Clarification about mirror neurons

Post by Alan Forrester
In BoI, David explicitly says that mirror neurons don't explain human imitation. However, there is another problem with the mirror neuron idea.
Neurons, or some set of neurons, can act as a set of universal classical gates. So mirror neurons (or some subset thereof) play a role in imitation by virtue of instantiating some algorithm. The explanation of how the imitation is done is in terms of that algorithm rather than in terms of the neurons per se. So then calling them mirror neurons is a bit like saying that a universal computer that happens to be set up to implement a chess playing algorithm is a chess playing chip when that chip could just as easily be programmed to do any other classical computation.
This could lead to mistakes. It could be the case that some of the mirror neurons could be cut out or destroyed without destroying the mirror functionality. They happen to go off because they're wired up to other neurons that do the mirror neuron algorithm. Worse, it could be the case that there are two sets of neurons A and B and you could destroy either one of them without destroying the mirror functionality but if we destroy both sets then we destroy the mirror functionality. In the absence of a specific explanation it's important to think of the mirror functionality as being software so we don't miss stuff.

In animals, the neurons used to do imitation may not change much since the knowledge in the animal's brain is coded for by genes and the animal creates no new knowledge. So then looking for neurons that go off when an animal does something and when it recognises another animal doing the same thing, mirror neurons, may provide a way of testing ideas about mirror algorithms. Having a term for that idea makes some sense and that seems to be David's position in BoI.

Alan

David Deutsch

2013-01-02 21:17:02 UTC

One reason I think it's vital to take that position is that the commonsense theory of how animals, especially apes, can imitate complex actions is that they do it by understanding what the actions are for -- i.e. the same way that humans do it. Indeed, that misconception was one of the motivations for biologists to search for mirror neurons in the first place.

It is an attractive misconception because copying even a simple action does indeed require a large amount of knowledge to be present in the copying animal. So the traditional misconception that knowledge requires a knowing subject then leads directly to the conclusion that an ape must be a knowing subject.

To make the arguments in BoI about what humans are and how they evolved, one must therefore refute those misconceptions. One thing I referred to for that purpose was the excellent research of Richard Byrne, which showed that apes have no idea of the purpose of their complex meme-encoded actions, which are not directly copied but are composed of several copied actions put together in coordinated ways. And he showed how those composite actions are learned. But that learning process requires apes to be able to recognise and copy the individual actions, and Byrne's research does not tell us how they do that because it happens inside the ape's brain. So it is vital to explain how that is possible.

The answer, in short, is that the necessary knowledge is encoded in the ape's genes, and implemented in a special-purpose computational system in its brain, which translates from sensory to motor signals. But only a particular class of actions, fixed once and for all in the animal's genome, can be copied using that system.

Would it not have been perverse, given that it was essential to argue that such a system must exist in the brains of apes, for BoI not to mention that a plausible candidate for that system has recently been discovered? Or not to call that system by its conventional and perfectly reasonable name, namely mirror neurons?

-- David Deutsch

Alan Forrester

2013-01-03 21:27:53 UTC

Post by Alan Forrester
In animals, the neurons used to do imitation may not change much since the knowledge in the animal's brain is coded for by genes and the animal creates no new knowledge. So then looking for neurons that go off when an animal does something and when it recognises another animal doing the same thing, mirror neurons, may provide a way of testing ideas about mirror algorithms. Having a term for that idea makes some sense and that seems to be David's position in BoI.

