to fungible universes at the quantum level, has to also apply at the macroscopic levels.
 
Which means that fungible universes are also in the 'same place' at macroscopic levels.
 
Now.....to see the huge significance of where this is going, you have to go back to the question I am asking. If the vast majority of universes in the multiverse produce the same emergence, then the macroscopic reality of the vast majority of universes in the multiverse REMAINS IN THE SAME PLACE. 
 
The consequence of that being, the multiverse is not divergent....but CONVERGENT up macroscopic levels. 
 
Which implies convergence toward ONE macroscopic universe. 

This is all wrong. The emergent laws of physics do not completely determine the macroscopic state.

Alan

[hibbsa]

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
Thought I'd try a summary of where this is going.
 
First of all, it's important to exclude - for now - MWI conceptions involving conscious decisions, and probably biological decisions. This isn't because what I'm driving at is weak...but that this is the best way forward. So please note we are considering the more primitive, non conscious or pre-conscious/pre-biological world.  
 
By 'emergent properties' I just mean the way macroscopic reality emerges from QM. The specific description I'm using is Deutsch's 'Reality of Abstractions' chapter. In that, he basically describes the way macroscopic properties (say those associated with boiling the kettle) arise with a great amount of independence from the atomic behaviour going on beneath.
 
Regarding this sort of emergence, it occurs to me that unless there was a huge amount of stability/reliability/repeatability in terms of the emergence of the same macroscopic properties - for any given QM 'object' (I'll describe 'object' below), our macroscopic world would not be stable, nor deterministic, the way we find it. 

There are limits to our ability to predict stuff owing to the divergence of macroscopic universes over time. There's a bit about this in FoR where David discusses chaos theory.
The macroscopic quantities we are used to dealing with are very coarse grained and so they can be the same for objects whose microscopic constitutions are different, e.g. - bubbles in boiling water forming in different places. As the difference between two versions of the same object grow they may become macroscopically different.

Hi Alan - thanks for engaging. In his Reality of Abstractions BoI chapter Deutsch speaks of the high degree of mutual independence between the emergent level and the specifics of the underlying atomic arrangement. How would this mutual independence sit with what you say above which seems to go the way of mutual dependence somewhat.

Additionally, the following taken together

- given in many instances the starting point of what becomes a divergence in the multiverse, can be regarded as duplicated on a large scale across the universe, and

- given that each such instance within this universe could manifest any of the quantum histories divergent in the multiverse from a single such event in this universe,and

- given recurrences of such conditions as duplicates within this universe would need to exhibit a very high degree of consistency in terms of the macroscopic emergence produced, in order for our macroscopic reality to be stable and consistent, deterministic and so on, as we find it

--> surely taken together the constraint emerges requiring the multiverse level divergent quantum histories from a single event in this universe to each and all produce the same macroscopic emergence, to the same order of consistency duplicates of the same event would need to produce the same macroscopic emergence in order for this universe to be stable, predictable, deterministic and so on?

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
As an aside, I don't think this issue depends on the question whether macroscopic reality does emerge from the QM world, because to the extent it doesn't, the MWI model cannot represent divergence of, or any impact over, the components that don't (i.e. because the MWI multiverse is purely in terms of quantum divergence). 
 
But the inherent MWI logic does seem to be that all or some macroscopic emergence does arise from the QM world. For example Deutsch's definition of fungibility includes macroscopic objects. 
 
So, the issue I would like to explore is along the following lines. Given macroscopic reality is complex, it seems reasonable to expect there are many 'levels' of emergence involved, and many instances of emergence. It actually seems reasonable to think that pretty much all instances of quantum divergence will contribute toward some degree of emergence within individual universes. 
 
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour involves or is associated with some emergence.
 
The consequence of taking the two together seems to be that the multiverse has to deliver the same emergence for the same QM in the same contexts. Because....at the level of individual universes, all the different possible quantum histories for a given context of occurrence, reflect *possible* occurences in each participating universe within the multiverse.
 
Now...I think there are a lot of consequences from this, that need to be worked through and considered. The reason I'm not going into those yet is just that, unless people can understand wtf I'm saying so far, there's no point.
 
But a sneak preview would be, for example, to do with Deutsch's conception of fungibility. Given he includes the macroscopic world, by implication he includes the levels of emergence up through that world. But...by his own philosophical reasoning, to do with, for example non-foundationalist conceptions, higher levels of emergence actually change the physical definition of what 'fungibility' can physically mean. For a simple example, the macroscopic conception of an object moving with constant velocity through space only has meaning in relativistic terms.
 
Likewise - the principle of equivalence disallows certain distinctions. And so on and so forth.
 
Returning to Deutschs conceptions of these issues, it is possible for an emergent level to be independently downward influential on a lower level of emergence. Therefore a higher level of emergence can theoretically be the primary causality behind what would amount to a breaking of fungibility.
 
One of the implications of this seems to be the following logic: If macroscopic levels can break fungibility, fungibility must therefore be *physically* pegged to macroscopic levels. Which means that, whatever concept of 'being in the same place' Deutsch applies to fungible universes at the quantum level, has to also apply at the macroscopic levels.
 
Which means that fungible universes are also in the 'same place' at macroscopic levels.
 
Now.....to see the huge significance of where this is going, you have to go back to the question I am asking. If the vast majority of universes in the multiverse produce the same emergence, then the macroscopic reality of the vast majority of universes in the multiverse REMAINS IN THE SAME PLACE. 
 
The consequence of that being, the multiverse is not divergent....but CONVERGENT up macroscopic levels. 
 
Which implies convergence toward ONE macroscopic universe. 

This is all wrong. The emergent laws of physics do not completely determine the macroscopic state.

Sure, but I do address this matter with the argument. To the extent the macroscopic state is not determined by emergence from the quantum level, the multiverse by definition has no influence on that aspect of the macroscopic state, since the multiverse can only differentiate at the quantum level (i.e. so can only cause differentiation at the macroscopic level that is emergent from the quantum level).

Therefore there is no dependence here on assumptions about what arises by emergence and what doesn't. What does is subject to the arguments I am making which suggest the multiverse divergence from any given point (i.e. ancester universe) is heavily constrained to all and each history produce the same emergence. On the other hand What doesn't emerge from the quantum level, the multiverse histories have absolutely no influence to alter in the first place thus will all feature the same state with no variance (if that state is stable by whatever does cause it)

Post by Alan
Alan

[hibbsa]

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
Thought I'd try a summary of where this is going.
 
First of all, it's important to exclude - for now - MWI conceptions involving conscious decisions, and probably biological decisions. This isn't because what I'm driving at is weak...but that this is the best way forward. So please note we are considering the more primitive, non conscious or pre-conscious/pre-biological world.  
 
By 'emergent properties' I just mean the way macroscopic reality emerges from QM. The specific description I'm using is Deutsch's 'Reality of Abstractions' chapter. In that, he basically describes the way macroscopic properties (say those associated with boiling the kettle) arise with a great amount of independence from the atomic behaviour going on beneath.
 
Regarding this sort of emergence, it occurs to me that unless there was a huge amount of stability/reliability/repeatability in terms of the emergence of the same macroscopic properties - for any given QM 'object' (I'll describe 'object' below), our macroscopic world would not be stable, nor deterministic, the way we find it. 

There are limits to our ability to predict stuff owing to the divergence of macroscopic universes over time. There's a bit about this in FoR where David discusses chaos theory.
The macroscopic quantities we are used to dealing with are very coarse grained and so they can be the same for objects whose microscopic constitutions are different, e.g. - bubbles in boiling water forming in different places. As the difference between two versions of the same object grow they may become macroscopically different.

Hi Alan - thanks for engaging. In his Reality of Abstractions BoI chapter Deutsch speaks of the high degree of mutual independence between the emergent level and the specifics of the underlying atomic arrangement. How would this mutual independence sit with what you say above which seems to go the way of mutual dependence somewhat.
Additionally, the following taken together
- given in many instances the starting point of what becomes a divergence in the multiverse, can be regarded as duplicated on a large scale across the universe, and
- given that each such instance within this universe could manifest any of the quantum histories divergent in the multiverse from a single such event in this universe,and
- given recurrences of such conditions as duplicates within this universe would need to exhibit a very high degree of consistency in terms of the macroscopic emergence produced, in order for our macroscopic reality to be stable and consistent, deterministic and so on, as we find it
--> surely taken together the constraint emerges requiring the multiverse level divergent quantum histories from a single event in this universe to each and all produce the same macroscopic emergence, to the same order of consistency duplicates of the same event would need to produce the same macroscopic emergence in order for this universe to be stable, predictable, deterministic and so on?

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
As an aside, I don't think this issue depends on the question whether macroscopic reality does emerge from the QM world, because to the extent it doesn't, the MWI model cannot represent divergence of, or any impact over, the components that don't (i.e. because the MWI multiverse is purely in terms of quantum divergence). 
 
But the inherent MWI logic does seem to be that all or some macroscopic emergence does arise from the QM world. For example Deutsch's definition of fungibility includes macroscopic objects. 
 
So, the issue I would like to explore is along the following lines. Given macroscopic reality is complex, it seems reasonable to expect there are many 'levels' of emergence involved, and many instances of emergence. It actually seems reasonable to think that pretty much all instances of quantum divergence will contribute toward some degree of emergence within individual universes. 
 
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour involves or is associated with some emergence.
 
The consequence of taking the two together seems to be that the multiverse has to deliver the same emergence for the same QM in the same contexts. Because....at the level of individual universes, all the different possible quantum histories for a given context of occurrence, reflect *possible* occurences in each participating universe within the multiverse.
 
Now...I think there are a lot of consequences from this, that need to be worked through and considered. The reason I'm not going into those yet is just that, unless people can understand wtf I'm saying so far, there's no point.
 
But a sneak preview would be, for example, to do with Deutsch's conception of fungibility. Given he includes the macroscopic world, by implication he includes the levels of emergence up through that world. But...by his own philosophical reasoning, to do with, for example non-foundationalist conceptions, higher levels of emergence actually change the physical definition of what 'fungibility' can physically mean. For a simple example, the macroscopic conception of an object moving with constant velocity through space only has meaning in relativistic terms.
 
Likewise - the principle of equivalence disallows certain distinctions. And so on and so forth.
 
Returning to Deutschs conceptions of these issues, it is possible for an emergent level to be independently downward influential on a lower level of emergence. Therefore a higher level of emergence can theoretically be the primary causality behind what would amount to a breaking of fungibility.
 
One of the implications of this seems to be the following logic: If macroscopic levels can break fungibility, fungibility must therefore be *physically* pegged to macroscopic levels. Which means that, whatever concept of 'being in the same place' Deutsch applies to fungible universes at the quantum level, has to also apply at the macroscopic levels.
 
Which means that fungible universes are also in the 'same place' at macroscopic levels.
 
Now.....to see the huge significance of where this is going, you have to go back to the question I am asking. If the vast majority of universes in the multiverse produce the same emergence, then the macroscopic reality of the vast majority of universes in the multiverse REMAINS IN THE SAME PLACE. 
 
The consequence of that being, the multiverse is not divergent....but CONVERGENT up macroscopic levels. 
 
Which implies convergence toward ONE macroscopic universe. 

This is all wrong. The emergent laws of physics do not completely determine the macroscopic state.

Sure, but I do address this matter with the argument. To the extent the macroscopic state is not determined by emergence from the quantum level, the multiverse by definition has no influence on that aspect of the macroscopic state, since the multiverse can only differentiate at the quantum level (i.e. so can only cause differentiation at the macroscopic level that is emergent from the quantum level).
Therefore there is no dependence here on assumptions about what arises by emergence and what doesn't. What does is subject to the arguments I am making which suggest the multiverse divergence from any given point (i.e. ancester universe) is heavily constrained to all and each history produce the same emergence. On the other hand What doesn't emerge from the quantum level, the multiverse histories have absolutely no influence to alter in the first place thus will all feature the same state with no variance (if that state is stable by whatever does cause it)

Post by Alan
Alan

Anticipating some possible objections:

1. "You use concepts that contain errors" [could be about initial states, or duplicates of something in this universe being equivalent to divergent histories multiverse histories of a single instance of same thing in this universe, or no two quantum histories are the same or whatever]

None of this would matter because all concepts are there for rough illustrative purposes only. The argument ultimately depends only on the same assumptions about this universe as we find it, that are essential for MWI itself to arise as an interpretation of QM (i.e. principle of local realism, determinism, etc).

E.g. let's say it's invalid to define things like I do above like this

Post by hibbsa
given in many instances the starting point of what becomes a >divergence in the multiverse, can be regarded as duplicated on a >large scale across the universe,.....

If it's not valid it only makes the argument stronger, because we have to return to the universe as we find it which requires macroscopic stability and consistency on small and large scales. Therefore if the objection is about the way duplicate objects (within one universe) get defined, say because the idea of there being the same type of quantum divergence based on similar starting points or whatever.

