Discussion:
Implications of Recent Developments in Network Science
hibbsa
2013-02-10 01:41:54 UTC
Permalink
I have a question for Popper-Deutschians as to whether certain
implications for the 'philosophy of science' arising from a recent
discovery in Network Science is (a) consistent with the philosophy
discussed here and (b) Interesting.

Admittedly it is early days in terms of the developments. But what there
is so far is pretty robust...so it seems worthwhile taking the
supposition these developments go on to firm up as candidate laws.

The discovery is that networks that occur 'naturally' as in they happen
in some sense in time and space, converge toward a single identity at
higher emergent levels. See here for an overview

http://phys.org/news/2012-11-human-brain-internet-cosmology-similar.html



and here for the more detailed proof

http://www.nature.com/srep/2012/121113/srep00793/full/srep00793.html


The implication dealt with in the report is for a way to much more
rapidly discover the features of networks that only partially undertood.
An actual 'worked example' is provided in that the discovery of a
specific network that would normally have taken a very large amount of
time in a supercomputer, was achieved in a tiny fraction of the time by
assuming the network in question exhibited the higher level regularities
common to all such networks. I don't recall but I think the findings are
then confirmed by the long supercomputer process.

Here's the extra implication to the domain of 'philosphy of science' as
I see it.

It's certainly reasonable and intuitive to expect the history of science
as it occured on the ground could be represented as a network.
Therefore, it seems very plausible that if some future project took
place involving a much more careful revising of what happened, when by
who, with who influences....the resulting network structure, could then
be used in conjunction with the known laws of such networks as mentioned
above, to further 'discover' the regularities, ultimately with the
potential of revealing previously unrealized regularities in play in
knowledge creation.

Regularities which could be very revealing or even definitive as to what
science is, and how it works. Which may well be consistent with the
PopperDeutsch explanation but simply explaining the same thing from a
different direction. Which would of itself be valuable. But also,
possible taking things a lot further.

One advantage of this over the current philosophy, would be its
objective character. Regularities defining science and knowledge
creation, of a mathematical nature, backed up by hard proofs, involving
laws of nature pertaining to networks.

As a further possible aside....if all natural networks have these shared
regularities that actually constrain what forms they can take, would
that be a possible explanation of why human intuition has been sucessful
in - apparently - inducing regularities by considering parochial
'patterns' and 'regularities' (which by the very words inherently have
networy features) ?





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
JAG
2013-02-11 11:41:41 UTC
Permalink
Post by hibbsa
Here's the extra implication to the domain of 'philosphy of science' as
I see it.
Greetings to all.....

not exactyly a respond to the topic discussed here but here is another real-LEGIT implication to the domain of philosophy of science (that is, according to Hume's following idea):

"How is 'experimental reasoning' about causes and effects itself
justified? In terms of deduction? that is impossible since the
conclusion of inductive arguments are not deductively derivable from
their premises. In terms of experimental reasoning? that is arguing
in circle."
-Hume
Alan Forrester
2013-02-13 08:56:01 UTC
Permalink
Post by JAG
Post by hibbsa
Here's the extra implication to the domain of 'philosphy of science' as
I see it.
Greetings to all.....
"How is 'experimental reasoning' about causes and effects itself
justified? In terms of deduction? that is impossible since the
conclusion of inductive arguments are not deductively derivable from
their premises. In terms of experimental reasoning? that is arguing
in circle."
-Hume
It isn't justified. Justification is unnecessary and impossible. See "The Beginning of Infinity" by David Deutsch and "Realism and the Aim of Science" by Karl Popper.

Alan
Brett Hall
2013-02-13 10:08:51 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alan Forrester
Post by JAG
Here's the extra implication to the domain of 'philosphy of science' as
I see it.
Greetings to all.....
"How is 'experimental reasoning' about causes and effects itself
justified? In terms of deduction? that is impossible since the
conclusion of inductive arguments are not deductively derivable from
their premises. In terms of experimental reasoning? that is arguing
in circle."
-Hume
It isn't justified. Justification is unnecessary and impossible. See "The Beginning of Infinity" by David Deutsch and "Realism and the Aim of Science" by Karl Popper.
Alan
And see also The Fabric of Reality, the title of the book from which this list draws its own name. Specifically, read chapter 3 and perhaps then come back here with questions.

Brett.