One reason I think it's vital to take that position is that the commonsense theory of how animals, especially apes, can imitate complex actions is that they do it by understanding what the actions are for -- i.e. the same way that humans do it. Indeed, that misconception was one of the motivations for biologists to search for mirror neurons in the first place.
It is an attractive misconception because copying even a simple action does indeed require a large amount of knowledge to be present in the copying animal. So the traditional misconception that knowledge requires a knowing subject then leads directly to the conclusion that an ape must be a knowing subject.
To make the arguments in BoI about what humans are and how they evolved, one must therefore refute those misconceptions. One thing I referred to for that purpose was the excellent research of Richard Byrne, which showed that apes have no idea of the purpose of their complex meme-encoded actions, which are not directly copied but are composed of several copied actions put together in coordinated ways. And he showed how those composite actions are learned. But that learning process requires apes to be able to recognise and copy the individual actions, and Byrne's research does not tell us how they do that because it happens inside the ape's brain. So it is vital to explain how that is possible.
The answer, in short, is that the necessary knowledge is encoded in the ape's genes, and implemented in a special-purpose computational system in its brain, which translates from sensory to motor signals. But only a particular class of actions, fixed once and for all in the animal's genome, can be copied using that system.
Would it not have been perverse, given that it was essential to argue that such a system must exist in the brains of apes, for BoI not to mention that a plausible candidate for that system has recently been discovered? Or not to call that system by its conventional and perfectly reasonable name, namely mirror neurons?

Yes. It is important to explain how animals can imitate without doing human level stuff and mirror neurons may help solve that problem.

Some people might be concerned that the mirror neuron idea might be used as a scientistic excuse for coercive policies. A coercive person might say that an autistic child has faulty mirror neurons and to fix that we have to force him to take medication or follow a routine or whatever. However, this problem only makes it more urgent the task of explaining mirror neurons properly, rather than abandoning an idea with some good features to coercive quacks.

Alan

a b

2013-01-05 09:54:49 UTC

On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 9:27 PM, Alan Forrester

Post by Alan Forrester
In animals, the neurons used to do imitation may not change much since
the knowledge in the animal's brain is coded for by genes and the animal
creates no new knowledge. So then looking for neurons that go off when an
animal does something and when it recognises another animal doing the same
thing, mirror neurons, may provide a way of testing ideas about mirror
algorithms. Having a term for that idea makes some sense and that seems to
be David's position in BoI.

One reason I think it's vital to take that position is that the
commonsense theory of how animals, especially apes, can imitate complex
actions is that they do it by understanding what the actions are for -- i.e.
the same way that humans do it. Indeed, that misconception was one of the
motivations for biologists to search for mirror neurons in the first place.
It is an attractive misconception because copying even a simple action
does indeed require a large amount of knowledge to be present in the copying
animal. So the traditional misconception that knowledge requires a knowing
subject then leads directly to the conclusion that an ape must be a knowing
subject.
To make the arguments in BoI about what humans are and how they evolved,
one must therefore refute those misconceptions. One thing I referred to for
that purpose was the excellent research of Richard Byrne, which showed that
apes have no idea of the purpose of their complex meme-encoded actions,
which are not directly copied but are composed of several copied actions put
together in coordinated ways. And he showed how those composite actions are
learned. But that learning process requires apes to be able to recognise and
copy the individual actions, and Byrne's research does not tell us how they
do that because it happens inside the ape's brain. So it is vital to explain
how that is possible.
The answer, in short, is that the necessary knowledge is encoded in the
ape's genes, and implemented in a special-purpose computational system in
its brain, which translates from sensory to motor signals. But only a
particular class of actions, fixed once and for all in the animal's genome,
can be copied using that system.
Would it not have been perverse, given that it was essential to argue
that such a system must exist in the brains of apes, for BoI not to mention
that a plausible candidate for that system has recently been discovered? Or
not to call that system by its conventional and perfectly reasonable name,
namely mirror neurons?

Yes. It is important to explain how animals can imitate without doing
human level stuff and mirror neurons may help solve that problem.
Some people might be concerned that the mirror neuron idea might be used
as a scientistic excuse for coercive policies. A coercive person might say
that an autistic child has faulty mirror neurons and to fix that we have to
force him to take medication or follow a routine or whatever. However, this
problem only makes it more urgent the task of explaining mirror neurons
properly, rather than abandoning an idea with some good features to coercive
quacks.
Alan

What about if quacks say a specialized region for language is faulty?
These are acknowledged in BoI

[reposting due to earlier format problems]

Alan Forrester

2013-01-05 12:44:47 UTC

Post by a b
On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 9:27 PM, Alan Forrester

Post by Alan Forrester
In animals, the neurons used to do imitation may not change much since
the knowledge in the animal's brain is coded for by genes and the animal
creates no new knowledge. So then looking for neurons that go off when an
animal does something and when it recognises another animal doing the same
thing, mirror neurons, may provide a way of testing ideas about mirror
algorithms. Having a term for that idea makes some sense and that seems to
be David's position in BoI.