Doesn't matter because the universe as we find requires macroscopic emergence be duplicated. So if the quantum histories are never the same, always have different starting conditions, then the choice is between requiring more broadly defined sets of quantum history with more divergence of key characteristics like starting condition, to all never the less produce the same emergent macroscopic effects.

Or alternatively if that's impossible for some QM law I don't know about, then the macroscopic world as we find it still takes precedence (because without the same assumptions I am using like determinism and local realism MWI never comes about in the first place). So if it's impossible for emergence to go upward, it has to happen downward in some counter intuitive way, or some combination of the two that is consistent with QM, or no causality between QM and the macroscopic world at all. None of these options or any of the others I can think of weaken the argument my end.

(p.s. I apologize if there is any impression given above of unrealistic confidenc. That absolutely isn't the reality....I do fully expect to be corrected here. It's just that I have obviously attempted to construct the argument to the highest standard I am currently able.)

-

[Richard Ruquist]

Post by hibbsa
**

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
Thought I'd try a summary of where this is going.
First of all, it's important to exclude - for now - MWI conceptions

involving conscious decisions, and probably biological decisions. This
isn't because what I'm driving at is weak...but that this is the best way
forward. So please note we are considering the more primitive, non
conscious or pre-conscious/pre-biological world.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
By 'emergent properties' I just mean the way macroscopic reality

emerges from QM. The specific description I'm using is Deutsch's 'Reality
of Abstractions' chapter. In that, he basically describes the way
macroscopic properties (say those associated with boiling the kettle) arise
with a great amount of independence from the atomic behaviour going on
beneath.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
Regarding this sort of emergence, it occurs to me that unless there

was a huge amount of stability/reliability/repeatability in terms of the
emergence of the same macroscopic properties - for any given QM 'object'
(I'll describe 'object' below), our macroscopic world would not be stable,
nor deterministic, the way we find it.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan
There are limits to our ability to predict stuff owing to the

divergence of macroscopic universes over time. There's a bit about this in
FoR where David discusses chaos theory.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan
The macroscopic quantities we are used to dealing with are very coarse

grained and so they can be the same for objects whose microscopic
constitutions are different, e.g. - bubbles in boiling water forming in
different places. As the difference between two versions of the same object
grow they may become macroscopically different.

Post by hibbsa
Hi Alan - thanks for engaging. In his Reality of Abstractions BoI

chapter Deutsch speaks of the high degree of mutual independence between
the emergent level and the specifics of the underlying atomic arrangement.
How would this mutual independence sit with what you say above which seems
to go the way of mutual dependence somewhat.

Post by hibbsa
Additionally, the following taken together
- given in many instances the starting point of what becomes a

divergence in the multiverse, can be regarded as duplicated on a large
scale across the universe, and

Post by hibbsa
- given that each such instance within this universe could manifest any

of the quantum histories divergent in the multiverse from a single such
event in this universe,and

Post by hibbsa
- given recurrences of such conditions as duplicates within this

universe would need to exhibit a very high degree of consistency in terms
of the macroscopic emergence produced, in order for our macroscopic reality
to be stable and consistent, deterministic and so on, as we find it

Post by hibbsa
--> surely taken together the constraint emerges requiring the

multiverse level divergent quantum histories from a single event in this
universe to each and all produce the same macroscopic emergence, to the
same order of consistency duplicates of the same event would need to
produce the same macroscopic emergence in order for this universe to be
stable, predictable, deterministic and so on?

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
As an aside, I don't think this issue depends on the question

whether macroscopic reality does emerge from the QM world, because to the
extent it doesn't, the MWI model cannot represent divergence of, or any
impact over, the components that don't (i.e. because the MWI multiverse is
purely in terms of quantum divergence).

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
But the inherent MWI logic does seem to be that all or some

macroscopic emergence does arise from the QM world. For example Deutsch's
definition of fungibility includes macroscopic objects.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
So, the issue I would like to explore is along the following

lines. Given macroscopic reality is complex, it seems reasonable to expect
there are many 'levels' of emergence involved, and many instances of
emergence. It actually seems reasonable to think that pretty much
all instances of quantum divergence will contribute toward some degree of
emergence within individual universes.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the

requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be
consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the
other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour
involves or is associated with some emergence.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
The consequence of taking the two together seems to be that the

multiverse has to deliver the same emergence for the same QM in the same
contexts. Because....at the level of individual universes, all the
different possible quantum histories for a given context of occurrence,
reflect *possible* occurences in each participating universe within the
multiverse.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
Now...I think there are a lot of consequences from this, that need

to be worked through and considered. The reason I'm not going into those
yet is just that, unless people can understand wtf I'm saying so far,
there's no point.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
But a sneak preview would be, for example, to do with Deutsch's

conception of fungibility. Given he includes the macroscopic world, by
implication he includes the levels of emergence up through that world.
But...by his own philosophical reasoning, to do with, for example
non-foundationalist conceptions, higher levels of emergence actually change
the physical definition of what 'fungibility' can physically mean. For a
simple example, the macroscopic conception of an object moving with
constant velocity through space only has meaning in relativistic terms.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
Likewise - the principle of equivalence disallows certain

distinctions. And so on and so forth.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
Returning to Deutschs conceptions of these issues, it is possible

for an emergent level to be independently downward influential on a lower
level of emergence. Therefore a higher level of emergence can theoretically
be the primary causality behind what would amount to a breaking of
fungibility.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
One of the implications of this seems to be the following logic: If

macroscopic levels can break fungibility, fungibility must therefore be
*physically* pegged to macroscopic levels. Which means that, whatever
concept of 'being in the same place' Deutsch applies to fungible universes
at the quantum level, has to also apply at the macroscopic levels.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
Which means that fungible universes are also in the 'same place' at

macroscopic levels.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
Now.....to see the huge significance of where this is going, you

have to go back to the question I am asking. If the vast majority of
universes in the multiverse produce the same emergence, then the
macroscopic reality of the vast majority of universes in the
multiverse REMAINS IN THE SAME PLACE.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
The consequence of that being, the multiverse is not

divergent....but CONVERGENT up macroscopic levels.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
Which implies convergence toward ONE macroscopic universe.

This is all wrong. The emergent laws of physics do not completely

determine the macroscopic state.

Post by hibbsa
Sure, but I do address this matter with the argument. To the extent the

macroscopic state is not determined by emergence from the quantum level,
the multiverse by definition has no influence on that aspect of the
macroscopic state, since the multiverse can only differentiate at the
quantum level (i.e. so can only cause differentiation at the macroscopic
level that is emergent from the quantum level).

Post by hibbsa
Therefore there is no dependence here on assumptions about what arises

by emergence and what doesn't. What does is subject to the arguments I am
making which suggest the multiverse divergence from any given point (i.e.
ancester universe) is heavily constrained to all and each history produce
the same emergence. On the other hand What doesn't emerge from the quantum
level, the multiverse histories have absolutely no influence to alter in
the first place thus will all feature the same state with no variance (if
that state is stable by whatever does cause it)

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan
Alan

1. "You use concepts that contain errors" [could be about initial states,
or duplicates of something in this universe being equivalent to divergent
histories multiverse histories of a single instance of same thing in this
universe, or no two quantum histories are the same or whatever]
None of this would matter because all concepts are there for rough
illustrative purposes only. The argument ultimately depends only on the
same assumptions about this universe as we find it, that are essential for
MWI itself to arise as an interpretation of QM (i.e. principle of local
realism, determinism, etc).
E.g. let's say it's invalid to define things like I do above like this

Post by hibbsa
given in many instances the starting point of what becomes a >divergence

in the multiverse, can be regarded as duplicated on a >large scale across
the universe,.....
If it's not valid it only makes the argument stronger, because we have to
return to the universe as we find it which requires macroscopic stability
and consistency on small and large scales. Therefore if the objection is
about the way duplicate objects (within one universe) get defined, say
because the idea of there being the same type of quantum divergence based
on similar starting points or whatever.
Doesn't matter because the universe as we find requires macroscopic
emergence be duplicated. So if the quantum histories are never the same,
always have different starting conditions, then the choice is between
requiring more broadly defined sets of quantum history with more divergence
of key characteristics like starting condition, to all never the less
produce the same emergent macroscopic effects.
Or alternatively if that's impossible for some QM law I don't know about,
then the macroscopic world as we find it still takes precedence (because
without the same assumptions I am using like determinism and local realism
MWI never comes about in the first place). So if it's impossible for
emergence to go upward, it has to happen downward in some counter intuitive
way, or some combination of the two that is consistent with QM, or no
causality between QM and the macroscopic world at all. None of these
options or any of the others I can think of weaken the argument my end.
(p.s. I apologize if there is any impression given above of unrealistic
confidenc. That absolutely isn't the reality....I do fully expect to be
corrected here. It's just that I have obviously attempted to construct the
argument to the highest standard I am currently able.)
-

Al,

I really like your idea of Macroscopic Emergence to a Single Macroscopic
World.
May I suggest that one aspect of the Emergence is Entanglement
and that this Mechanism ensures a Single Macroscopic World.
and even has a Substance-Base in Super-String Theory.
Yanni Ru
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

[hibbsa]

Post by hibbsa

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
Thought I'd try a summary of where this is going.
 
First of all, it's important to exclude - for now - MWI conceptions involving conscious decisions, and probably biological decisions. This isn't because what I'm driving at is weak...but that this is the best way forward. So please note we are considering the more primitive, non conscious or pre-conscious/pre-biological world.  
 
By 'emergent properties' I just mean the way macroscopic reality emerges from QM. The specific description I'm using is Deutsch's 'Reality of Abstractions' chapter. In that, he basically describes the way macroscopic properties (say those associated with boiling the kettle) arise with a great amount of independence from the atomic behaviour going on beneath.
 
Regarding this sort of emergence, it occurs to me that unless there was a huge amount of stability/reliability/repeatability in terms of the emergence of the same macroscopic properties - for any given QM 'object' (I'll describe 'object' below), our macroscopic world would not be stable, nor deterministic, the way we find it. 

There are limits to our ability to predict stuff owing to the divergence of macroscopic universes over time. There's a bit about this in FoR where David discusses chaos theory.
The macroscopic quantities we are used to dealing with are very coarse grained and so they can be the same for objects whose microscopic constitutions are different, e.g. - bubbles in boiling water forming in different places. As the difference between two versions of the same object grow they may become macroscopically different.

Hi Alan - thanks for engaging. In his Reality of Abstractions BoI chapter Deutsch speaks of the high degree of mutual independence between the emergent level and the specifics of the underlying atomic arrangement. How would this mutual independence sit with what you say above which seems to go the way of mutual dependence somewhat.
Additionally, the following taken together
- given in many instances the starting point of what becomes a divergence in the multiverse, can be regarded as duplicated on a large scale across the universe, and
- given that each such instance within this universe could manifest any of the quantum histories divergent in the multiverse from a single such event in this universe,and
- given recurrences of such conditions as duplicates within this universe would need to exhibit a very high degree of consistency in terms of the macroscopic emergence produced, in order for our macroscopic reality to be stable and consistent, deterministic and so on, as we find it
--> surely taken together the constraint emerges requiring the multiverse level divergent quantum histories from a single event in this universe to each and all produce the same macroscopic emergence, to the same order of consistency duplicates of the same event would need to produce the same macroscopic emergence in order for this universe to be stable, predictable, deterministic and so on?

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa
As an aside, I don't think this issue depends on the question whether macroscopic reality does emerge from the QM world, because to the extent it doesn't, the MWI model cannot represent divergence of, or any impact over, the components that don't (i.e. because the MWI multiverse is purely in terms of quantum divergence). 
 
But the inherent MWI logic does seem to be that all or some macroscopic emergence does arise from the QM world. For example Deutsch's definition of fungibility includes macroscopic objects. 
 
So, the issue I would like to explore is along the following lines. Given macroscopic reality is complex, it seems reasonable to expect there are many 'levels' of emergence involved, and many instances of emergence. It actually seems reasonable to think that pretty much all instances of quantum divergence will contribute toward some degree of emergence within individual universes. 
 
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour involves or is associated with some emergence.
 
The consequence of taking the two together seems to be that the multiverse has to deliver the same emergence for the same QM in the same contexts. Because....at the level of individual universes, all the different possible quantum histories for a given context of occurrence, reflect *possible* occurences in each participating universe within the multiverse.
 
Now...I think there are a lot of consequences from this, that need to be worked through and considered. The reason I'm not going into those yet is just that, unless people can understand wtf I'm saying so far, there's no point.
 
But a sneak preview would be, for example, to do with Deutsch's conception of fungibility. Given he includes the macroscopic world, by implication he includes the levels of emergence up through that world. But...by his own philosophical reasoning, to do with, for example non-foundationalist conceptions, higher levels of emergence actually change the physical definition of what 'fungibility' can physically mean. For a simple example, the macroscopic conception of an object moving with constant velocity through space only has meaning in relativistic terms.
 