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
Bruno Marchal
2013-02-14 11:50:29 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alan Forrester
Post by JAG
Post by hibbsa
Here's the extra implication to the domain of 'philosphy of
science' as
Post by Alan Forrester
Post by JAG
Post by hibbsa
I see it.
Greetings to all.....
not exactyly a respond to the topic discussed here but here is
another real-LEGIT implication to the domain of philosophy of
Post by Alan Forrester
Post by JAG
"How is 'experimental reasoning' about causes and effects itself
justified? In terms of deduction? that is impossible since the
conclusion of inductive arguments are not deductively derivable
from
Post by Alan Forrester
Post by JAG
their premises. In terms of experimental reasoning? that is
arguing
Post by Alan Forrester
Post by JAG
in circle."
-Hume
It isn't justified. Justification is unnecessary and impossible.
See "The Beginning of Infinity" by David Deutsch and "Realism and
the Aim of Science" by Karl Popper.
Post by Alan Forrester
Alan
And see also The Fabric of Reality, the title of the book from which
this list draws its own name. Specifically, read chapter 3 and
perhaps then come back here with questions.
Justification and proofs make sense in the frame of a theory
(hypothesis, conjecture, postulate, question).

We cannot justify *as true* any application of a theory. But we can
still justify the "use" of a theory, for some application, usually by
showing it clear and simple (or more clear or simple or encompassing
than other theories).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
Bruno Marchal
2013-02-17 16:10:52 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alan Forrester
Post by JAG
Here's the extra implication to the domain of 'philosphy of science' as
I see it.
Greetings to all.....
"How is 'experimental reasoning' about causes and effects itself
justified? In terms of deduction? that is impossible since the
conclusion of inductive arguments are not deductively derivable from
their premises. In terms of experimental reasoning? that is arguing
in circle."
-Hume
It isn't justified. Justification is unnecessary and impossible.
I can justify "experimental reasoning" in the computationalist theory
of mind (and matter).

I hope you agree that some justification can exist. I can justify, for
example, that there are no natural nulbers x and y, different from 0,
such that 2x^2 = y^2. I am pretty sure that you can justify this too
by yourself.
May be you are using "justification" is some other sense.
It seems to me, also, That Deustch does justify the belief in the MWI
from the two (four actually) slit experiments. I don't understand the
critics on justification and inductive inference, despite I do have
the feeling of sharing some critics on 'justificationism' and
'inductivism'.

Bruno
Post by Alan Forrester
See "The Beginning of Infinity" by David Deutsch and "Realism and
the Aim of Science" by Karl Popper.
Alan
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
Bruno Marchal
2013-02-17 16:04:27 UTC
Permalink
Post by JAG
Here's the extra implication to the domain of 'philosphy of science' as
I see it.
Greetings to all.....
not exactyly a respond to the topic discussed here but here is
another real-LEGIT implication to the domain of philosophy of
"How is 'experimental reasoning' about causes and effects itself
justified? In terms of deduction? that is impossible since the
conclusion of inductive arguments are not deductively derivable from
their premises. In terms of experimental reasoning? that is arguing
in circle."
Computationalism does illustrate why experimental reasoning can be
justified from some principle in philosophy/metaphysics/theology.

If you believe that the brain is Turing emulable, the physical reality
exists and consists in the sum of all possible (arithmetical)
computations going through your computational states.

The only mystery which remains is our belief in elementary arithmetic,
but this one, can be justified not being amenable to anything simpler.
It has to be a mystery, somehow.

Hume, unconsciously, assumed an Aristotelian conception of reality. I
think that we can doubt about it.