One reason I think it's vital to take that position is that the
commonsense theory of how animals, especially apes, can imitate complex
actions is that they do it by understanding what the actions are for -- i.e.
the same way that humans do it. Indeed, that misconception was one of the
motivations for biologists to search for mirror neurons in the first place.
It is an attractive misconception because copying even a simple action
does indeed require a large amount of knowledge to be present in the copying
animal. So the traditional misconception that knowledge requires a knowing
subject then leads directly to the conclusion that an ape must be a knowing
subject.
To make the arguments in BoI about what humans are and how they evolved,
one must therefore refute those misconceptions. One thing I referred to for
that purpose was the excellent research of Richard Byrne, which showed that
apes have no idea of the purpose of their complex meme-encoded actions,
which are not directly copied but are composed of several copied actions put
together in coordinated ways. And he showed how those composite actions are
learned. But that learning process requires apes to be able to recognise and
copy the individual actions, and Byrne's research does not tell us how they
do that because it happens inside the ape's brain. So it is vital to explain
how that is possible.
The answer, in short, is that the necessary knowledge is encoded in the
ape's genes, and implemented in a special-purpose computational system in
its brain, which translates from sensory to motor signals. But only a
particular class of actions, fixed once and for all in the animal's genome,
can be copied using that system.
Would it not have been perverse, given that it was essential to argue
that such a system must exist in the brains of apes, for BoI not to mention
that a plausible candidate for that system has recently been discovered? Or
not to call that system by its conventional and perfectly reasonable name,
namely mirror neurons?

Yes. It is important to explain how animals can imitate without doing
human level stuff and mirror neurons may help solve that problem.
Some people might be concerned that the mirror neuron idea might be used
as a scientistic excuse for coercive policies. A coercive person might say
that an autistic child has faulty mirror neurons and to fix that we have to
force him to take medication or follow a routine or whatever. However, this
problem only makes it more urgent the task of explaining mirror neurons
properly, rather than abandoning an idea with some good features to coercive
quacks.
Alan

What about if quacks say a specialized region for language is faulty?
These are acknowledged in BoI

If a doctor discovers that in one of his patients a specialised region in the brain devoted to language has some problem, then there several relevant issues:

(1) If the patient can express preferences, then the doctor should ask him for consent for treatments. The idea that the patient's family or friends wanted the patient to be coerced does not legitimise coercion, nor does the idea that the doctor doesn't like the patient.

(2) Suppose the patient can't communicate any preferences as a result of this damage. If this is the case, then the doctor should treat the patient in such a way as to get him back to being healthy and able to express preferences.

(3) Suppose the patient uses physical force or fraud on the doctor or makes a credible threat to do so. The doctor should defend himself and seek prosecution if he thinks it is right to do so. It is possible that a patient could misinterpret something the doctor does as an attempt to use force or something like that and he might attack the doctor for this perceived violation. Such misunderstandings may be settled without legal action. It is important to be clear that while the doctor is defending himself, the patient and doctor have an adversarial relationship and the doctor is not acting to help the patient.

(4) If the patient has a fit and as a result of this fit the doctor is injured, then the doctor should not attack the patient. It would be reasonable to take steps to prevent himself and others from being further injured.

Alan

a b

2013-01-09 14:02:16 UTC

On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 12:44 PM, Alan Forrester

Post by a b
On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 9:27 PM, Alan Forrester

Post by Alan Forrester
In animals, the neurons used to do imitation may not change much since
the knowledge in the animal's brain is coded for by genes and the animal
creates no new knowledge. So then looking for neurons that go off when an
animal does something and when it recognises another animal doing the same
thing, mirror neurons, may provide a way of testing ideas about mirror
algorithms. Having a term for that idea makes some sense and that seems to
be David's position in BoI.