Likewise - the principle of equivalence disallows certain distinctions. And so on and so forth.
 
Returning to Deutschs conceptions of these issues, it is possible for an emergent level to be independently downward influential on a lower level of emergence. Therefore a higher level of emergence can theoretically be the primary causality behind what would amount to a breaking of fungibility.
 
One of the implications of this seems to be the following logic: If macroscopic levels can break fungibility, fungibility must therefore be *physically* pegged to macroscopic levels. Which means that, whatever concept of 'being in the same place' Deutsch applies to fungible universes at the quantum level, has to also apply at the macroscopic levels.
 
Which means that fungible universes are also in the 'same place' at macroscopic levels.
 
Now.....to see the huge significance of where this is going, you have to go back to the question I am asking. If the vast majority of universes in the multiverse produce the same emergence, then the macroscopic reality of the vast majority of universes in the multiverse REMAINS IN THE SAME PLACE. 
 
The consequence of that being, the multiverse is not divergent....but CONVERGENT up macroscopic levels. 
 
Which implies convergence toward ONE macroscopic universe. 

This is all wrong. The emergent laws of physics do not completely determine the macroscopic state.

Sure, but I do address this matter with the argument. To the extent the macroscopic state is not determined by emergence from the quantum level, the multiverse by definition has no influence on that aspect of the macroscopic state, since the multiverse can only differentiate at the quantum level (i.e. so can only cause differentiation at the macroscopic level that is emergent from the quantum level).
Therefore there is no dependence here on assumptions about what arises by emergence and what doesn't. What does is subject to the arguments I am making which suggest the multiverse divergence from any given point (i.e. ancester universe) is heavily constrained to all and each history produce the same emergence. On the other hand What doesn't emerge from the quantum level, the multiverse histories have absolutely no influence to alter in the first place thus will all feature the same state with no variance (if that state is stable by whatever does cause it)

Hi - I was wondering if anyone was willing to give a criticism to this argument? I still don't see a way for MWI + Fungibility + Reality of Abstractions (BoI) to be consistent with one another.

Does Prof. Deutsch have any comments perhaps?

[hibbsa]

Post by hibbsa
Thought I'd try a summary of where this is going.
 
First of all, it's important to exclude - for now - MWI conceptions involving conscious decisions, and probably biological decisions. This isn't because what I'm driving at is weak...but that this is the best way forward. So please note we are considering the more primitive, non conscious or pre-conscious/pre-biological world.  
 
By 'emergent properties' I just mean the way macroscopic reality emerges from QM. The specific description I'm using is Deutsch's 'Reality of Abstractions' chapter. In that, he basically describes the way macroscopic properties (say those associated with boiling the kettle) arise with a great amount of independence from the atomic behaviour going on beneath.
 
Regarding this sort of emergence, it occurs to me that unless there was a huge amount of stability/reliability/repeatability in terms of the emergence of the same macroscopic properties - for any given QM 'object' (I'll describe 'object' below), our macroscopic world would not be stable, nor deterministic, the way we find it. 
 
As an aside, I don't think this issue depends on the question whether macroscopic reality does emerge from the QM world, because to the extent it doesn't, the MWI model cannot represent divergence of, or any impact over, the components that don't (i.e. because the MWI multiverse is purely in terms of quantum divergence). 
 
But the inherent MWI logic does seem to be that all or some macroscopic emergence does arise from the QM world. For example Deutsch's definition of fungibility includes macroscopic objects. 
 
So, the issue I would like to explore is along the following lines. Given macroscopic reality is complex, it seems reasonable to expect there are many 'levels' of emergence involved, and many instances of emergence. It actually seems reasonable to think that pretty much all instances of quantum divergence will contribute toward some degree of emergence within individual universes. 
 
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour involves or is associated with some emergence.
 
The consequence of taking the two together seems to be that the multiverse has to deliver the same emergence for the same QM in the same contexts. Because....at the level of individual universes, all the different possible quantum histories for a given context of occurrence, reflect *possible* occurences in each participating universe within the multiverse.
 
Now...I think there are a lot of consequences from this, that need to be worked through and considered. The reason I'm not going into those yet is just that, unless people can understand wtf I'm saying so far, there's no point.
 
But a sneak preview would be, for example, to do with Deutsch's conception of fungibility. Given he includes the macroscopic world, by implication he includes the levels of emergence up through that world. But...by his own philosophical reasoning, to do with, for example non-foundationalist conceptions, higher levels of emergence actually change the physical definition of what 'fungibility' can physically mean. For a simple example, the macroscopic conception of an object moving with constant velocity through space only has meaning in relativistic terms.
 
Likewise - the principle of equivalence disallows certain distinctions. And so on and so forth.
 
Returning to Deutschs conceptions of these issues, it is possible for an emergent level to be independently downward influential on a lower level of emergence. Therefore a higher level of emergence can theoretically be the primary causality behind what would amount to a breaking of fungibility.
 
One of the implications of this seems to be the following logic: If macroscopic levels can break fungibility, fungibility must therefore be *physically* pegged to macroscopic levels. Which means that, whatever concept of 'being in the same place' Deutsch applies to fungible universes at the quantum level, has to also apply at the macroscopic levels.
 
Which means that fungible universes are also in the 'same place' at macroscopic levels.
 
Now.....to see the huge significance of where this is going, you have to go back to the question I am asking. If the vast majority of universes in the multiverse produce the same emergence, then the macroscopic reality of the vast majority of universes in the multiverse REMAINS IN THE SAME PLACE. 
 
The consequence of that being, the multiverse is not divergent....but CONVERGENT up macroscopic levels. 
 
Which implies convergence toward ONE macroscopic universe. 
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

DD - From my perspective I put time and effort into thinking about your ideas, and in the above contributed a fairly hard logical problem.

I appreciate some aspect may be wrong, but how can we know unless you are willing to point it out?

Alan had a bash, but I think my response to him was fairly much knock-down.

I suppose more generally the question in my mind is now something like, how does this C&R thing work? I thought there was something along the lines of, a well formed logical criticism either gets conceded or knocked-down.

Perhaps my criticism is so bad it doesn't deserve attention. But then, surely if it's really that bad, a simple one-liner will do the trick?

Yours, sincerely.

[Gary Oberbrunner]

Post by hibbsa

Post by hibbsa
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the

requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be
consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the
other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour
involves or is associated with some emergence.

If this is the issue, I'm not sure what the issue is. Emergence generally
(not always, but mostly) smooths out low-level randomness or lumpiness into
consistent, reliable, deterministic macroscopic behavior, which is what
you're hoping for. Low-level quantum phenomena have lots of randomness;
averaging over lots of those universes (or lots of instances in one
universe) gives nicely predictable emergent properties like temperature,
energy and entropy, or in another domain, predictable, stable giant ant
hills from fairly random individual ant behaviors.

ps: if you see this, it means I can post to FoR again.

[hibbsa]

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa

Post by hibbsa
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the

requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be
consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the
other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour
involves or is associated with some emergence.

If this is the issue, I'm not sure what the issue is. Emergence generally
(not always, but mostly) smooths out low-level randomness or lumpiness into
consistent, reliable, deterministic macroscopic behavior, which is what
you're hoping for. Low-level quantum phenomena have lots of randomness;
averaging over lots of those universes (or lots of instances in one
universe) gives nicely predictable emergent properties like temperature,
energy and entropy, or in another domain, predictable, stable giant ant
hills from fairly random individual ant behaviors.
ps: if you see this, it means I can post to FoR again.
--
Gary
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Gary, I think it's probably more reasonable to assume a lot more emergence, in a lot more ways, than what might readily come to mind.

What is the problem. Well look, emergence is definitively independent of the how the underlying quantum effects pan out. Which is the same as saying, it's independent of the sort of variation produced by divergence.

So the problem is, MWI has basically has no macroscopic influence.

I keep hearing about the bizarre vanishingly improbable outcomes, but despite that saying nothing not already covered in probability/statistics, it looks to me like mwi only works conceptually when applied to humans and daft outliers.

Or please explain why I'm wrong. But please if you do, first say a few words confirming what you think I think, otherwise I won't know if what you are saying helps me :o)

p.s. there are other categories of major problem. What about the fact MWI is created by integrating QM with a load of assumptions....that never get any kind of treatment or analysis. Lots of implicit assumptions in there too.

I think you, Deutsch, basically all of you, are seriously mixed up about what you can and cannot do with unexamined assumptions in vague form effectively treated as constants.

What you can do is use them as intuitive guides...a way to help find an insight direction.

But what you cannot ever do, is actually use them in the actual calculation. You can't make them into major influences. You can't do that, because science tells us the nature of reality as output, we don't tell it

[David Deutsch]

Post by hibbsa
So the problem is, MWI has basically has no macroscopic influence.

Compared with what?

I would have thought that X can be said to have an *influence* if events that happen when X is present are different from those that happen when it is absence.

What do you have in mind by the "MWI" being present or absent?

-- David Deutsch

[hibbsa]

Post by David Deutsch

Post by hibbsa
So the problem is, MWI has basically has no macroscopic influence.

Compared with what?

compared to most all major scientific theories I should think. Even QM minus mwi is hugely influential since it is probably behind a large amount of the emergence that creates macroscopic reality.

But the point about mwi is that the conception doesn't appear to have any differential effect on emergence. Or do you say different?

Does it matter? If you say it doesn't, then are you willing to generalize that thought by saying if science had produced popper good explanations but technology, the industrial, medical and institutional revolutions never happened, it wouldn't reflect on the explanations?
You seem to believe philosophy is the same as science, but what is the actual point by point similarity? How much more like science is it, than like religion, or an ideology?

Would one of the classical greeks find the workings of your philosophy so unfamiliar?

You seem to discount all of these, what are, defining features, unique features. Granted you say it's fundamentally about good explanations and the juice is criticism.

But there's no history that I know of, or even energy, that gives reason to think actually getting criticism, and actually wanting to throw out whole chunks right away if shown wrong, and wanting the details and/or lack of depth and details to also be structured so as to be vulnerable.

Now you say it doesn't matter if the multiverse as defined is intrinsically incapable of getting past the first level of emergence such that a difference emergences. I mean, that's ok I suppose, but it's yet another huge swathe of what might have material for criticism, now enjoying immunity.

But ok. But is it even interesting? What about the implications for the way you define fungibility..are there any ramifications? For example can you answer this. You say in BoI that by fungible you mean both the same and in the same physical place.

So if the multiverse doesn't differentiate macroscopically, in what way has the macroscopic world moved to a different place? If it's because the multiverse is driven by quantum divergence and macroscopic reality just effortless tags along, why is that picture preferable to, say, a multiverse shaped like a pyramid, where the large base represents divergent quantum worlds but going upward sees a progressive convergence to the one macroscopic world. Maybe because that's the only way to do it.

So this being a reply to the other post as well, I think things like productivity, or predictions and all the rest, do matter if they or what they caused to happen, are indivisibly important to our conception of what it has done for us.

Technological breakthroughs are fundamentally enabled by the predictive quality of theories. It's only when we can describe something so finely, that we can predict what is going on in each scenario, that we ever break out to the level of actually devising ways to manipulate the physics, with also finely predicted effects. That is the ascent to technology. Do you not regard that as profound...I think it's wondrous.

Post by David Deutsch
I would have thought that X can be said to have an *influence* if events that happen when X is present are different from those that happen when it is absence.
What do you have in mind by the "MWI" being present or absent?
-- David Deutsch

[Gary Oberbrunner]

Post by hibbsa

Post by David Deutsch

Post by hibbsa
So the problem is, MWI has basically has no macroscopic influence.

Compared with what?

compared to most all major scientific theories I should think. Even QM
minus mwi is hugely influential since it is probably behind a large amount
of the emergence that creates macroscopic reality.

Isn't "QM minus MWI" = Copenhagen? In other words by "subtracting" MWI,
you're really adding in the collapse postulate, since MWI is just QM
without collapse.

Are you really just saying that MWI is untestable? I.e. that it doesn't
make an refutable predictions? That's a valid criticism. I think IF we
can build a large-scale quantum computer, such that it can do more than a
theoretical perfectly efficient computer occupying the same spacetime, that
would be a refutation of Copenhagen, since all that computation has to be
done somewhere.

[Alan Forrester]

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa

Post by David Deutsch

Post by hibbsa
So the problem is, MWI has basically has no macroscopic influence.

Compared with what?

compared to most all major scientific theories I should think. Even QM
minus mwi is hugely influential since it is probably behind a large amount
of the emergence that creates macroscopic reality.

Isn't "QM minus MWI" = Copenhagen? In other words by "subtracting" MWI,
you're really adding in the collapse postulate, since MWI is just QM
without collapse.
Are you really just saying that MWI is untestable? I.e. that it doesn't
make an refutable predictions? That's a valid criticism. I think IF we
can build a large-scale quantum computer, such that it can do more than a
theoretical perfectly efficient computer occupying the same spacetime, that
would be a refutation of Copenhagen, since all that computation has to be
done somewhere.