Bruno
Post by JAG
-Hume
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
JAG
2013-02-18 17:41:48 UTC
Permalink
Post by Bruno Marchal
Post by JAG
Here's the extra implication to the domain of 'philosphy of science' as
I see it.
Greetings to all.....
not exactyly a respond to the topic discussed here but here is
another real-LEGIT implication to the domain of philosophy of
"How is 'experimental reasoning' about causes and effects itself
justified? In terms of deduction? that is impossible since the
conclusion of inductive arguments are not deductively derivable from
their premises. In terms of experimental reasoning? that is arguing
in circle."
Computationalism does illustrate why experimental reasoning can be
justified from some principle in philosophy/metaphysics/theology.
If you believe that the brain is Turing emulable, the physical reality
exists and consists in the sum of all possible (arithmetical)
computations going through your computational states.
The only mystery which remains is our belief in elementary arithmetic,
but this one, can be justified not being amenable to anything simpler.
It has to be a mystery, somehow.
Hume, unconsciously, assumed an Aristotelian conception of reality. I
think that we can doubt about it.
Bruno
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
From a META-theoretical point of view 'Computationalism' could also *prove* how some methods and philosophies are truly outdated and problematic. ;)
"The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one from which a new tradition of normal science can emerge is far from a cumulative process ... Rather it is a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some of the field's most
elementary theoretical generalizations..."
-Thomas Kuhn
Bruno Marchal
2013-02-19 11:15:02 UTC
Permalink
Post by Bruno Marchal
Post by Bruno Marchal
Post by JAG
Here's the extra implication to the domain of 'philosphy of science' as
I see it.
Greetings to all.....
not exactyly a respond to the topic discussed here but here is
another real-LEGIT implication to the domain of philosophy of
"How is 'experimental reasoning' about causes and effects itself
justified? In terms of deduction? that is impossible since the
conclusion of inductive arguments are not deductively derivable from
their premises. In terms of experimental reasoning? that is arguing
in circle."
Computationalism does illustrate why experimental reasoning can be
justified from some principle in philosophy/metaphysics/theology.
If you believe that the brain is Turing emulable, the physical reality
exists and consists in the sum of all possible (arithmetical)
computations going through your computational states.
The only mystery which remains is our belief in elementary arithmetic,
but this one, can be justified not being amenable to anything simpler.
It has to be a mystery, somehow.
Hume, unconsciously, assumed an Aristotelian conception of reality. I
think that we can doubt about it.
Bruno
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
From a META-theoretical point of view 'Computationalism' could also
*prove* how some methods and philosophies are truly outdated and
problematic. ;)
Yes. That is how we can progress. I think we agree with David here.
Post by Bruno Marchal
"The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one from which a
new tradition of normal science can emerge is far from a cumulative
process ... Rather it is a reconstruction of the field from new
fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some of the field's most
elementary theoretical generalizations..."
-Thomas Kuhn
The best revolution are those which changes nothing, but the angle of
the points of view. It leads to simpler theories, with more
applications.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
Alan Forrester
2013-02-19 20:28:27 UTC
Permalink
Post by Bruno Marchal
Post by Bruno Marchal
Post by Bruno Marchal
Post by JAG
Here's the extra implication to the domain of 'philosphy of science' as
I see it.
Greetings to all.....
not exactyly a respond to the topic discussed here but here is
another real-LEGIT implication to the domain of philosophy of
"How is 'experimental reasoning' about causes and effects itself
justified? In terms of deduction? that is impossible since the
conclusion of inductive arguments are not deductively derivable from
their premises. In terms of experimental reasoning? that is arguing
in circle."
Computationalism does illustrate why experimental reasoning can be
justified from some principle in philosophy/metaphysics/theology.
If you believe that the brain is Turing emulable, the physical reality
exists and consists in the sum of all possible (arithmetical)
computations going through your computational states.
The only mystery which remains is our belief in elementary arithmetic,
but this one, can be justified not being amenable to anything simpler.
It has to be a mystery, somehow.
Hume, unconsciously, assumed an Aristotelian conception of reality. I
think that we can doubt about it.
Bruno
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
From a META-theoretical point of view 'Computationalism' could also
*prove* how some methods and philosophies are truly outdated and
problematic. ;)
Yes. That is how we can progress. I think we agree with David here.
David doesn't say that the theory of computation proves that anything is false. He has stated clearly that he does not think it is possible to prove ideas are true or probable. So this statement that you agree with David is false.

Alan
Bruno Marchal
2013-02-20 15:38:29 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alan Forrester
Post by Bruno Marchal
Post by Bruno Marchal
Post by Bruno Marchal
Post by JAG
Here's the extra implication to the domain of 'philosphy of science' as
I see it.
Greetings to all.....
not exactyly a respond to the topic discussed here but here is
another real-LEGIT implication to the domain of philosophy of
"How is 'experimental reasoning' about causes and effects itself
justified? In terms of deduction? that is impossible since the
conclusion of inductive arguments are not deductively derivable from
their premises. In terms of experimental reasoning? that is arguing
in circle."
Computationalism does illustrate why experimental reasoning can be
justified from some principle in philosophy/metaphysics/theology.
If you believe that the brain is Turing emulable, the physical reality
exists and consists in the sum of all possible (arithmetical)
computations going through your computational states.
The only mystery which remains is our belief in elementary arithmetic,
but this one, can be justified not being amenable to anything simpler.
It has to be a mystery, somehow.
Hume, unconsciously, assumed an Aristotelian conception of reality. I
think that we can doubt about it.
Bruno
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
From a META-theoretical point of view 'Computationalism' could also
*prove* how some methods and philosophies are truly outdated and
problematic. ;)
Yes. That is how we can progress. I think we agree with David here.
David doesn't say that the theory of computation proves that
anything is false. He has stated clearly that he does not think it
is possible to prove ideas are true or probable. So this statement
that you agree with David is false.
Computationalism does not prove anything true, it refutes, only, the
Aristotelian metaphysics, and thus physicalism, naturalism, and/or
materialism. David seems to not have yet study the refutation, and I
just said that we agree with David here, because David clearly agree
that we can learn through the refutation (and thus outdating) of old
theories.

Physicalism is refuted in the comp theory of mind. Not physics, but
the idea that there is a primary physical reality on which other
realities, like consciousness would emerge or be explained from
physics. On the contrary, with comp physics *has to be* reducible to
arithmetic, which is a simpler theory already part of physics. The
conceptual simplification is big, and is, assuming the brain is Turing
emulable at some level, unavoidable.

Bruno
Post by Alan Forrester
Alan
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

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