One reason I think it's vital to take that position is that the
commonsense theory of how animals, especially apes, can imitate complex
actions is that they do it by understanding what the actions are for -- i.e.
the same way that humans do it. Indeed, that misconception was one of the
motivations for biologists to search for mirror neurons in the first place.
It is an attractive misconception because copying even a simple action
does indeed require a large amount of knowledge to be present in the copying
animal. So the traditional misconception that knowledge requires a knowing
subject then leads directly to the conclusion that an ape must be a knowing
subject.
To make the arguments in BoI about what humans are and how they evolved,
one must therefore refute those misconceptions. One thing I referred to for
that purpose was the excellent research of Richard Byrne, which showed that
apes have no idea of the purpose of their complex meme-encoded actions,
which are not directly copied but are composed of several copied actions put
together in coordinated ways. And he showed how those composite actions are
learned. But that learning process requires apes to be able to recognise and
copy the individual actions, and Byrne's research does not tell us how they
do that because it happens inside the ape's brain. So it is vital to explain
how that is possible.
The answer, in short, is that the necessary knowledge is encoded in the
ape's genes, and implemented in a special-purpose computational system in
its brain, which translates from sensory to motor signals. But only a
particular class of actions, fixed once and for all in the animal's genome,
can be copied using that system.
Would it not have been perverse, given that it was essential to argue
that such a system must exist in the brains of apes, for BoI not to mention
that a plausible candidate for that system has recently been discovered? Or
not to call that system by its conventional and perfectly reasonable name,
namely mirror neurons?

Yes. It is important to explain how animals can imitate without doing
human level stuff and mirror neurons may help solve that problem.
Some people might be concerned that the mirror neuron idea might be used
as a scientistic excuse for coercive policies. A coercive person might say
that an autistic child has faulty mirror neurons and to fix that we have to
force him to take medication or follow a routine or whatever. However, this
problem only makes it more urgent the task of explaining mirror neurons
properly, rather than abandoning an idea with some good features to coercive
quacks.
Alan

What about if quacks say a specialized region for language is faulty?
These are acknowledged in BoI

If a doctor discovers that in one of his patients a specialised region in
the brain devoted to language has some problem, then there several relevant
(1) If the patient can express preferences, then the doctor should ask him
for consent for treatments. The idea that the patient's family or friends
wanted the patient to be coerced does not legitimise coercion, nor does the
idea that the doctor doesn't like the patient.
(2) Suppose the patient can't communicate any preferences as a result of
this damage. If this is the case, then the doctor should treat the patient
in such a way as to get him back to being healthy and able to express
preferences.
(3) Suppose the patient uses physical force or fraud on the doctor or
makes a credible threat to do so. The doctor should defend himself and seek
prosecution if he thinks it is right to do so. It is possible that a patient
could misinterpret something the doctor does as an attempt to use force or
something like that and he might attack the doctor for this perceived
violation. Such misunderstandings may be settled without legal action. It is
important to be clear that while the doctor is defending himself, the
patient and doctor have an adversarial relationship and the doctor is not
acting to help the patient.
(4) If the patient has a fit and as a result of this fit the doctor is
injured, then the doctor should not attack the patient. It would be
reasonable to take steps to prevent himself and others from being further
injured.
Alan

This is fine. This is a candidate set of guidelines for good philosphy
procedure.

But what I'm looking for is the distinctiveness between special areas
for language and special areas for enhancing certain types of commonly
used visualization...which is basically what 'mirror neurons' seem to
be about.

The other thing I'm looking for is precisely what or where the reality
or not of such areas contradict or cause problems for the philosophy.

I've read the better explanation you say popperians already have, but
a lot of assumptions go into that, that I don't think hold water. I'll
list a couple.