The CI makes no predictions. The CI makes ad hoc modifications of QM
and the precise details of what predictions QM will make depend on the
precise details of the modifications. But there is no explanation of
those precise details because if such an explanation existed the
theory wouldn't be ad hoc. So the CI makes no predictions.

For example, if the wave function collapses the precise of details of
where and how that happens will affect the results of experiments. But
the problem of why we can't see other versions of objects around us
has been solved by decoherence, so there is no need for the collapse
and no explanation of where and how it happens.

As a result, the CI can't be used to explain anything about emergence.
The other "interpretations" of QM have similar problems.

You are laying the blame for the untestability of other
interpretations on the MWI. This is analogous to saying that modern
cosmology is untestable when compared to creationism and this is a
fault in evolution. The truth is that creationism makes no
predictions: God could have made the universe 6000 years ago (or five
minutes ago, or two seconds ago, or he could make and destroy the
universe every time the number of seconds since the Big Bang is a
prime number, or...) and made it look like it is billions of years
old. That's not a fault in modern cosmology.

Alan

[hibbsa]

Post by Alan Forrester

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa

Post by David Deutsch

Post by hibbsa
So the problem is, MWI has basically has no macroscopic influence.

Compared with what?

compared to most all major scientific theories I should think. Even QM
minus mwi is hugely influential since it is probably behind a large amount
of the emergence that creates macroscopic reality.

Isn't "QM minus MWI" = Copenhagen? In other words by "subtracting" MWI,
you're really adding in the collapse postulate, since MWI is just QM
without collapse.
Are you really just saying that MWI is untestable? I.e. that it doesn't
make an refutable predictions? That's a valid criticism. I think IF we
can build a large-scale quantum computer, such that it can do more than a
theoretical perfectly efficient computer occupying the same spacetime, that
would be a refutation of Copenhagen, since all that computation has to be
done somewhere.

The CI makes no predictions. The CI makes ad hoc modifications of QM
and the precise details of what predictions QM will make depend on the
precise details of the modifications. But there is no explanation of
those precise details because if such an explanation existed the
theory wouldn't be ad hoc. So the CI makes no predictions.
For example, if the wave function collapses the precise of details of
where and how that happens will affect the results of experiments. But
the problem of why we can't see other versions of objects around us
has been solved by decoherence, so there is no need for the collapse
and no explanation of where and how it happens.
As a result, the CI can't be used to explain anything about emergence.
The other "interpretations" of QM have similar problems.
You are laying the blame for the untestability of other
interpretations on the MWI. This is analogous to saying that modern
cosmology is untestable when compared to creationism and this is a
fault in evolution.

The only testability I have heard you mention amounted to claiming QM's accomplishments for MWI. Is that still all it is, or is the standard higher now?

Post by Alan Forrester
predictions: God could have made the universe 6000 years ago (or five
minutes ago, or two seconds ago, or he could make and destroy the
universe every time the number of seconds since the Big Bang is a
prime number, or...) and made it look like it is billions of years
old. That's not a fault in modern cosmology.
Alan

[Ismail Atalay]

Post by Alan Forrester

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
Isn't "QM minus MWI" = Copenhagen? In other words by "subtracting" MWI,
you're really adding in the collapse postulate, since MWI is just QM
without collapse.

I disagree with that. I would say QM=MWI+"something else". And this "something else" is very tightly and deeply intertwined with MWI. It is so tight that MWI does not have an independent ontological existence.

Post by Alan Forrester

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
Are you really just saying that MWI is untestable? I.e. that it doesn't
make an refutable predictions? That's a valid criticism. I think IF we
can build a large-scale quantum computer, such that it can do more than a
theoretical perfectly efficient computer occupying the same spacetime, that
would be a refutation of Copenhagen, since all that computation has to be
done somewhere.

MWI automatically becomes untestable when one accepts that the it does not have an independent ontological existence. This means that MWI only relevant through its interaction and interplay with this "something else"

Post by Alan Forrester
The CI makes no predictions. The CI makes ad hoc modifications of QM
and the precise details of what predictions QM will make depend on the
precise details of the modifications. But there is no explanation of
those precise details because if such an explanation existed the
theory wouldn't be ad hoc. So the CI makes no predictions.
For example, if the wave function collapses the precise of details of
where and how that happens will affect the results of experiments. But
the problem of why we can't see other versions of objects around us
has been solved by decoherence, so there is no need for the collapse
and no explanation of where and how it happens.

I agree.

Post by Alan Forrester
As a result, the CI can't be used to explain anything about emergence.
The other "interpretations" of QM have similar problems.

Emergence issue could only be solved if we concentrate on physical principles that makes convergence possible within the background provided by SWE and MWI.
Lets' assume there is some kind of exotic "convergence" field in physical material. So QM=MWI+convergence field

If we go back to double-slit experiment, we have an electron that is sent towards an apparatus (double slit and fluorescent screen). The big question is why this electron (as one particle) shifts to wave behavior when detached from the electron gun whereas when I break the gun into two macro pieces I do not see any QM behavior in the part that is detached from the gun.

It looks like the electron got out of the electron guns' convergence field (that make converge the gun as a macroscopic object) and could not converge on its own now (can not form a convergence field). It only needs to collide with the fluorescent screen and with this interaction it joins the convergence field of the screen (from this we deduce that convergence fields could grow and include new particles upon interaction) and thus materializes accordingly.

So why a single electron could not converge on its own but some large macro part of the electron gun could be detached without any convergence problem?

I think the answer lies in the electron guns "interaction" with its surroundings. The detachment of the electron from the electron gun caused the electron remaining outside any (macro) convergence field. This because the electron (just after it detachment) is not having any interaction with any already existing "macro" convergence field. Once outside the convergence field, MWI/SWE only aspect dominates until it interacts with another (macro) convergence field (that would the slit or the screen).

Here by "interaction" I mean all types of interactions with physical surroundings not only the electron colliding to a macro object. For example photons colliding to the electron and changing directions is also a type of interaction This might be because the emitter of the photon, the photon itself and the receiver still remains within one holistic convergence field. So convergence fields are  formed by their "internal change detection" capability as a whole.
In this vein, a large macro chunk could never get out of interaction with the (macro) convergence fields around it and thus could never exhibit MWI/SWE only property. But for an electron, it is possible that interaction with surrounding convergence fields is non-existent. 

When this electron interacts with the double slit, the interplay between MWI/SWE and convergence field immediately begins. Double slit without "internal change detection" capability wrt to some fired electrons could not act as convergence field (thus wave behavior is kept). Double slit with "internal change detection" capability wrt to fired electrons acts as a convergence field (thus wave behavior disappears upon interaction)

If this theory of mine is correct, "convergence fields" are dynamic physical structures that could grow/shrink and are defined by their internal change detection capability and holistic behavior.

All above should be seen as an effort to explain my way of approaching to the problem.
İsmail Atalay 




[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

[Ismail Atalay i_c_atalay-/[e-mail] [Fabric-of-Reality]]

I know it has been quite a while after this discussion and I stayed away from the topic.


Nevertheless, just to clarify my position, I think my ideas below seems to bear resemblence the the relational framework of QM (as initiated by Borelli in 1996 and of which I did not have absolutely no previous information). I recently learned about RQM


What I call as "convergence field" seems to correspond to "information". "Interaction with convergence field" means information acquired through interaction of two QM systems. "Internal change detection" capability corresponds information acquisition capability of a measurement device. 


I am sad that I could not formulate it neatly and from purely information theoretical point of view. But I think my initial idea of the electron in double slit experiment has its own perspective/experience similar to double slit and to fluorescent screen is somewhat close to relational/perspective based QM. When total "uncertainty" (no information) is there, the electron experiences all physically possible combinations, it is only when there is information in an observer system, the electron physics are shaped accordingly wrt the acquired information through interaction/measurement.


Ismail Atalay
 

Post by Alan Forrester

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
Isn't "QM minus MWI" = Copenhagen? In other words by "subtracting" MWI,
you're really adding in the collapse postulate, since MWI is just QM
without collapse.

I disagree with that. I would say QM=MWI+"something else". And this "something else" is very tightly and deeply intertwined with MWI. It is so tight that MWI does not have an independent ontological existence.

Post by Alan Forrester

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
Are you really just saying that MWI is untestable? I.e. that it doesn't
make an refutable predictions? That's a valid criticism. I think IF we
can build a large-scale quantum computer, such that it can do more than a
theoretical perfectly efficient computer occupying the same spacetime, that
would be a refutation of Copenhagen, since all that computation has to be
done somewhere.

MWI automatically becomes untestable when one accepts that the it does not have an independent ontological existence. This means that MWI only relevant through its interaction and interplay with this "something else"

Post by Alan Forrester
The CI makes no predictions. The CI makes ad hoc modifications of QM
and the precise details of what predictions QM will make depend on the
precise details of the modifications. But there is no explanation of
those precise details because if such an explanation existed the
theory wouldn't be ad hoc. So the CI makes no predictions.
For example, if the wave function collapses the precise of details of
where and how that happens will affect the results of experiments. But
the problem of why we can't see other versions of objects around us
has been solved by decoherence, so there is no need for the collapse
and no explanation of where and how it happens.

I agree. 

Post by Alan Forrester
As a result, the CI can't be used to explain anything about emergence.
The other "interpretations" of QM have similar problems.

Emergence issue could only be solved if we concentrate on physical principles that makes convergence possible within the background provided by SWE and MWI. 
Lets' assume there is some kind of exotic "convergence" field in physical material. So QM=MWI+convergence field
If we go back to double-slit experiment, we have an electron that is sent towards an apparatus (double slit and fluorescent screen). The big question is why this electron (as one particle) shifts to wave behavior when detached from the electron gun whereas when I break the gun into two macro pieces I do not see any QM behavior in the part that is detached from the gun.
 It looks like the electron got out of the electron guns' convergence field (that make converge the gun as a macroscopic object) and could not converge on its own now (can not form a convergence field). It only needs to collide with the fluorescent screen and with this interaction it joins the convergence field of the screen (from this we deduce that convergence fields could grow and include new particles upon interaction) and thus materializes accordingly. 
So why a single electron could not converge on its own but some large macro part of the electron gun could be detached without any convergence problem?
I think the answer lies in the electron guns "interaction" with its surroundings. The detachment of the electron from the electron gun caused the electron remaining outside any (macro) convergence field.  This because the electron (just after it detachment) is not having any interaction with any already existing "macro" convergence field. Once outside the convergence field, MWI/SWE only aspect dominates until it interacts with another (macro) convergence field (that would the slit or the screen). 
Here by "interaction" I mean all types of interactions with physical surroundings not only the electron colliding to a macro object. For example photons colliding to the electron and changing directions is also a type of interaction This might be because the emitter of the photon, the photon itself and the receiver still remains within one holistic convergence field. So convergence fields are  formed by their "internal change detection" capability as a whole.
In this vein, a large macro chunk could never get out of interaction with the (macro) convergence fields around it and thus could never exhibit MWI/SWE only property. But for an electron, it is possible that interaction with surrounding convergence fields is non-existent. 


When this electron interacts with the double slit, the interplay between MWI/SWE and convergence field immediately begins. Double slit without "internal change detection" capability wrt to some fired electrons could not act as convergence field (thus wave behavior is kept). Double slit with "internal change detection" capability wrt to fired electrons acts as a convergence field (thus wave behavior disappears upon interaction)
If this theory of mine is correct, "convergence fields" are dynamic physical structures that could grow/shrink and are defined by their internal change detection capability and holistic behavior.
All above should be seen as an effort to explain my way of approaching to the problem.
İsmail Atalay 

[Gary Oberbrunner]

Post by hibbsa
**

Post by hibbsa

Post by hibbsa
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the

requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be
consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on

the

Post by hibbsa
other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour
involves or is associated with some emergence.

If this is the issue, I'm not sure what the issue is. Emergence generally
(not always, but mostly) smooths out low-level randomness or lumpiness

into

consistent, reliable, deterministic macroscopic behavior, which is what
you're hoping for. Low-level quantum phenomena have lots of randomness;
averaging over lots of those universes (or lots of instances in one
universe) gives nicely predictable emergent properties like temperature,
energy and entropy, or in another domain, predictable, stable giant ant
hills from fairly random individual ant behaviors.
ps: if you see this, it means I can post to FoR again.
--
Gary
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Gary, I think it's probably more reasonable to assume a lot more
emergence, in a lot more ways, than what might readily come to mind.

Such as?

Post by hibbsa
What is the problem. Well look, emergence is definitively independent of
the how the underlying quantum effects pan out. Which is the same as
saying, it's independent of the sort of variation produced by divergence.

I'd say most emergent properties result from averaging large groups of
properties. (Not all of course; conscousness is possibly an emergent
property of brains or other things.) But yes, changing some minor property
at the lower level typically has little effect on the macroscopic realm.
"Butterfly effects" are the canonical counterexample, but they are
comparatively rare.

Post by hibbsa
So the problem is, MWI has basically has no macroscopic influence.

That I don't understand at all. MWI just says the SWE describes physical
reality, all of it. Macro and micro. MWI describes it all. Maybe what
you're saying is the details of particular interatomic reactions typically
have no macroscopic influence. True, as far as it goes. If one photon
goes off in this direction and another goes off in another, that rarely
triggers vials of poison that kill cats.

Post by hibbsa
I keep hearing about the bizarre vanishingly improbable outcomes, but
despite that saying nothing not already covered in probability/statistics,
it looks to me like mwi only works conceptually when applied to humans and
daft outliers.

MWI by definition works when applied to physical objects - any or all of
them. I don't understand your comment above. How does MWI not apply to a
bouncing ball, for instance? MWI says solve the SWE; we see that the ball
is not relativistic so we can use Newtonian mechanics (which is a good
approximation for slow, "regular size" objects). We could in principle
solve the whole SWE for the ball + rest of system, but it's computationally
intractable (very).

Post by hibbsa
Or please explain why I'm wrong. But please if you do, first say a few
words confirming what you think I think, otherwise I won't know if what you
are saying helps me :o)

I'm not sure if you're wrong or not, since I don't understand your claim.
(And even then who knows if I'd have the knowledge to say if you're wrong.)

Post by hibbsa
p.s. there are other categories of major problem. What about the fact MWI
is created by integrating QM with a load of assumptions....that never get
any kind of treatment or analysis. Lots of implicit assumptions in there
too.

Well, let's take one thing at a time. But MWI is not created by
"integrating QM with a load of assumptions". It's defined by removing the
collapse postulate and taking the rest (the SWE) as a description of actual
physical reality (not just numerical fictions). That latter is indeed an
assumption that distinguishes MWIers from the "shut up and calculate"
crowd, but they have no model at all for what is "real" -- they don't care
as long as the math comes out.

Post by hibbsa
I think you, Deutsch, basically all of you, are seriously mixed up about
what you can and cannot do with unexamined assumptions in vague form
effectively treated as constants.

You could be right. What's an example of an unexamined assumption that's
being treated as a constant?

[hibbsa]

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
**

Post by hibbsa

Post by hibbsa
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the

requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be
consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the
other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour
involves or is associated with some emergence.

If this is the issue, I'm not sure what the issue is. Emergence generally
(not always, but mostly) smooths out low-level randomness or lumpiness into
consistent, reliable, deterministic macroscopic behavior, which is what
you're hoping for. Low-level quantum phenomena have lots of randomness;
averaging over lots of those universes (or lots of instances in one
universe) gives nicely predictable emergent properties like temperature,
energy and entropy, or in another domain, predictable, stable giant ant
hills from fairly random individual ant behaviors.
ps: if you see this, it means I can post to FoR again.
--
Gary
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Gary, I think it's probably more reasonable to assume a lot more
emergence, in a lot more ways, than what might readily come to mind.

Such as?

Post by hibbsa
What is the problem. Well look, emergence is definitively independent of
the how the underlying quantum effects pan out. Which is the same as
saying, it's independent of the sort of variation produced by divergence.

I'd say most emergent properties result from averaging large groups of
properties. (Not all of course; conscousness is possibly an emergent
property of brains or other things.) But yes, changing some minor property
at the lower level typically has little effect on the macroscopic realm.
"Butterfly effects" are the canonical counterexample, but they are
comparatively rare.

if that's as far as it goes there's not a problem. In which case are you willing to provide a plausible description for how quantum divergence can become part of an effect that goes on result in macroscopic divergence.

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
So the problem is, MWI has basically has no macroscopic influence.

That I don't understand at all. MWI just says the SWE describes physical
reality, all of it. Macro and micro. MWI describes it all.

You say MWI says that? I thought you said yesterday that's what gets assumed going in. In which case what the multiverse says is this might be what things would be like, *if* it was true.

Which backs off to the process that decided swe describes physical reality. Is there any mention why this is judged so important to be, reality would be willing to throw in a multiverse just to make it so?

Isn't this going to end up back to observing all the baffling things that throw classical realism out the window?

Doesn't that then become the starting point for why the swe must be a must have?

Maybe what

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
you're saying is the details of particular interatomic reactions typically
have no macroscopic influence. True, as far as it goes. If one photon
goes off in this direction and another goes off in another, that rarely
triggers vials of poison that kill cats.

Post by hibbsa
I keep hearing about the bizarre vanishingly improbable outcomes, but
despite that saying nothing not already covered in probability/statistics,
it looks to me like mwi only works conceptually when applied to humans and
daft outliers.

MWI by definition works when applied to physical objects - any or all of
them. I don't understand your comment above. How does MWI not apply to a
bouncing ball, for instance? MWI says solve the SWE; we see that the ball
is not relativistic so we can use Newtonian mechanics (which is a good
approximation for slow, "regular size" objects). We could in principle
solve the whole SWE for the ball + rest of system, but it's computationally
intractable (very).

I would have said the relevant question to the context would be whether divergence of the ball ever sees macroscopic divergence of the ball.

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
Or please explain why I'm wrong. But please if you do, first say a few
words confirming what you think I think, otherwise I won't know if what you
are saying helps me :o)

I'm not sure if you're wrong or not, since I don't understand your claim.
(And even then who knows if I'd have the knowledge to say if you're wrong.)

Post by hibbsa
p.s. there are other categories of major problem. What about the fact MWI
is created by integrating QM with a load of assumptions....that never get
any kind of treatment or analysis. Lots of implicit assumptions in there
too.

Well, let's take one thing at a time. But MWI is not created by
"integrating QM with a load of assumptions". It's defined by removing the
collapse postulate and taking the rest (the SWE) as a description of actual
physical reality (not just numerical fictions). That latter is indeed an
assumption that distinguishes MWIers from the "shut up and calculate"
crowd, but they have no model at all for what is "real" -- they don't care
as long as the math comes out.

If you want to throw out the local realism rationale for the swe thing, then it'd just become whatever reason goes in its place

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
I think you, Deutsch, basically all of you, are seriously mixed up about
what you can and cannot do with unexamined assumptions in vague form
effectively treated as constants.

You could be right. What's an example of an unexamined assumption that's
being treated as a constant?

- unless local realism gets treated in a process that explores what exactly is being suggested about local realism, and whether that can be better fitted. Then a process that establishes it thinks this is the only way local realism can be preserved in light of the quantum effects.

Which presumably then has eliminated, for example, the scenario where local realism, space and time existed prior to the big bang, and are *re*emergent effects, and what QM is telling us is something about what it took for that sort of complexity to successfully reassemble after being broken down, and squirted through the needle of a camels eye.

That would also preserve local reality in light of the quantum effects, but exchanging a through the camels eye puzzle for a multiverse. Maybe you would prefer the multiverse because maybe that feels like a solution not a problem. But on the other hand a through the camels eye problem is accessible via the scientific approach along many lines. And while the explanation leaves quantum mechanics still to be resolved, what it does do is point squarely the direction to where that solution will be found, and that will be the big bang

So, which is the better, more robust, more researchable, and overall more promising explanation. So more realistic by far because things get profoundly more realistic when something new is discovered, or equally promising, thrown out.

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
--
Gary
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

[Gary Oberbrunner]

Post by hibbsa
**

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
**

Post by hibbsa

Post by hibbsa
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the

requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be
consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the
other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour
involves or is associated with some emergence.

If this is the issue, I'm not sure what the issue is. Emergence generally
(not always, but mostly) smooths out low-level randomness or lumpiness into
consistent, reliable, deterministic macroscopic behavior, which is what
you're hoping for. Low-level quantum phenomena have lots of randomness;
averaging over lots of those universes (or lots of instances in one
universe) gives nicely predictable emergent properties like temperature,
energy and entropy, or in another domain, predictable, stable giant ant
hills from fairly random individual ant behaviors.
ps: if you see this, it means I can post to FoR again.
--
Gary
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Gary, I think it's probably more reasonable to assume a lot more
emergence, in a lot more ways, than what might readily come to mind.

Such as?

Post by hibbsa
What is the problem. Well look, emergence is definitively independent of
the how the underlying quantum effects pan out. Which is the same as
saying, it's independent of the sort of variation produced by divergence.

I'd say most emergent properties result from averaging large groups of
properties. (Not all of course; conscousness is possibly an emergent
property of brains or other things.) But yes, changing some minor property
at the lower level typically has little effect on the macroscopic realm.
"Butterfly effects" are the canonical counterexample, but they are
comparatively rare.

if that's as far as it goes there's not a problem.

Good.

Post by hibbsa
In which case are you willing to provide a plausible description for how
quantum divergence can become part of an effect that goes on result in
macroscopic divergence.

I don't know. What is "quantum divergence"? Is it just that in some
worlds the photon is emitted at t_1, and at some others at t_2? It's not a
term I'm familiar with.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
So the problem is, MWI has basically has no macroscopic influence.

That I don't understand at all. MWI just says the SWE describes physical
reality, all of it. Macro and micro. MWI describes it all.

You say MWI says that? I thought you said yesterday that's what gets
assumed going in.

Sorry, perhaps I missed something. MWI is the theory that the SWE is a
description of reality, and its observables are real (they exist, not just
as "convenient mathematical fictions"). I.e. there is no collapse.

Post by hibbsa
In which case what the multiverse says is this might be what things would
be like, *if* it was true.

I'm not sure how to parse that. I'm not sure the multiverse "says"
anything, especially anything self-referential.

Post by hibbsa
Which backs off to the process that decided swe describes physical
reality. Is there any mention why this is judged so important to be,
reality would be willing to throw in a multiverse just to make it so?

That last part doesn't seem to be a complete sentence. I'm not sure how to
parse it. Nor am I sure how to parse the first sentence fragment, though
there I'm guessing you mean "this [foregoing] raises the question of what
process was used to decide that the SWE describes physical reality".

It's clear that the SWE correctly predicts the outcome of physical
processes and experiments, to a very high degree of precision. That is to
say, it's probably not wrong in its domain of applicability. The "shut up
and calculate" folks have been using it very successfully for satellite
design, GPS, and lots of other applications. Your question appears to be
about whether we should "take it seriously" as describing ontologically
real things, specifically the part of it it says that any given interaction
has multiple outcomes, rather than the one we're used to. This is a harder
question of course. There are several competing interpretations of QM. I
think most serious physicists no longer think the Copenhagen interpretation
(instantaneous collapse) describes reality, so what your question boils
down to, I think, is: do any of the current interpretations of QM describe
reality? If so, which one? If not, where might we look? I'm afraid I
don't have much to offer on that topic. The SWE does such a good job that
I think QM describes reality. Collapse seems so obviously bad that
Copenhagen is out. That leaves violating locality (no FTL travel), or
causality (as commonly construed), or "realism", that events have only one
continuer. I favor the latter, which is MWI, because the others seem to
cause more troubles, and I'm reasonably comfortable with the main difficult
idea of MWI, that the world is a lot bigger than we thought -- it's
happened repeatedly throughout history.

Post by hibbsa
Isn't this going to end up back to observing all the baffling things that
throw classical realism out the window?

Again I'm not sure how to parse that sentence. What is the "this"? And
what are the "baffling things"? And of course "classical realism" (by
which I assume you mean a Newtonian block universe) isn't even close to the
window anymore, it was gone nearly a century ago.

Post by hibbsa
Doesn't that then become the starting point for why the swe must be a must have?

I'm not sure what such a starting point would be. My starting point for
"why the swe must be a must have" is that it does an astoundingly good job.

Post by hibbsa
Maybe what

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
you're saying is the details of particular interatomic reactions typically
have no macroscopic influence. True, as far as it goes. If one photon
goes off in this direction and another goes off in another, that rarely
triggers vials of poison that kill cats.

Post by hibbsa
I keep hearing about the bizarre vanishingly improbable outcomes, but
despite that saying nothing not already covered in probability/statistics,
it looks to me like mwi only works conceptually when applied to humans and
daft outliers.

MWI by definition works when applied to physical objects - any or all of
them. I don't understand your comment above. How does MWI not apply to a
bouncing ball, for instance? MWI says solve the SWE; we see that the ball
is not relativistic so we can use Newtonian mechanics (which is a good
approximation for slow, "regular size" objects). We could in principle
solve the whole SWE for the ball + rest of system, but it's computationally
intractable (very).

I would have said the relevant question to the context would be whether
divergence of the ball ever sees macroscopic divergence of the ball.

I don't know what that sentence means. What is "divergence of the ball"?
And how does divergence "see" anything? Maybe if you explain what
"divergence" is I'll get it.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
Or please explain why I'm wrong. But please if you do, first say a few

Post by hibbsa
words confirming what you think I think, otherwise I won't know if

what you

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
are saying helps me :o)

I'm not sure if you're wrong or not, since I don't understand your claim.
(And even then who knows if I'd have the knowledge to say if you're wrong.)