- You seem to be assuming that if apes used a 'mirror neuron' system
for some rather hard coded processes, that with evolution into humans
that function become redundant AND SO mirror neuron functionality fell
by the wayside. But that isn't necessarily what happens when traits
become redundant in their old role. What might actually happen is the
trait finds a new way to be useful to other functions. Given the
evolution into humans increased brain complexity rather a lot, it is
quite possible 'mirror neuron' functionality dramatically increased
its useful to a range of different processes.

- Your 'better explanation' assumes what the problem was to be solved.
But what if that was just one part of a bigger problem that needed to
be solved? That could change everything and leave your better
explanation inadequate. For example. What if the 'mirror function' is
referenced by multiple processes...that sometimes need to happen
simultaneously? Or what if some of those processes need to reference
the mirror-function multiply, or what if the mirror-function needs to
develop in real-time potentially in parallel to many other processes,
some, all or none of which may need to reference that mirror function?
These would all be good reasons for a process to get abstracted away
into a specialized area.

It's worth noting that specialized areas would need this sort of
reason to have become specialized in the first place, and a corollary
of that is that specialized regions probably get referenced by other
processes when if those processes (which may be rational thoughts)
fire up. Which means no processes may reference the specialized
region, in which case it may just form part of the background
perception or it may wait awhile and shut down again.

- Finally, there doesn't seem to be any reason why a 'mirror function'
wouldn't have gone on to be referenced by language related processes.
For example, linking body language into the process of better guessing
what the person might be trying to say. Or perhaps for working out
what they are saying when they can't hear them properly..maybe when a
long way off. It's well known that if someone hears, say, "take me to
Bale Street' at the same time as looking at someone's lips saying
"take me to vale street" that they will actually hear the word Vale.
So language already links into body language in deep ways that
actually change what our brain's decide that they hear.

It's important to point out something else about a 'special region
for....' in the brain. The special region may be one place doing one
thing. But the 'for...' part is determined by the process that
references that special region. A 'Special region...for language' may
or may not be exclusively for language. In fact we know of some
special regions for language that aren't exclusively for language.
Mutations in one such has becme the leading candidate for explaining
conditions like Dylexia. The region in question distinguishes between
similar sounds by identifying subtle differences.

Which as an aside raises ANOTHER question. Does Deutsch's acceptance
of special brain regions for langauge, mean that he accepts certain
conditions linked to language-related impairments, are plausible and
may have a genetic basis? Which leaves the position on mental illness
/mental conditions....where? Autism like conditions are out, but
Dyslexia type are in? Where are we?

Back to the main line of reasoning. Look......the situation we are in
is that 'mirror functionality' could in some contexts actually BE
specialized services to languages. So it's very hard to see that the
distinctions you and Deutsch are making hold much water under
reasonable scrutiny. It all seems to rely on a bunch of underlying
assumptions ....that don't kick very well with some very boilerplate
evolutionary concepts about where special regions might come from, how
they might get referenced and be useful to other processes, and what a
'specialized region' FOR something necessarily is (i.e. does it
necessary have to be exclusively for language...what about for musical
ability?)

A lot of problems I am seeing. A lot of them pretty straight off the
bat for just accepting those specialized language regions in the first
place.

It looks to me like Deutsch and you and others just don't see the
value in thinking through the consequencs of delving into the domain
of physical brain architecture and actually introducing concepts like
'specialized regions for language'.

I mean....straight off the bat....does this mean language impairment
related conditions like Dyslexia are now deemed good-philosophy
non-scientism conditions? Or not? And if not, why not?

a b

2013-01-09 22:55:03 UTC

Post by a b
On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 12:44 PM, Alan Forrester

Post by a b
On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 9:27 PM, Alan Forrester

Post by Alan Forrester
In animals, the neurons used to do imitation may not change much since
the knowledge in the animal's brain is coded for by genes and the animal
creates no new knowledge. So then looking for neurons that go off when an
animal does something and when it recognises another animal doing the same
thing, mirror neurons, may provide a way of testing ideas about mirror
algorithms. Having a term for that idea makes some sense and that seems to
be David's position in BoI.