Post by hibbsa
p.s. there are other categories of major problem. What about the fact MWI
is created by integrating QM with a load of assumptions....that never get
any kind of treatment or analysis. Lots of implicit assumptions in there
too.

Well, let's take one thing at a time. But MWI is not created by
"integrating QM with a load of assumptions". It's defined by removing the
collapse postulate and taking the rest (the SWE) as a description of actual
physical reality (not just numerical fictions). That latter is indeed an
assumption that distinguishes MWIers from the "shut up and calculate"
crowd, but they have no model at all for what is "real" -- they don't care
as long as the math comes out.

If you want to throw out the local realism rationale for the swe thing,
then it'd just become whatever reason goes in its place

Local realism is not a rationale for "the swe thing" -- the SWE is what it
is. If you don't add the collapse postulate, you get something that is
local, but not "realistic" (single-valued) - i.e. MWI. If you throw out
locality, you can add collapse or various other things. And so on. None
of these are rationales for SWE, they're consequences of it. What you
can't have is the SWE plus local realism (and causality as usually
understood). It's internally inconsistent.

(I don't want to go off on a tangent, but I'll reiterate my common refrain
that "realism" as a QM term meaning single-valued is emotionally loaded
[who would want an UNrealistic theory??] and not even correct. The MWI is
perfectly "realistic" in the common sense; that's why I prefer to use
single-valued instead. Someone else here recently suggested another term
for it, which I can't remember now.)

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
I think you, Deutsch, basically all of you, are seriously mixed up about
what you can and cannot do with unexamined assumptions in vague form
effectively treated as constants.

You could be right. What's an example of an unexamined assumption that's
being treated as a constant?

- unless local realism gets treated in a process that explores what
exactly is being suggested about local realism, and whether that can be
better fitted. Then a process that establishes it thinks this is the only
way local realism can be preserved in light of the quantum effects.

Your first sentence is incomplete. I have no idea what it means, nor if
it's an answer to my question. Your second sentence is English but I still
can't make sense of it. How does a process think?

Post by hibbsa
Which presumably then has eliminated, for example, the scenario where local
realism, space and time existed prior to the big bang, and are *re*emergent
effects, and what QM is telling us is something about what it took for that
sort of complexity to successfully reassemble after being broken down, and
squirted through the needle of a camels eye.

Since I couldn't parse the sentence before this, I don't understand the
"which" (first word). And I'm not sure what any of this has to do with
before or after the big bang. And of course I don't think "local realism"
is possible at all in a QM world.

Post by hibbsa
That would also preserve local reality in light of the quantum effects

Sorry, what would preserve this?

Post by hibbsa
, but exchanging a through the camels eye puzzle for a multiverse.

I don't really understand the "through the camels eye puzzle". I have a
vague feeling you are trying to convey something about information transfer
during the big bang, but I'm not sure what it is or why it's relevant.

Post by hibbsa
Maybe you would prefer the multiverse because maybe that feels like a
solution not a problem. But on the other hand a through the camels eye
problem is accessible via the scientific approach along many lines. And
while the explanation leaves quantum mechanics still to be resolved, what
it does do is point squarely the direction to where that solution will be
found, and that will be the big bang

Sorry, what is the explanation which points in that direction? (And what's
it an explanation of?) I missed that.

Post by hibbsa
So, which is the better, more robust, more researchable, and overall more
promising explanation.

I assume that's a question despite the period. Unfortunately I don't know
what the two explanations being evaluated are. I assume one is QM and/or
one of its interpretations.

Post by hibbsa
So more realistic by far because things get profoundly more realistic when
something new is discovered, or equally promising, thrown out.

Again, I'm not sure what that sentence fragment refers to, nor its meaning.
Sorry.

[hibbsa]

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
**

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
**

Post by hibbsa

Post by hibbsa
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the

requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be
consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the
other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour
involves or is associated with some emergence.

If this is the issue, I'm not sure what the issue is. Emergence generally
(not always, but mostly) smooths out low-level randomness or lumpiness into
consistent, reliable, deterministic macroscopic behavior, which is what
you're hoping for. Low-level quantum phenomena have lots of randomness;
averaging over lots of those universes (or lots of instances in one
universe) gives nicely predictable emergent properties like temperature,
energy and entropy, or in another domain, predictable, stable giant ant
hills from fairly random individual ant behaviors.
ps: if you see this, it means I can post to FoR again.
--
Gary
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Gary, I think it's probably more reasonable to assume a lot more
emergence, in a lot more ways, than what might readily come to mind.

Such as?

Post by hibbsa
What is the problem. Well look, emergence is definitively independent of
the how the underlying quantum effects pan out. Which is the same as
saying, it's independent of the sort of variation produced by divergence.

I'd say most emergent properties result from averaging large groups of
properties. (Not all of course; conscousness is possibly an emergent
property of brains or other things.) But yes, changing some minor property
at the lower level typically has little effect on the macroscopic realm.
"Butterfly effects" are the canonical counterexample, but they are
comparatively rare.

if that's as far as it goes there's not a problem.

Good.

Post by hibbsa
In which case are you willing to provide a plausible description for how
quantum divergence can become part of an effect that goes on result in
macroscopic divergence.

I don't know. What is "quantum divergence"? Is it just that in some
worlds the photon is emitted at t_1, and at some others at t_2? It's not a
term I'm familiar with.

the term wasn't correct, but we had a context and there was a key work divergence. I was talking about divergence in the multiverse.

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
So the problem is, MWI has basically has no macroscopic influence.

That I don't understand at all. MWI just says the SWE describes physical
reality, all of it. Macro and micro. MWI describes it all.

You say MWI says that? I thought you said yesterday that's what gets
assumed going in.

Sorry, perhaps I missed something. MWI is the theory that the SWE is a
description of reality, and its observables are real (they exist, not just
as "convenient mathematical fictions"). I.e. there is no collapse.

Post by hibbsa
In which case what the multiverse says is this might be what things would
be like, *if* it was true.

I'm not sure how to parse that. I'm not sure the multiverse "says"
anything, especially anything self-referential.

Gary, I was using the same style you had just used to me, you said "MWI says..."

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
Which backs off to the process that decided swe describes physical
reality. Is there any mention why this is judged so important to be,
reality would be willing to throw in a multiverse just to make it so?

That last part doesn't seem to be a complete sentence. I'mt sure how to
parse it. Nor am I sure how to parse the first sentence fragment, though
there I'm guessing you mean "this [foregoing] raises the question of what
process was used to decide that the SWE describes physical reality".

Dude, in the previous gone you had said MWI didn't come out of a process involving assumptions, including for local reality. You seemed to want to place the swe as the seed motivation. I

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
It's clear that the SWE correctly predicts the outcome of physical
processes and experiments, to a very high degree of precision. That is to
say, it's probably not wrong in its domain of applicability. The "shut up
and calculate" folks have been using it very successfully for satellite
design, GPS, and lots of other applications. Your question appears to be
about whether we should "take it seriously" as describing ontologically
real things, specifically the part of it it says that any given interaction
has multiple outcomes, rather than the one we're used to. This is a harder
question of course. There are several competing interpretations of QM. I
think most serious physicists no longer think the Copenhagen interpretation
(instantaneous collapse) describes reality, so what your question boils
down to, I think, is: do any of the current interpretations of QM describe
reality? If so, which one? If not, where might we look? I'm afraid I
don't have much to offer on that topic. The SWE does such a good job that
I think QM describes reality. Collapse seems so obviously bad that
Copenhagen is out. That leaves violating locality (no FTL travel), or
causality (as commonly construed), or "realism", that events have only one
continuer. I favor the latter, which is MWI, because the others seem to
cause more troubles, and I'm reasonably comfortable with the main difficult
idea of MWI, that the world is a lot bigger than we thought -- it's
happened repeatedly throughout history.

Post by hibbsa
Isn't this going to end up back to observing all the baffling things that
throw classical realism out the window?

Again I'm not sure how to parse that sentence. What is the "this"? And
what are the "baffling things"? And of course "classical realism" (by
which I assume you mean a Newtonian block universe) isn't even close to the
window anymore, it was gone nearly a century ago.

Post by hibbsa
Doesn't that then become the starting point for why the swe must be a must have?

I'm not sure what such a starting point would be. My starting point for
"why the swe must be a must have" is that it does an astoundingly good job.

Post by hibbsa
Maybe what

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
you're saying is the details of particular interatomic reactions typically
have no macroscopic influence. True, as far as it goes. If one photon
goes off in this direction and another goes off in another, that rarely
triggers vials of poison that kill cats.

Post by hibbsa
I keep hearing about the bizarre vanishingly improbable outcomes, but
despite that saying nothing not already covered in probability/statistics,
it looks to me like mwi only works conceptually when applied to humans and
daft outliers.

MWI by definition works when applied to physical objects - any or all of
them. I don't understand your comment above. How does MWI not apply to a
bouncing ball, for instance? MWI says solve the SWE; we see that the ball
is not relativistic so we can use Newtonian mechanics (which is a good
approximation for slow, "regular size" objects). We could in principle
solve the whole SWE for the ball + rest of system, but it's computationally
intractable (very).

I would have said the relevant question to the context would be whether
divergence of the ball ever sees macroscopic divergence of the ball.

I don't know what that sentence means. What is "divergence of the ball"?
And how does divergence "see" anything? Maybe if you explain what
"divergence" is I'll get it.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
Or please explain why I'm wrong. But please if you do, first say a few

Post by hibbsa
words confirming what you think I think, otherwise I won't know if

what you

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
are saying helps me :o)

I'm not sure if you're wrong or not, since I don't understand your claim.
(And even then who knows if I'd have the knowledge to say if you're wrong.)

Post by hibbsa
p.s. there are other categories of major problem. What about the fact MWI
is created by integrating QM with a load of assumptions....that never get
any kind of treatment or analysis. Lots of implicit assumptions in there
too.

Well, let's take one thing at a time. But MWI is not created by
"integrating QM with a load of assumptions". It's defined by removing the
collapse postulate and taking the rest (the SWE) as a description of actual
physical reality (not just numerical fictions). That latter is indeed an
assumption that distinguishes MWIers from the "shut up and calculate"
crowd, but they have no model at all for what is "real" -- they don't care
as long as the math comes out.

If you want to throw out the local realism rationale for the swe thing,
then it'd just become whatever reason goes in its place

Local realism is not a rationale for "the swe thing" -- the SWE is what it
is. If you don't add the collapse postulate, you get something that is
local, but not "realistic" (single-valued) - i.e. MWI. If you throw out
locality, you can add collapse or various other things. And so on. None
of these are rationales for SWE, they're consequences of it. What you
can't have is the SWE plus local realism (and causality as usually
understood). It's internally inconsistent.
(I don't want to go off on a tangent, but I'll reiterate my common refrain
that "realism" as a QM term meaning single-valued is emotionally loaded
[who would want an UNrealistic theory??] and not even correct. The MWI is
perfectly "realistic" in the common sense; that's why I prefer to use
single-valued instead. Someone else here recently suggested another term
for it, which I can't remember now.)

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
I think you, Deutsch, basically all of you, are seriously mixed up about
what you can and cannot do with unexamined assumptions in vague form
effectively treated as constants.

You could be right. What's an example of an unexamined assumption that's
being treated as a constant?

- unless local realism gets treated in a process that explores what
exactly is being suggested about local realism, and whether that can be
better fitted. Then a process that establishes it thinks this is the only
way local realism can be preserved in light of the quantum effects.

Your first sentence is incomplete. I have no idea what it means, nor if
it's an answer to my question. Your second sentence is English but I still
can't make sense of it. How does a process think?

Post by hibbsa
Which presumably then has eliminated, for example, the scenario where local
realism, space and time existed prior to the big bang, and are *re*emergent
effects, and what QM is telling us is something about what it took for that
sort of complexity to successfully reassemble after being broken down, and
squirted through the needle of a camels eye.

Since I couldn't parse the sentence before this, I don't understand the
"which" (first word). And I'm not sure what any of this has to do with
before or after the big bang. And of course I don't think "local realism"
is possible at all in a QM world.

Post by hibbsa
That would also preserve local reality in light of the quantum effects

Sorry, what would preserve this?

Post by hibbsa
, but exchanging a through the camels eye puzzle for a multiverse.

I don't really understand the "through the camels eye puzzle". I have a
vague feeling you are trying to convey something about information transfer
during the big bang, but I'm not sure what it is or why it's relevant.

Post by hibbsa
Maybe you would prefer the multiverse because maybe that feels like a
solution not a problem. But on the other hand a through the camels eye
problem is accessible via the scientific approach along many lines. And
while the explanation leaves quantum mechanics still to be resolved, what
it does do is point squarely the direction to where that solution will be
found, and that will be the big bang

Sorry, what is the explanation which points in that direction? (And what's
it an explanation of?) I missed that.

Post by hibbsa
So, which is the better, more robust, more researchable, and overall more
promising explanation.

I assume that's a question despite the period. Unfortunately I don't know
what the two explanations being evaluated are. I assume one is QM and/or
one of its interpretations.

Post by hibbsa
So more realistic by far because things get profoundly more realistic when
something new is discovered, or equally promising, thrown out.

Again, I'm not sure what that sentence fragment refers to, nor its meaning.
Sorry.
--
Gary

Gary - You're a good guy and we're comfortable. It's up to you of course, but if you find yourself at the end of a reply to me, and pretty much every one of your responses is saying you don't parse this, or you don't see the point, and so on. Unless there's some burning reason that you want to keep running the thread, feel free to choose to discard before sending :O)

[Gary Oberbrunner]

Post by hibbsa
...

Post by hibbsa
In which case are you willing to provide a plausible description for

how

Post by hibbsa
quantum divergence can become part of an effect that goes on result in
macroscopic divergence.

I don't know. What is "quantum divergence"? Is it just that in some
worlds the photon is emitted at t_1, and at some others at t_2? It's not

a

term I'm familiar with.

the term wasn't correct, but we had a context and there was a key work
divergence. I was talking about divergence in the multiverse.

OK -- divergence like I meant above, right? Where a photon is emitted at
two different times in different worlds? In that case, Schroedinger's Cat
is the canonical example of macroscopic amplification of a quantum effect.
But so is a geiger counter, and there are many others. Do those serve?

Post by hibbsa

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
So the problem is, MWI has basically has no macroscopic influence.

That I don't understand at all. MWI just says the SWE describes

physical

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
reality, all of it. Macro and micro. MWI describes it all.

You say MWI says that? I thought you said yesterday that's what gets
assumed going in.

Sorry, perhaps I missed something. MWI is the theory that the SWE is a
description of reality, and its observables are real (they exist, not

just

as "convenient mathematical fictions"). I.e. there is no collapse.

Post by hibbsa
In which case what the multiverse says is this might be what things

would

Post by hibbsa
be like, *if* it was true.

I'm not sure how to parse that. I'm not sure the multiverse "says"
anything, especially anything self-referential.

Gary, I was using the same style you had just used to me, you said "MWI says..."

The MWI is an interpretation of QM. It definitely says something; it makes
definite claims (as does QM itself, as a scientific theory). The
multiverse, on the other hand, just is (or isn't, I suppose), like a rock
or a triangle. It is not an interpretation or a story or a description.

Post by hibbsa

Which backs off to the process that decided swe describes physical

Post by hibbsa
reality. Is there any mention why this is judged so important to be,
reality would be willing to throw in a multiverse just to make it so?

That last part doesn't seem to be a complete sentence. I'mt sure how to
parse it. Nor am I sure how to parse the first sentence fragment, though
there I'm guessing you mean "this [foregoing] raises the question of what
process was used to decide that the SWE describes physical reality".

Dude, in the previous gone you had said MWI didn't come out of a process
involving assumptions, including for local reality. You seemed to want to
place the swe as the seed motivation. I

Was my interpretation of your sentence correct? I'm just trying to figure
out what you're talking about. I'm not disagreeing with you or anything.
Hopefully my interpretation was correct, and the paragraph below helps.
Was it, and did it?

Post by hibbsa
It's clear that the SWE correctly predicts the outcome of physical

processes and experiments, to a very high degree of precision. That is to
say, it's probably not wrong in its domain of applicability. The "shut up
and calculate" folks have been using it very successfully for satellite
design, GPS, and lots of other applications. Your question appears to be
about whether we should "take it seriously" as describing ontologically
real things, specifically the part of it it says that any given

interaction

has multiple outcomes, rather than the one we're used to. This is a

harder

question of course. There are several competing interpretations of QM. I
think most serious physicists no longer think the Copenhagen

interpretation

(instantaneous collapse) describes reality, so what your question boils
down to, I think, is: do any of the current interpretations of QM

describe

reality? If so, which one? If not, where might we look? I'm afraid I
don't have much to offer on that topic. The SWE does such a good job that
I think QM describes reality. Collapse seems so obviously bad that
Copenhagen is out. That leaves violating locality (no FTL travel), or
causality (as commonly construed), or "realism", that events have only

one

continuer. I favor the latter, which is MWI, because the others seem to
cause more troubles, and I'm reasonably comfortable with the main

difficult

idea of MWI, that the world is a lot bigger than we thought -- it's
happened repeatedly throughout history.

Post by hibbsa
Isn't this going to end up back to observing all the baffling things

that

Post by hibbsa
throw classical realism out the window?

Again I'm not sure how to parse that sentence. What is the "this"? And
what are the "baffling things"? And of course "classical realism" (by
which I assume you mean a Newtonian block universe) isn't even close to

the

window anymore, it was gone nearly a century ago.

Post by hibbsa
Doesn't that then become the starting point for why the swe must be a

must

Post by hibbsa
have?

I'm not sure what such a starting point would be. My starting point for
"why the swe must be a must have" is that it does an astoundingly good

job.

Post by hibbsa
Maybe what

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
you're saying is the details of particular interatomic reactions

typically

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
have no macroscopic influence. True, as far as it goes. If one photon
goes off in this direction and another goes off in another, that

rarely

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
triggers vials of poison that kill cats.

Post by hibbsa
I keep hearing about the bizarre vanishingly improbable outcomes,

but

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
despite that saying nothing not already covered in

probability/statistics,

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
it looks to me like mwi only works conceptually when applied to

humans and

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
daft outliers.

MWI by definition works when applied to physical objects - any or

all of

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
them. I don't understand your comment above. How does MWI not apply

to a

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
bouncing ball, for instance? MWI says solve the SWE; we see that the

ball

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
is not relativistic so we can use Newtonian mechanics (which is a

good

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
approximation for slow, "regular size" objects). We could in

principle

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
solve the whole SWE for the ball + rest of system, but it's

computationally

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
intractable (very).

I would have said the relevant question to the context would be whether
divergence of the ball ever sees macroscopic divergence of the ball.

I don't know what that sentence means. What is "divergence of the ball"?
And how does divergence "see" anything? Maybe if you explain what
"divergence" is I'll get it.

OK, now I know what you mean by "divergence" -- different experimental
outcomes in different branches of the multiverse (a totally normal state of
affairs). Here's how I analyze the ball case: in (virtually) all the
universes in which you and the ball exist, and you drop the ball, the ball
hits the table and bounces back -- the microscopic differences in position,
momentum, etc. all average out. Of course there's a few where random
brownian motion of ball molecules line up and the ball goes wild, but those
are so very few they can almost always be ignored. The exact height of the
bounce, however, will be a tiny bit different in all the different versions
of the experiment (different universes) due to tiny quantum differences
(how many photons hit the ball on the way down vs. up, and so on).

Does that help?

Post by hibbsa

Post by hibbsa
Or please explain why I'm wrong. But please if you do, first say a few

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
words confirming what you think I think, otherwise I won't know if

what you

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
are saying helps me :o)

Indeed, this is what I've been trying to do.

Post by hibbsa

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
I'm not sure if you're wrong or not, since I don't understand your

claim.

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
(And even then who knows if I'd have the knowledge to say if you're

wrong.)

...> > > > p.s. there are other categories of major problem. What about the

Post by hibbsa
fact MWI

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
is created by integrating QM with a load of assumptions....that

never get

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
any kind of treatment or analysis. Lots of implicit assumptions in

there

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
too.

Well, let's take one thing at a time. But MWI is not created by
"integrating QM with a load of assumptions". It's defined by

removing the

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
collapse postulate and taking the rest (the SWE) as a description of

actual

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
physical reality (not just numerical fictions). That latter is

indeed an

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
assumption that distinguishes MWIers from the "shut up and calculate"
crowd, but they have no model at all for what is "real" -- they

don't care

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
as long as the math comes out.

If you want to throw out the local realism rationale for the swe thing,
then it'd just become whatever reason goes in its place

Local realism is not a rationale for "the swe thing" -- the SWE is what

it

is. If you don't add the collapse postulate, you get something that is
local, but not "realistic" (single-valued) - i.e. MWI. If you throw out
locality, you can add collapse or various other things. And so on. None
of these are rationales for SWE, they're consequences of it. What you
can't have is the SWE plus local realism (and causality as usually
understood). It's internally inconsistent.
(I don't want to go off on a tangent, but I'll reiterate my common

refrain

that "realism" as a QM term meaning single-valued is emotionally loaded
[who would want an UNrealistic theory??] and not even correct. The MWI is
perfectly "realistic" in the common sense; that's why I prefer to use
single-valued instead. Someone else here recently suggested another term
for it, which I can't remember now.)

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
I think you, Deutsch, basically all of you, are seriously mixed up

about

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
what you can and cannot do with unexamined assumptions in vague

form

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
effectively treated as constants.

You could be right. What's an example of an unexamined assumption

that's

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner
being treated as a constant?

- unless local realism gets treated in a process that explores what
exactly is being suggested about local realism, and whether that can be
better fitted. Then a process that establishes it thinks this is the

only

Post by hibbsa
way local realism can be preserved in light of the quantum effects.

Your first sentence is incomplete. I have no idea what it means, nor if
it's an answer to my question. Your second sentence is English but I

still

can't make sense of it. How does a process think?

Post by hibbsa
Which presumably then has eliminated, for example, the scenario where

local

Post by hibbsa
realism, space and time existed prior to the big bang, and are

*re*emergent

Post by hibbsa
effects, and what QM is telling us is something about what it took for

that

Post by hibbsa
sort of complexity to successfully reassemble after being broken down,

and

Post by hibbsa
squirted through the needle of a camels eye.

Since I couldn't parse the sentence before this, I don't understand the
"which" (first word). And I'm not sure what any of this has to do with
before or after the big bang. And of course I don't think "local realism"
is possible at all in a QM world.

Post by hibbsa
That would also preserve local reality in light of the quantum effects

Sorry, what would preserve this?

Post by hibbsa
, but exchanging a through the camels eye puzzle for a multiverse.

I don't really understand the "through the camels eye puzzle". I have a
vague feeling you are trying to convey something about information

transfer

during the big bang, but I'm not sure what it is or why it's relevant.

Post by hibbsa
Maybe you would prefer the multiverse because maybe that feels like a
solution not a problem. But on the other hand a through the camels eye
problem is accessible via the scientific approach along many lines. And
while the explanation leaves quantum mechanics still to be resolved,

what

Post by hibbsa
it does do is point squarely the direction to where that solution will

be

Post by hibbsa
found, and that will be the big bang

Sorry, what is the explanation which points in that direction? (And

what's

it an explanation of?) I missed that.

Post by hibbsa
So, which is the better, more robust, more researchable, and overall

more

Post by hibbsa
promising explanation.

I assume that's a question despite the period. Unfortunately I don't know
what the two explanations being evaluated are. I assume one is QM and/or
one of its interpretations.

Post by hibbsa
So more realistic by far because things get profoundly more realistic

when

Post by hibbsa
something new is discovered, or equally promising, thrown out.

Again, I'm not sure what that sentence fragment refers to, nor its

meaning.

Sorry.
--
Gary

Gary - You're a good guy and we're comfortable. It's up to you of course,
but if you find yourself at the end of a reply to me, and pretty much every
one of your responses is saying you don't parse this, or you don't see the
point, and so on. Unless there's some burning reason that you want to keep
running the thread, feel free to choose to discard before sending :O)

Sorry, don't mean to appear mean or anything. I think you probably have a
really interesting idea in here; I know you've spent a lot of time thinking
deeply about these things. I want to understand what you have to say. I
just have a hard time figuring out what you're trying to say sometimes. It
might take me a few tries. Sorry if I appear pedantic; I really am trying.
As a scientist I think it's important to be clear in terminology and say
things as plainly as possible; it seems to be the best way to get at the
truth and avoid talking at cross-purposes.

Now that I've explained that MWI is local but not "realistic" (single
valued), how does that affect your idea?

[hibbsa]

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
...

Post by hibbsa
In which case are you willing to provide a plausible description for how
quantum divergence can become part of an effect that goes on result in
macroscopic divergence.

I don't know. What is "quantum divergence"? Is it just that in some
worlds the photon is emitted at t_1, and at some others at t_2? It's not a
term I'm familiar with.

the term wasn't correct, but we had a context and there was a key work
divergence. I was talking about divergence in the multiverse.

OK -- divergence like I meant above, right? Where a photon is emitted at
two different times in different worlds? In that case, Schroedinger's Cat
is the canonical example of macroscopic amplification of a quantum effect.
But so is a geiger counter, and there are many others. Do those serve?

These examples don't qualify because they are human/biology dependent (right at the start I did exclude this realm if you want to go back and check) We already know divergence is easy to demonstrate in that realm. But what about outside that realm? Deutsch describes a wave spreading out at the speed of light driving the process of divergence onward. But at what stage does the macroscopic world look different between universes, and why?