One reason I think it's vital to take that position is that the
commonsense theory of how animals, especially apes, can imitate complex
actions is that they do it by understanding what the actions are for -- i.e.
the same way that humans do it. Indeed, that misconception was one of the
motivations for biologists to search for mirror neurons in the first place.
It is an attractive misconception because copying even a simple action
does indeed require a large amount of knowledge to be present in the copying
animal. So the traditional misconception that knowledge requires a knowing
subject then leads directly to the conclusion that an ape must be a knowing
subject.
To make the arguments in BoI about what humans are and how they evolved,
one must therefore refute those misconceptions. One thing I referred to for
that purpose was the excellent research of Richard Byrne, which showed that
apes have no idea of the purpose of their complex meme-encoded actions,
which are not directly copied but are composed of several copied actions put
together in coordinated ways. And he showed how those composite actions are
learned. But that learning process requires apes to be able to recognise and
copy the individual actions, and Byrne's research does not tell us how they
do that because it happens inside the ape's brain. So it is vital to explain
how that is possible.
The answer, in short, is that the necessary knowledge is encoded in the
ape's genes, and implemented in a special-purpose computational system in
its brain, which translates from sensory to motor signals. But only a
particular class of actions, fixed once and for all in the animal's genome,
can be copied using that system.
Would it not have been perverse, given that it was essential to argue
that such a system must exist in the brains of apes, for BoI not to mention
that a plausible candidate for that system has recently been discovered? Or
not to call that system by its conventional and perfectly reasonable name,
namely mirror neurons?

Yes. It is important to explain how animals can imitate without doing
human level stuff and mirror neurons may help solve that problem.
Some people might be concerned that the mirror neuron idea might be used
as a scientistic excuse for coercive policies. A coercive person might say
that an autistic child has faulty mirror neurons and to fix that we have to
force him to take medication or follow a routine or whatever. However, this
problem only makes it more urgent the task of explaining mirror neurons
properly, rather than abandoning an idea with some good features to coercive
quacks.
Alan

What about if quacks say a specialized region for language is faulty?
These are acknowledged in BoI

This is fine. This is a candidate set of guidelines for good philosphy
procedure.
But what I'm looking for is the distinctiveness between special areas
for language and special areas for enhancing certain types of commonly
used visualization...which is basically what 'mirror neurons' seem to
be about.
The other thing I'm looking for is precisely what or where the reality
or not of such areas contradict or cause problems for the philosophy.
I've read the better explanation you say popperians already have, but
a lot of assumptions go into that, that I don't think hold water. I'll
list a couple.
- You seem to be assuming that if apes used a 'mirror neuron' system
for some rather hard coded processes, that with evolution into humans
that function become redundant AND SO mirror neuron functionality fell
by the wayside. But that isn't necessarily what happens when traits
become redundant in their old role. What might actually happen is the
trait finds a new way to be useful to other functions. Given the
evolution into humans increased brain complexity rather a lot, it is
quite possible 'mirror neuron' functionality dramatically increased
its useful to a range of different processes.
- Your 'better explanation' assumes what the problem was to be solved.
But what if that was just one part of a bigger problem that needed to
be solved? That could change everything and leave your better
explanation inadequate. For example. What if the 'mirror function' is
referenced by multiple processes...that sometimes need to happen
simultaneously? Or what if some of those processes need to reference
the mirror-function multiply, or what if the mirror-function needs to
develop in real-time potentially in parallel to many other processes,
some, all or none of which may need to reference that mirror function?
These would all be good reasons for a process to get abstracted away
into a specialized area.
It's worth noting that specialized areas would need this sort of
reason to have become specialized in the first place, and a corollary
of that is that specialized regions probably get referenced by other
processes when if those processes (which may be rational thoughts)
fire up. Which means no processes may reference the specialized
region, in which case it may just form part of the background
perception or it may wait awhile and shut down again.
- Finally, there doesn't seem to be any reason why a 'mirror function'
wouldn't have gone on to be referenced by language related processes.
For example, linking body language into the process of better guessing
what the person might be trying to say. Or perhaps for working out
what they are saying when they can't hear them properly..maybe when a
long way off. It's well known that if someone hears, say, "take me to
Bale Street' at the same time as looking at someone's lips saying
"take me to vale street" that they will actually hear the word Vale.
So language already links into body language in deep ways that
actually change what our brain's decide that they hear.
It's important to point out something else about a 'special region
for....' in the brain. The special region may be one place doing one
thing. But the 'for...' part is determined by the process that
references that special region. A 'Special region...for language' may
or may not be exclusively for language. In fact we know of some
special regions for language that aren't exclusively for language.
Mutations in one such has becme the leading candidate for explaining
conditions like Dylexia. The region in question distinguishes between
similar sounds by identifying subtle differences.
Which as an aside raises ANOTHER question. Does Deutsch's acceptance
of special brain regions for langauge, mean that he accepts certain
conditions linked to language-related impairments, are plausible and
may have a genetic basis? Which leaves the position on mental illness
/mental conditions....where? Autism like conditions are out, but
Dyslexia type are in? Where are we?
Back to the main line of reasoning. Look......the situation we are in
is that 'mirror functionality' could in some contexts actually BE
specialized services to languages. So it's very hard to see that the
distinctions you and Deutsch are making hold much water under
reasonable scrutiny. It all seems to rely on a bunch of underlying
assumptions ....that don't kick very well with some very boilerplate
evolutionary concepts about where special regions might come from, how
they might get referenced and be useful to other processes, and what a
'specialized region' FOR something necessarily is (i.e. does it
necessary have to be exclusively for language...what about for musical
ability?)
A lot of problems I am seeing. A lot of them pretty straight off the
bat for just accepting those specialized language regions in the first
place.
It looks to me like Deutsch and you and others just don't see the
value in thinking through the consequencs of delving into the domain
of physical brain architecture and actually introducing concepts like
'specialized regions for language'.
I mean....straight off the bat....does this mean language impairment
related conditions like Dyslexia are now deemed good-philosophy
non-scientism conditions? Or not? And if not, why not?