I'm not saying it doesn't happen. I made it clear I expect it does. But it should be possible to explain consistent with Deutsch's explanation of emergence. I mean, using the vocabularly of emergence. This shouldn't be a problem, and it's all I've been asking for.

[Gary Oberbrunner]

Post by hibbsa
But at what stage does the macroscopic world look different between
universes, and why?

Any time anything macroscopic is lightly balanced, a single quantum event
can tip the balance. Take a 3-body system for instance (3 stars or 3
planets or even 3 dust motes in space), which has built-in elements of
orbital instability. Over a long time (many orbits), a tiny impact from a
photon can create a very different orbital pattern, even leading to one
body being ejected or impacted.

There are thousands of other examples. A rock falling off a cliff face,
the shape of a cloud, wind patterns, global climate, any sensitively
balanced chemical reaction; all can be affected by a small number (even one
in the limit) of quantum events, like photon emission or absorption, or
anything similar, especially after a long time; certain physical systems
amplify small events.

Look for phenomena that have a fractal pattern of metastability (on the
edge of chaos) -- those are the kind to look for if you're interested in
how microscopic events can have macroscopic impact. Google for "period
doubling" or "metastability" or "fractal chaos" or "chaotic attractors" or
the like for plenty of examples.

I don't know how to describe this in Deutsch's language of emergence,
sorry. So perhaps this is helpful, perhaps not.

[Rami Rustom]

Post by hibbsa

Post by Gary Oberbrunner

Post by hibbsa
...

Post by hibbsa
In which case are you willing to provide a plausible description for how
quantum divergence can become part of an effect that goes on result in
macroscopic divergence.

I don't know. What is "quantum divergence"? Is it just that in some
worlds the photon is emitted at t_1, and at some others at t_2? It's not a
term I'm familiar with.

the term wasn't correct, but we had a context and there was a key work
divergence. I was talking about divergence in the multiverse.

OK -- divergence like I meant above, right? Where a photon is emitted at
two different times in different worlds? In that case, Schroedinger's Cat
is the canonical example of macroscopic amplification of a quantum effect.
But so is a geiger counter, and there are many others. Do those serve?

These examples don't qualify because they are human/biology dependent (right at the start I did exclude this realm if you want to go back and check) We already know divergence is easy to demonstrate in that realm. But what about outside that realm? Deutsch describes a wave spreading out at the speed of light driving the process of divergence onward. But at what stage does the macroscopic world look different between universes, and why?
I'm not saying it doesn't happen. I made it clear I expect it does. But it should be possible to explain consistent with Deutsch's explanation of emergence. I mean, using the vocabularly of emergence. This shouldn't be a problem, and it's all I've been asking for.

fyi, i read your emails about mwi and never know what you're asking.
so its a problem for me to answer you.

for example, I don't understand why you care about vocabulary. why do
you think that's important to solving your problem?

-- Rami Rustom
http://ramirustom.blogspot.com

[Alan]

Post by hibbsa

Post by hibbsa
Thought I'd try a summary of where this is going.
 
First of all, it's important to exclude - for now - MWI conceptions involving conscious decisions, and probably biological decisions. This isn't because what I'm driving at is weak...but that this is the best way forward. So please note we are considering the more primitive, non conscious or pre-conscious/pre-biological world.  
 
By 'emergent properties' I just mean the way macroscopic reality emerges from QM. The specific description I'm using is Deutsch's 'Reality of Abstractions' chapter. In that, he basically describes the way macroscopic properties (say those associated with boiling the kettle) arise with a great amount of independence from the atomic behaviour going on beneath.
 
Regarding this sort of emergence, it occurs to me that unless there was a huge amount of stability/reliability/repeatability in terms of the emergence of the same macroscopic properties - for any given QM 'object' (I'll describe 'object' below), our macroscopic world would not be stable, nor deterministic, the way we find it. 
 
As an aside, I don't think this issue depends on the question whether macroscopic reality does emerge from the QM world, because to the extent it doesn't, the MWI model cannot represent divergence of, or any impact over, the components that don't (i.e. because the MWI multiverse is purely in terms of quantum divergence). 
 
But the inherent MWI logic does seem to be that all or some macroscopic emergence does arise from the QM world. For example Deutsch's definition of fungibility includes macroscopic objects. 
 
So, the issue I would like to explore is along the following lines. Given macroscopic reality is complex, it seems reasonable to expect there are many 'levels' of emergence involved, and many instances of emergence. It actually seems reasonable to think that pretty much all instances of quantum divergence will contribute toward some degree of emergence within individual universes. 
 
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour involves or is associated with some emergence.
 
The consequence of taking the two together seems to be that the multiverse has to deliver the same emergence for the same QM in the same contexts. Because....at the level of individual universes, all the different possible quantum histories for a given context of occurrence, reflect *possible* occurences in each participating universe within the multiverse.
 
Now...I think there are a lot of consequences from this, that need to be worked through and considered. The reason I'm not going into those yet is just that, unless people can understand wtf I'm saying so far, there's no point.
 
But a sneak preview would be, for example, to do with Deutsch's conception of fungibility. Given he includes the macroscopic world, by implication he includes the levels of emergence up through that world. But...by his own philosophical reasoning, to do with, for example non-foundationalist conceptions, higher levels of emergence actually change the physical definition of what 'fungibility' can physically mean. For a simple example, the macroscopic conception of an object moving with constant velocity through space only has meaning in relativistic terms.
 
Likewise - the principle of equivalence disallows certain distinctions. And so on and so forth.
 
Returning to Deutschs conceptions of these issues, it is possible for an emergent level to be independently downward influential on a lower level of emergence. Therefore a higher level of emergence can theoretically be the primary causality behind what would amount to a breaking of fungibility.
 
One of the implications of this seems to be the following logic: If macroscopic levels can break fungibility, fungibility must therefore be *physically* pegged to macroscopic levels. Which means that, whatever concept of 'being in the same place' Deutsch applies to fungible universes at the quantum level, has to also apply at the macroscopic levels.
 
Which means that fungible universes are also in the 'same place' at macroscopic levels.
 
Now.....to see the huge significance of where this is going, you have to go back to the question I am asking. If the vast majority of universes in the multiverse produce the same emergence, then the macroscopic reality of the vast majority of universes in the multiverse REMAINS IN THE SAME PLACE. 
 
The consequence of that being, the multiverse is not divergent....but CONVERGENT up macroscopic levels. 
 
Which implies convergence toward ONE macroscopic universe. 
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

DD - From my perspective I put time and effort into thinking about your ideas, and in the above contributed a fairly hard logical problem.
I appreciate some aspect may be wrong, but how can we know unless you are willing to point it out?
Alan had a bash, but I think my response to him was fairly much knock-down.
I suppose more generally the question in my mind is now something like, how does this C&R thing work? I thought there was something along the lines of, a well formed logical criticism either gets conceded or knocked-down.
Perhaps my criticism is so bad it doesn't deserve attention. But then, surely if it's really that bad, a simple one-liner will do the trick?

I don't know about David, but I don't understand the substance of your position. It seems to involve some large number of abstractions that you have heaped on top of one another. You have provided no examples to illustrate what you're talking about. Nor have you explained what problem is solved by your position.

A position that is badly explained and apparently solves no problems does not require an answer.

Alan

[hibbsa]

Post by Alan

Post by hibbsa

Post by hibbsa
Thought I'd try a summary of where this is going.
 
First of all, it's important to exclude - for now - MWI conceptions involving conscious decisions, and probably biological decisions. This isn't because what I'm driving at is weak...but that this is the best way forward. So please note we are considering the more primitive, non conscious or pre-conscious/pre-biological world.  
 
By 'emergent properties' I just mean the way macroscopic reality emerges from QM. The specific description I'm using is Deutsch's 'Reality of Abstractions' chapter. In that, he basically describes the way macroscopic properties (say those associated with boiling the kettle) arise with a great amount of independence from the atomic behaviour going on beneath.
 
Regarding this sort of emergence, it occurs to me that unless there was a huge amount of stability/reliability/repeatability in terms of the emergence of the same macroscopic properties - for any given QM 'object' (I'll describe 'object' below), our macroscopic world would not be stable, nor deterministic, the way we find it. 
 
As an aside, I don't think this issue depends on the question whether macroscopic reality does emerge from the QM world, because to the extent it doesn't, the MWI model cannot represent divergence of, or any impact over, the components that don't (i.e. because the MWI multiverse is purely in terms of quantum divergence). 
 
But the inherent MWI logic does seem to be that all or some macroscopic emergence does arise from the QM world. For example Deutsch's definition of fungibility includes macroscopic objects. 
 
So, the issue I would like to explore is along the following lines. Given macroscopic reality is complex, it seems reasonable to expect there are many 'levels' of emergence involved, and many instances of emergence. It actually seems reasonable to think that pretty much all instances of quantum divergence will contribute toward some degree of emergence within individual universes. 
 
The issue arises when you converge, on the one hand, the requirements our own macroscopic world need to meet in order to be consistent, reliable, repeating and ultimately deterministic. With, on the other hand, the supposition all or most instances of quantum behaviour involves or is associated with some emergence.
 
The consequence of taking the two together seems to be that the multiverse has to deliver the same emergence for the same QM in the same contexts. Because....at the level of individual universes, all the different possible quantum histories for a given context of occurrence, reflect *possible* occurences in each participating universe within the multiverse.
 
Now...I think there are a lot of consequences from this, that need to be worked through and considered. The reason I'm not going into those yet is just that, unless people can understand wtf I'm saying so far, there's no point.
 
But a sneak preview would be, for example, to do with Deutsch's conception of fungibility. Given he includes the macroscopic world, by implication he includes the levels of emergence up through that world. But...by his own philosophical reasoning, to do with, for example non-foundationalist conceptions, higher levels of emergence actually change the physical definition of what 'fungibility' can physically mean. For a simple example, the macroscopic conception of an object moving with constant velocity through space only has meaning in relativistic terms.
 
Likewise - the principle of equivalence disallows certain distinctions. And so on and so forth.
 
Returning to Deutschs conceptions of these issues, it is possible for an emergent level to be independently downward influential on a lower level of emergence. Therefore a higher level of emergence can theoretically be the primary causality behind what would amount to a breaking of fungibility.
 
One of the implications of this seems to be the following logic: If macroscopic levels can break fungibility, fungibility must therefore be *physically* pegged to macroscopic levels. Which means that, whatever concept of 'being in the same place' Deutsch applies to fungible universes at the quantum level, has to also apply at the macroscopic levels.
 
Which means that fungible universes are also in the 'same place' at macroscopic levels.
 
Now.....to see the huge significance of where this is going, you have to go back to the question I am asking. If the vast majority of universes in the multiverse produce the same emergence, then the macroscopic reality of the vast majority of universes in the multiverse REMAINS IN THE SAME PLACE. 
 
The consequence of that being, the multiverse is not divergent....but CONVERGENT up macroscopic levels. 
 
Which implies convergence toward ONE macroscopic universe. 
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

DD - From my perspective I put time and effort into thinking about your ideas, and in the above contributed a fairly hard logical problem.
I appreciate some aspect may be wrong, but how can we know unless you are willing to point it out?
Alan had a bash, but I think my response to him was fairly much knock-down.
I suppose more generally the question in my mind is now something like, how does this C&R thing work? I thought there was something along the lines of, a well formed logical criticism either gets conceded or knocked-down.
Perhaps my criticism is so bad it doesn't deserve attention. But then, surely if it's really that bad, a simple one-liner will do the trick?

I don't know about David, but I don't understand the substance of your position. It seems to involve some large number of abstractions that you have heaped on top of one another. You have provided no examples to illustrate what you're talking about. Nor have you explained what problem is solved by your position.
A position that is badly explained and apparently solves no problems does not require an answer.
Alan

I don't understand what barrier prevents you from grasping the core issue being raised. There's an issue whether/how the sort of variation produced by divergence has any influence on any associated emergence.

Can you help with a plausible detailed scenario where the multiverse changes the emergence that creates macroscopic reality? Excluding humans and outliers.

And if the multiverse cannot produce significant macroscopic diversity, that's mwi pretty much doing nothing.

The method behind its derivation is no good, because it amounts to integrating QM with a load of untreated assumptions, using a scheme of 'what would it take for QM to be explained if all these assumptions are held constant'.

That's just a transformation Alan. It's a guaranteed result..translations are geometrically almost always possible. Typically, anything can be accommodated by expanding distribution.

[David Deutsch]

Post by hibbsa
Can you help with a plausible detailed scenario where the multiverse changes the emergence that creates macroscopic reality? Excluding humans and outliers.
And if the multiverse cannot produce significant macroscopic diversity, that's mwi pretty much doing nothing.

Compared with what?

What do you mean by the multiverse "changing" something?

Or "producing" something?

Or "doing" something?

-- David Deutsch