Just in case that was too long, here are a couple of the highlights

- Does accepting specialized regions for language imply accepting
condition s related to language impairment (like dyslexia) are
possibly legitimate? In which case is it now that autism-like
conditions are scientism but dyslexia-like conditions aren't? If not,
why not?

- Mirror-Neuron regions could be referenced by language related
processes, in which case they would actually be specialized areas for
language in those contexts (likewise there are specialized areas for
language that may be referenced by non-language processes, say
relating to Music).

- So...where are we? If mirror-neuron regions are referenced by
language-related processes, and Deutsch already accepts specialized
regions for language....

David Deutsch

2013-01-10 12:29:46 UTC

Post by a b
- Does accepting specialized regions for language imply accepting
condition s related to language impairment (like dyslexia) are
possibly legitimate?

If there are specialised regions for a computational function in the brain, the unspecialised regions are still universal and can learn to perform the function.

But the very term "specialized" can be misleading here because it can mean many different things. Because of universality, it is impossible for neurons to be 'specialised' in any computational sense. So a *computationally* "specialised region of the brain" can only be one in which the connections between neurons are genetically preprogrammed to enact a particular algorithm. But understanding human language, and using it, are both creative functions that are not inborn (we are not born able to read, speak etc). And therefore those functions cannot be pre-programmed. So they have to be learned creatively.

A region could be specialised in another sense, e.g. it could have exclusive access to signals coming from the optic nerves. If so, then if that region was damaged, the person might be blind or have difficulty seeing. But that does not prevent the person from performing the *computational* task associated with reading. For instance, they can learn to read Braille, using a different part of the brain.

It is logically possible for *any* genetic attribute, whether it codes for a defect in a brain region for or a skin colour or whatever, to 'cause' the behaviour that has been called 'dyslexia', via interactions with the environment such as affecting the behaviour of other people, or the person's own ideas via cultural interpretation. What it cannot possibly do is code for the behaviour itself, or make it immutable, because humans choose their behaviour, and their creative ability is universal and can be turned to any task that can be performed at all, including reading.

-- David Deutsch

Rami Rustom

2013-01-10 14:33:28 UTC

Post by a b
- Does accepting specialized regions for language imply accepting
condition s related to language impairment (like dyslexia) are
possibly legitimate?

I have a analogous question.

- Does accepting specialized regions for facial recognition imply
accepting conditions related to reading social cues (like
"Autism/Aspergers") are possibly legitimate? (I'll use David's answer
below to answer this question.)

Post by David Deutsch
If there are specialised regions for a computational function in the brain, the unspecialised regions are still universal and can learn to perform the function.
But the very term "specialized" can be misleading here because it can mean many different things. Because of universality, it is impossible for neurons to be 'specialised' in any computational sense. So a *computationally* "specialised region of the brain" can only be one in which the connections between neurons are genetically preprogrammed to enact a particular algorithm. But understanding human language, and using it, are both creative functions that are not inborn (we are not born able to read, speak etc). And therefore those functions cannot be pre-programmed. So they have to be learned creatively.

Understanding that a frown (together with all the other signals that
one could gather from another person) and then deciding that all of
those signals taken together means that he is sad, is a computational
function -- hence anybody can learn it because of the universality.

But, registering that a person's face is making a frown, is not computational.

Do you think that there is a similar part of the brain responsible for
registering the minute differences in facial expressions? If so, is
this computational?

Post by David Deutsch
But that does not prevent the person from performing the *computational* task associated with reading. For instance, they can learn to read Braille, using a different part of the brain.

So, if there is a specialized part of the brain that registers facial
expressions, and if a person has some genetic difference that causes
that part of the brain to not be functional (or brain damage to that
part of the brain), the person can still use his universal sight
recognition to *learn* to register facial expressions.

Post by David Deutsch
It is logically possible for *any* genetic attribute, whether it codes for a defect in a brain region for or a skin colour or whatever, to 'cause' the behaviour that has been called 'dyslexia', via interactions with the environment such as affecting the behaviour of other people, or the person's own ideas via cultural interpretation. What it cannot possibly do is code for the behaviour itself, or make it immutable, because humans choose their behaviour, and their creative ability is universal and can be turned to any task that can be performed at all, including reading.

-- Rami Rustom
http://ramirustom.blogspot.com

David Deutsch

2013-01-10 19:17:40 UTC

Post by a b
- Does accepting specialized regions for language imply accepting
condition s related to language impairment (like dyslexia) are
possibly legitimate?

I have a analogous question.
- Does accepting specialized regions for facial recognition imply
accepting conditions related to reading social cues (like
"Autism/Aspergers") are possibly legitimate? (I'll use David's answer
below to answer this question.)

I agree that the answer is the same.

Understanding that a frown (together with all the other signals that
one could gather from another person) and then deciding that all of
those signals taken together means that he is sad, is a computational
function -- hence anybody can learn it because of the universality.
But, registering that a person's face is making a frown, is not computational.

I don't see why it isn't. The only way frowns might not be detectable through general-purpose thinking about what we see, would be if the data from the eyes was only presented to the general-purpose part of the brain after automatic and lossy processing, but was presented to the supposed frown-recognition centre in raw form. Something a bit like that does happen when the eye itself does information processing, discarding what its algorithms reject as erroneous data.

(Even when the information is lost, we can still learn how to take that into account, and not be fooled by the erroneous interpretations placed on our sense data by hardware, whether defective or not. Painters have to learn to do precisely that, for instance. And anyone can detect their own blind spot with simple experiments, and learn not to make various mistakes based on of thinking that their visual field is like the image on a TV screen.)

However, none of that can be the case for frowns, because we can detect them in hugely degraded images.

Do you think that there is a similar part of the brain responsible for
registering the minute differences in facial expressions?

No.

Post by Rami Rustom
If so, is this computational?

If it existed it would be computational, and so could be done by general-purpose thinking too, unless the information flow was lossy in the above sense.

Yes.

-- David Deutsch

a b

2013-01-19 22:46:01 UTC